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BOCKSHAMMER

ON THE

FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN,

WITH

ADDITIONS

BY

A. KAUFMAN, JR.

Of the Theological Seminary, Andover.

Ζητῶ γὰρ τὴν ἀληθειαν, ὑπ' ἧς οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐβλάβη.
Marcus Antoninus.



ANDOVER:

PUBLISHED BY GOULD AND NEWMAN.


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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The Author of the present investigation has either no justifying reason to offer why his views on the Freedom of the human Will are here made known after so much has been thought and published by others, and why he may have chosen the most difficult of all problems of philosophy as the object of his first literary effort ;—or if he have, that justification must be found in the work itself. Hence all further anxiety to justify the undertaking before the public in a preface, or any effort to excuse it, must necessarily be superfluous, or would be vain. It only remains then that the preface attempt to bring the reader to an understanding with respect to some of the more external circumstances of the writing.

To him who at the very commencement may wish to come as quickly as possible to a clear knowledge of the book, it may, indeed, seem to be a deficiency, that it is not definitely announced at the beginning to what scientific system the author belongs. It is true that by making such a declaration the introductory survey might be rendered more easy and clear, there would be an anticipation of the results, and in general an immediate classification might be made. But this small inconvenience was unavoidable from the circumstance that the Author did not start out from any finished system either of another's or of his own; nor was it his design simply to set forth results previously determined upon, and to encompass them with proofs. His purpose was rather to search out results themselves and to deduce them from the investigation. Although not now philosophizing for the first time, yet the Author believed that as he had undertaken to consider the Freedom of the Will anew, it was obligatory upon him to preserve the freedom of investigation also as pure as might be. Philosophical *Principles*, however, from which one can proceed to conclusions, have always appeared to him to be something entirely different from prepared *Forms* into which the thoughts are to be moulded. Much rather are these principles productive, when, like germs, they are still enveloped,

and from which, in proportion to the energy of their plastic power, the growth of scientific knowing may develop itself organically.

In the present condition of science the thoughts and discoveries of earlier inquirers unquestionably belong to the elements and conditions of this developing process ; and although the names of authors and the titles of books are not here quoted, yet whatever of others the present writing may have appropriated to itself, it does not for that reason deny, but would expressly acknowledge.

The Author found it necessary to dwell more circumstantially upon Schelling's work on the Essence of human Freedom, inasmuch as a scientific examination of that object would of itself more than once lead to a consideration of the work named ; and the more so, since it not only treats fully of freedom itself and the most important objects kindred with it, but also stands in the strictest connexion with the whole of a peculiar scientific system, whose influence upon the age cannot be misapprehended, and in reference to which to be ignorant, or to act as if ignorant, would, to say the least, not be compatible with a living interest in the present state of German Science.

Without being numbered either among the disciples or the opposers of Schelling's philosophy, the Author

places an infinite value in pursuing fearlessly his own convictions. He believes that he has brought considerations not unimportant against some peculiar tendencies of Schelling's theory of Freedom; and he did this openly with no other design than that which lies at the heart of all the friends of science, viz. that truth might be promoted. But still in the exercise of an unquestionable right he feels assured that duty has not been violated, nor did he ever lose sight of the regard due to that scientific man.

Besides, it were to be wished, (and the present essay may at least contribute a share to occasion it,) that some impartial judge skilled in the system might subject the philosophical views of Schelling, especially his theory of Freedom in its strict connexion with other the most important objects of religion and philosophy, to a more thorough and scrutinizing examination, than from the nature of the case could have been undertaken by his friends or enemies immediately after the publication of the first impression when all was yet excitement.

Buttenhausen, July 24, 1820.

GUSTAVUS FERDINAND BOCKSHAMMER.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

As the Author of the following Essay, when presenting it to the learned of Germany where works of science and deep thought abound much more than with us, did not think proper to offer any other justification of his procedure than what was to be found in the essay itself, it is certain that were he still living he would feel not indebtedness to the Translator, if, in offering it the lovers of philosophical discussion in his own country, he should presume to accompany it with a laboured apology. The Essay must, therefore, be left to cary within itself its own apology, or its condemnation. It may be observed in general terms, however, that the points brought to view in the following pages are discussed with modesty but yet with manliness. The essay is short but comprehensive, comprising all the most important objects connected with the Will. It does not pursue out into all their ramifications and detail the topics started, but abounds rather in first principles. Like the writings of Lord Bacon "it is full of the seeds of things." Professor Tholuck of Halle, so well and so favourably known in this country both as a scholar and a Christian, and not less as a

deep thinker, pronounces this essay one of the most remarkable and excellent productions of the times.

Of the writer himself but little is known. Winer, in his *Manual of Theological Literature*, states simply that he was a Pastor in the village of Bittenhausen in Würtemberg. He died in 1822. The presumption is that at his death he was yet a young man. In addition to the writing here translated, he wrote another work somewhat larger, entitled *Revelation and Theology*, which is quoted with high approbation in his native country. In religion and philosophy the Author belonged to the same general class with Schleiermacher, Neander, Olshausen, Heinroth, Twisten, Tholuck, Hengstenberg, and others, whose writings are in Germany every day exerting a more wide-spread and salutary influence upon the philosophy and religion of that interesting people. Among these Christian Philosophers in the truest and best sense, or *Mystics* as they are sometimes styled by the opposing Rationalists, our Author stood forth as a philosophical theologian of energy and thought ;—one who soon attained the maturity of his powers and was soon gathered to the grave. From the specimens of originality and depth which he furnished, Science had reason to deplore his loss.

The constant aim of the Translator has been to present the precise views of his author ; in no case to thrust in any thoughts of his own, nor in any case to leave out any important thought. In doing this, however, original sentences have oftentimes been

divided into two or three ; oftentimes words have been repeated to keep up the logical connexion, and not unfrequently words and whole clauses added to make the sense complete. Explanatory phrases have in some cases been added when the original was so concise and idiomatic as not to be intelligible if literally translated ; and all that is found in brackets is from the Translator.

If, in thus endeavouring to show faithfulness to the Author, free use has sometimes been made with the English language, it is hoped that this will be pardoned by the discriminating reader. The language of German philosophy has much more of vigour and conciseness than ours ; it was, therefore, sometimes found necessary to adopt words and phrases not in ordinary use, or else to choose the more problematical course of employing diluting periphrases. To transfuse all the freshness of the original into a translation were impossible ; to impart to it the same energy, or to clothe it with the same precision, would be equally difficult. But those who are incapable of the pleasure of using the original, will, it is hoped, be content to receive these thoughts in a form somewhat less elegant and precise.

If the Translator has in any case not been able to give an energetic and perspicuous sense, or to convey the precise shade of his Author's meaning, or even in some cases to have failed in apprehending it, he would in these items also bespeak the favour of the learned reader. And he feels assured that those will be most ready to exercise charity who are best acquainted with

the intrinsic difficulty of discoursing with accuracy on spiritual topics generally, and the augmentation of that difficulty when attempting to transfer into English, an essay on the Freedom of the Will, written in the peculiar and nervous language of German Transcendental Metaphysic. He conceives that his claim to mildness is the better grounded, from the circumstance that he has ventured upon a comparatively new sphere. Whilst German Literature in general is cultivated with enthusiasm, and their historians and poets are translated in abundance, German Philosophy is but little studied ; or if it be, no one is yet known to have undertaken and succeeded in translating into English any complete work.

Our language does not even furnish a means of acquiring a knowledge of the general scope and tendency of German Philosophy. The English reader may in his own language acquaint himself with the splendid creations of Klopstock and Goethe, or pursue the classic narrations of Schiller and Niebuhr, whilst Fichte, and Schelling, and Jacobi, and Schleiermacher, and Schultz, must be entirely unknown to him unless he have recourse to the originals. In the last century Mr. Nitsch¹ and Dr. Willich,² two dis-

¹ A general and introductory view of Professor Kant's principles concerning man, the world and the Deity, &c. by F. A. Nitsch, Lond. 1796.

² Elements of the Critical Philosophy, containing a concise account of its origin and tendency ; a view of all the works published by its founder, Professor Immanuel Kant, &c. by A. F. M. Willich, M. D. Lond. 1798.

ciples and pupils of Kant, published in England a digest of the leading principles of their great Master ; but these works are necessarily meagre, having been written before the principles of the New Philosophy had been fully developed and scrutinized. Their terminology, too, has been in a great measure superseded by the adoption of a better nomenclature. The latter of the two works named is principally occupied with a brief historical Introduction to the rise of Transcendentalism, and in giving a catalogue of Kant's works together with an analysis of their contents. Madame De Staël's survey of German Philosophy is more rich and interesting, but it is still designed for the general reader alone.

Stewart's view of the German School was, with the exception of one of Kant's first essays written in Latin and entitled *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis*, according to his own statement, derived from second or third hand. It is of course imperfect. A number of elaborate articles on the Kantian Philosophy have appeared in the *Encyclopædia Londinensis*, of which, taken as a whole, we here forbear to say any thing. Some parts are good, and may afford considerable aid to the student. Tenne-
mann's *Grundriss* has been translated into English by Mr. Johnson, fellow of Wadham College, England ; this work we have not seen, and from personal examination therefore can neither affirm nor deny any thing in regard to its worth. But judging from the specimens furnished by the Edinburgh Quarterly for October 1832,


we should think it would not be of much service to one who wished to become acquainted with the peculiarities of the Critical School. Coleridge's Writings afford the best introduction to the study of German Philosophy. He had much of the German spirit, and often employs German terms. Yet he was by no means bound to the Germans ; for instead of translating their works or retailing their speculations, he drew his thoughts from the depth and fullness of his own exhaustless mind.

Without making pretensions to any thing like an accurate knowledge of the history, or of the compass and complement of German Philosophy, the Translator would still hope that his additions have thrown some light upon certain points and allusions in the Essay which might otherwise have been unintelligible to the mere English scholar. The appendix and all the notes are from him. They are generally intended to be illustrative ; in some few cases they are confirmatory of the views advanced by the Author. Many of the extracts added are from rare works ; they serve to show the accordance of thought between thinking men, and are conceived to add interest to the discussion.

That this little work may aid its reader to obtain a more living insight into himself and nature ; that it may be promotive of a spiritual religion subjectively, and of christian energy in action, is the only wish of

THE TRANSLATOR.

Andover, Feb. 1835.



FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

MIGHT it not be better to omit all profound investigations on the Freedom of the human Will, and adhere simply to that which is certain and indisputable, viz. to conscience and moral feeling, without being disturbed with doubts or metaphysical difficulties? This question presents itself at the threshold of our inquiry, and in so far as it concerns practical life we might readily answer it in the affirmative. To science, however, this sphere of investigation must ever remain open, because the direct and leading aim of science is not action, but truth, and the connexion of knowledge. —Happy may he be esteemed who has never heard of a free or an unfree Will; and who, faithfully following his inward consciousness of right and wrong, calmly pursues the right, without permitting himself, even for one moment, to be perplexed in regard to the question of liberty. When the time of action arrives even the Philosopher forgets his system, with which he finds it so difficult to incorporate empirical¹ freedom; and, if in

¹ In English the word Empiric is now generally used to designate an ignorant pretender to medical skill. But in German Philosophy the corresponding adjective is employ-

other respects a man, in word and deed he pursues that course, which without any subtilties he knows it

ed with a very different significance. It there means that which belongs to experience, what rests upon experience, what is derived from experience, a posteriori ;—Empirism, the knowledge of experience. As an equivalent term experimental is, perhaps, of more frequent use with us ; but empirical is more philosophic, and by no means unused or unauthorized. Empirical freedom, then, is that freedom of which we feel conscious in all the actions of daily life, without inquiring into the grounds on which that freedom rests ; without inquiring whether the Will is self-active and self-determinant, or whether all its acts take place in accordance with a necessitated and pre-established law ; without deciding whether that apparent freedom may not yet be but the gradual unfolding of a hidden mechanism, or whether all acts be not the results of Divine efficiency, or whether they may not be produced through objective motives according to the changeless law of cause and effect. In philosophy and the art of healing, an Empiric is the opposite of a Rationalist ; one who attends simply to the notices of nature instead of searching out the reasons of them. Even the etymology of the word would indicate this meaning ; and in the third century there existed a school of Greek physicians who did not refuse to bear the name of Empirics. They rejected the speculations and subtilties of preceding physicians ; they went back to experience, and rested entirely upon her decisions.—As Kant has given currency to this word in more recent speculations, the meaning which he attached to it may be seen from the following statement of his views. “ He presupposed philosophy and mathematics to be, in regard to their origin, rational sciences, or sciences of reason.

to be his duty to pursue. Thus Luther *acted* with efficiency and as a man who was free; yet in his *speculative* moments he maintained the doctrine of a *ser-vum arbitrium*. But on this very account the Metaphysician should be allowed fearlessly to pursue within their legitimate bounds, his inquiries on this object of human knowledge; and this, too, without being made answerable for the results, should they, in the event, prove any less favourable to empirical freedom. Many a one, contrary to his design and with a resisting heart,

Rational knowledge is distinguished from *EMPIRICAL* by its character of *necessity* and *universality*. With the possibility of the same stands or falls the possibility of philosophical knowledge, which is of two kinds—synthetic and analytic. The latter rests upon the first law of thought [i. e. the principle of contradiction]; but what is the principle of synthetic knowledge a priori in opposition to *empirical*, the ground of which is perception? The existence of such knowledge is warranted by the existence of mathematics, and even of common knowledge; and in Metaphysics the reflexive effort of reason is chiefly directed to its realization. There is, therefore, a science in the highest degree necessary and of the greatest importance, which, on principles, inquires into the possibility of such knowledge as well as into its grounds and employment." *Empirical* knowledge, then, is dependent upon perception; rational science is associated with an inner Faculty; and as the latter involves unity, necessity and universality, so the former is characterized as that which is fragmentary, conditional and limited. See Tennemann's *Grundriss der Gesch. der Phil.* § 381. p. 467. also *Conversations-Lexikon*, art. Empirismus. TR.

is, by the irresistible current of his thoughts, forced to adopt his philosophical *theory* of freedom ; and he is thus brought to the melancholy experience that the process of knowledge even is oftentimes subject to destiny. Contemplation has its pains as well as its pleasures ; and it is therefore no ground of accusation against the calm and reflecting Inquirer, if, by the strictly interlinked chain of his thoughts, he finds himself led to the adoption of views which seem to correspond neither to his own nor to the feelings of others. A Science too, which, like speculative philosophy, inquires after the ultimate grounds of things and of knowledge, and the whole vitality of which consists in acts of apprehension or cognition, cannot at the same time have in view another principle end separate from these cognitive acts. Moreover what is thought or written on this point is inaccessible to the multitude, and of a consequence cannot exert any evil influence upon daily life ; so that the fears commonly entertained in regard to the practical tendency of such an inquiry are groundless, and the censuring cavils sometimes urged against it are unjust and out of place.

He who is accustomed to reflect, who is in the habit of inquiring after ultimate grounds, and who has come to the living consciousness of an opposition which when once awakened must be satisfied—for him the question in reference to the essential character of human freedom, and how the same may be reconciled with belief in God, and with the assumption of an eternal order of events as they take place in the world, even on account of its difficulty possesses a high attraction,

and upon the whole cannot be passed over. Urged by his inmost feeling to attribute to himself and to others, now guilt and now merit, and obliged also by his conscience to recognize human action as free, every honest Inquirer must surely wish to see this assumption of freedom brought to accord with the remaining requisitions of his spirit, with his views of God and nature; or at least to see it defended against the difficulties and apparent contradictions which unavoidably force themselves upon his consideration. Wherever a spirit of investigation exists, there the question in regard to liberty is inevitable; that is, human reason in the progress of its inquiries is necessarily forced upon it. Every investigation of nature points, as it were unconsciously, to man, in whom the earthly nature attains its perfection; but in whom there is at the same time found a higher, an un-earthly nature, which appears to be as much elevated above mere organic life as this is superior to blind motion effected by attraction and the power of gravity. Making Nature, therefore, the starting point, reflection seeks to arrive at Intelligence; the Material must resolve itself into the Spiritual, Necessity must be lost in Freedom. A similar problem presents itself for solution to the Historian and the Poet. For that which is called the History of the World is something more than the fixed course of fate and necessity, in that its great and truly elevating portion, the Tragic of History, consists in the self-subsistent striving of the will against such fixed course;—in the conflict between Liberty and Necessity. For which reason Poetry also, were

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we are Every generation of men
 will have its own history
 the history of the world
 is the history of the human mind
 the history of the human soul
 the history of the human heart
 the history of the human spirit

it not for this indestructible co-existence of both Liberty and Necessity, now in conflict with each other and now meeting in perfect concord, would be deprived of its animating principle, and would necessarily degenerate into spiritlessness or rather sink into death. The purely spiritual efforts of man, his converse with Ideas,¹

¹ For half a century past the word *idea* has been used by English writers with great indeterminateness and in such a way as to cause much confusion of thought. They speak of the *idea* of a tree, a dog, a poem, a circle, the free will, the soul, immortality and God. I have an *idea* that A has no *idea* of the nature of an *idea*. The Critical Philosophy has attempted to rescue the word from this promiscuous and indefinite use, and to appropriate it exclusively to *objects of Reason*, as opposed to *objects of the Understanding*, which are designated by the term Conception. Intuition marks the *immediate* object of the outer or inner sense, of understanding or imagination. An Idea is equally removed from fact, notion, image and sensation. Of this character is the idea of the Perfect, of Eternity, of God, of Holiness, of Beauty, of mathematical and moral Truth. To those who are not unwilling to be at the trouble of fixing determinately the meaning of phrases, or of learning the history of a word, the following extracts may not be unacceptable :

“The word ἰδέα, in its original sense, as used by Pindar, Aristophanes, and in the gospel of Matthew, represented the visual abstraction of a distant object, when we see the whole without distinguishing its parts. Plato adopted it as a technical term, and as the antithesis to εἰδωλα, or sensuous images ; the transient and perishable emblems, or mental words, of ideas. The ideas themselves he considered as mysterious powers, living, seminal, formative, and exempt from time. In

or his endeavour to apprehend, by contemplation, the laws of that higher necessity by which all things have

this sense the word became the property of the Platonic school; and it seldom occurs in Aristotle, without some such phrase annexed to it, as, according to Plato, or as Plato says. Our English writers to the end of Charles 2nd's reign, or somewhat later, employed it either in the original sense, or Platonically, or in a sense nearly correspondent to our present use of the substantive, Ideal, always, however, opposing it, more or less, to image, whether of present or absent objects. The reader will not be displeased with the following interesting exemplification from Bishop Jeremy Taylor: 'St. Lewis the king sent Ivo bishop of Chartres on an embassy, and he told, that he met a grave and stately matron on the way, with a censer of fire in the one hand, and a vessel of water in the other; on observing her to have a melancholy, religious and phantastic deportment and look, he asked her what those symbols meant, and what she meant to do with her fire and water; she answered, my purpose is with the fire to burn paradise, and with my water to quench the flames of hell, that men may serve God purely for the love of God. But we rarely meet with such spirits, which love virtue so metaphysically as *to abstract from her all sensible composition, and love the purity of the IDEA.*' Des Cartes having introduced into his philosophy the fanciful hypothesis of *material ideas*, or certain configurations of the brain, which are so many moulds to the influxes of the external world; Mr. Locke adopted the term, but extended the signification to whatever is the immediate object of the mind's attention or consciousness. Mr. Hume, distinguishing those representations which are accompanied with a sense of a present object, from those reproduced by the mind itself,

their being, could not proceed one step, nay could not begin to be, without the most free self-subsistent act of the spirit. Or is it not a breaking away from those inward sensations that succeed each other according to natural laws, and at the same time a rising above the chain of external phenomena, which first brings man to himself, and which marks especially the condition of the philosophizing mind? For him upon whom the question does not force itself, it is, perhaps, not of much importance to action (Morality) to decide whether Reason,¹ whilst it prescribes laws, may

designated the former by *impressions*, and confined the word *Idea* to the latter." *Biographia Literaria*, 2d ed. p. 64. See further Appendix [A.] TR.

¹ It is well known that in German Metaphysics, as well as by the Old English writers and some of a more recent date, a broad distinction is made between Reason and the Understanding. The latter faculty is busied with the things of sense, is occupied with perceiving, arranging, classifying and combining the varied phenomena of nature, and is concerned with the affairs of daily life; the former, from individual data given, rises to an apprehension of the universal, and lives in the infinite and the eternal. "The faculty of thought manifests itself both as Understanding and as Reason. By the *understanding* we inquire after and investigate the grounds, causes and conditions of our representations, feelings and desires, and of those objects standing in immediate connexion with them; by *reason* we inquire after *ultimate* grounds, causes and conditions. Reason strives after the comprehension of all that is known in the Unconditioned and the Absolute. By the understanding we evolve rules for the

not on the other hand be determined by reciprocal influences, and whether, therefore, in a higher sense it

regulation of our desiring faculty; by reason we subordinate these rules to a higher Law—to a law which determines the unconditioned form, the highest end of acting. Through the power of thought, therefore, our knowledge both theoretic and practical, is comprehended in unity, connexion and in being." Tennemann's Grundriss § 41. p. 30.

"By the UNDERSTANDING, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming *judgments* on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure REASON, I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles, (the eternal verities of Plato and Des Cartes) and of ideas, (N. B. not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle of Mathematics; and of Justice, Holiness, Free-Will, &c. in Morals. Hence in works of pure Science the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning; in other works they more aptly form the conclusion.

"To many of my readers it will, I trust, be some recommendation of these distinctions, that they are more than once expressed, and every where supposed, in the writings of St. Paul. I have no hesitation in undertaking to prove, that every Heresy which has disquieted the Christian Church, from Tritheism to Socinianism, has originated in, and supported itself by, arguments rendered plausible only by the confusion of these faculties, and thus demanding for the objects of one, a sort of evidence appropriated to those of another faculty.—These disquisitions have the misfortune of being in ill-report, as dry and unsatisfactory; but I hope, in the course of the work, to gain them a better character—and if elucidations of their practical importance from the

may not itself be unfree; but nevertheless this view accords not with the demands and the strong moral feeling of an inquiring mind, for which it is not sufficient that the willing man *imagines* only that he performs his own act, whilst yet with his inmost self he is, on that supposition, but the instrument of developing a concealed Necessity. If therefore transcendental¹

most momentous events of History, can render them interesting, to give them that interest at least. Besides, there is surely some good in the knowledge of Truth as Truth—(we were not made to live by bread alone) and in the strengthening of the intellect. It is an excellent remark of Scaliger, ‘*Harum indagatio Subtilitatum, etsi non est utilis ad machinas farinarias conficiendas, exuit animum tamen incitiæ rubigine acuitque ad alia.*’ Scalig. Exerc. 307. § 3. i. e. The investigation of these subtilties, though it is of no use to the construction of machines to grind corn with, yet clears the mind from the rust of ignorance, and sharpens it for other things.” *Friend*, p. 150, 151. Tr.

¹As Reason is distinguished from Understanding, Idea from Conception, Subject from Object, so TRANSCENDENTAL stands opposed to *Empirical*. “There is a *philosophic* (and inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an *artificial*) *consciousness*, which lies beneath, or, (as it were) *behind* the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings. As the elder Romans distinguished their northern provinces into Cis-Alpine and Trans-Alpine, so may we divide all the objects of human knowledge into those on this side, and those on the other side of the spontaneous consciousness; *citra et trans conscientiam communem*. The latter is exclusively the domain of *PURE* philosophy, which

freedom were given up, it would be impossible, for the critical Inquirer at least, to be satisfactorily assured of practical freedom; for, (although it might be possible for the spirit to tolerate it) he could not peacefully or indifferently suffer a continual inward dissension, the thorn of a contradiction lying in the depth of his personal being. Moreover the well known expedient to be resorted to in such a case could not long afford satisfaction, that is, in theoretical philosophy, to permit the thing to rest upon itself, and to give up the question about freedom; but on the contrary, in practical philosophy, to recognize reason as prescribing laws (that is as free), or, for the behoof of action, to postulate this freedom. Because, in order to be satisfied as to the correctness of such a view, it would be demanded that there should be two kinds of reason, one for action and another for thought; and so related too, that neither could have any knowledge of the other.¹

Hence it is that the human spirit has continually repeated the attempt to solve the riddle of freedom, and that those given to reflection are led, as it were by an instinctive impulse, to exercise their power upon

is, therefore, properly entitled *transcendental*, in order to discriminate it at once, both from mere reflection and *re-presentation* on the one hand, and on the other from those flights of lawless speculation, which, abandoned by *all* distinct consciousness, because transgressing the bounds and purposes of our intellectual faculties, are justly condemned as *transcendent*." *Lit. Biog.* p. 143. Tr.

¹ See Appendix [B.]

this dark and difficult point ; for partly the very difficulty of the problem renders it the more powerfully attractive, and induces renewed and continued efforts, and partly also the connexion of this problem with other the noblest and dearest objects of philosophy, makes some kind of answer to it in the highest degree desirable to those engaged in speculation.

But the problem which is here the subject of discourse appears, like so many others presented to our consideration, in its nature to belong to the infinite ; and in this respect a remarkable analogy reigns between it and the kindred problem of the practical philosophy which proposes holiness as its end. And although it is impossible for us at once to attain perfect holiness, still it is our imperative duty to be forever approximating towards it. As now in this case which concerns our *practice*, the greatness of the problem would by no means justify us in despairing of its solution, nor excuse any irresolution in our efforts for its attainment, but rather demands, and imposes upon us obligations to use, the more untiring zeal and higher efforts, whilst at the same time it inexorably destroys the fond illusion which would ever persuade us that we have reached the goal ; even thus is it in respect to the limits of our *knowledge* on the subject now before us. So that there is no contradiction whatever in regarding it as impossible to give at once a full and satisfactory solution of all the difficulties pertaining to this question, and yet to venture with delight and hope to tread in the path that stretches forward in endless prospect be-

fore us. The pleasure of speculation and the happiness of the Inquirer consist to a great degree in this, that as soon as one boundary is attained, immediately another, from the darkness of a still greater distance, emerges as it were, and invites on to renewed exertions. We admit that this very peculiarity passes with us for an irrefragable proof of the indestructibility of the spirit of man ; and in an especial manner do we feel that the present life, were it deprived of this reflection of the infinite, would be to us worthless and exceedingly insipid.

In view of these things it is proper, if possible, to contribute somewhat to the system of knowledge and science, which nevertheless always remains imperfect ; and it is fit that every one, not entirely unversed in the things of philosophy, should be able to appreciate the labours of others, and also by his own labours to gain respect for himself.

Although the fact of the feeling of freedom as it makes itself known in the moral consciousness cannot in general be denied, and although all feel themselves compelled to recognize or presuppose man to be free, in so far as he acts, yet at the very commencement of this investigation a not unimportant difficulty presents itself before us ; that namely, of finding a precise scientific expression to designate this feeling which manifests itself in all. For notwithstanding that all feel themselves to be free, still all do not therefore know what Freedom is ;—and the progress of this inquiry depends not a little on the preliminary conception which we

form of freedom. Without noticing separately and by name all the different definitions of Liberty which have been given, we remark simply that two classes of them seem to us as especially worthy of attention. Not a few make the essence of freedom to consist in the preponderance of the Intelligential over the Animal, and consequently describe it as the Dominion of the Spirit over the desires and lustful passions. Others, however, less advantageously indeed, but adhering more faithfully to its empirical manifestation, represent freedom as the Ability to Good and Evil. Those first named appear to describe freedom in the manner mentioned, either to point out under what form, according to their view, true freedom should exhibit itself, as they well feel that human dignity consists in rising superiour to the influence of sensual gratifications; or else they do it to avoid the difficulty, in which the assumption that an ability to evil is derived from God, necessarily involves us. But in their endeavour to avoid this difficulty they fall into another not less important, since on their supposition it now becomes impossible to explain existent evil from the freedom of the will, and they must be unavoidably driven either to the denial of evil, that is of immorality, in so far as it is imputable to the creature, or else to the denial of freedom, as arbitrary election (the faculty of choice, volition). For if man were free only in proportion as he reigns over his lustful passions and desires, then in the opposite respect he would be proportionally unfree; so that were this definition correct, it would be proper indeed to speak of the freedom of good persons, but not of the

freedom of bad ones. But it is plain that this would be the same as to take away the right of imputing evil ; and consequently it would destroy evil itself, as moral evil, in so far at least as it has respect to man. So on the other hand, if we called freedom the dominion of Intelligence, we should still have to inquire in the first place after the freedom of this freedom. We may indeed in a noble sense of the word pronounce that man to be really free who has attained the dominion over his lusts and passions, and who makes goodness the regulative principle of his life. But every one immediately perceives that the above expression is but another term for purity or holiness ; in regard to this holiness, however, the question now first arises, did man attain it by his own free election, and consequently by a self-determination which rejected the opposite course that might have been taken ;¹ or in other words, is

¹ By many we are told that such a course were impossible ; that every state in which we find ourselves, or every act which we perform, is the necessary result of a concatenation of antecedent causes, natural or moral, or both combined, and to suppose that we might have been otherwise, or that we might have acted differently, all things considered, would be as absurd as to suppose that we might put our hands into the fire without being burned. "A volition, or determination, [or act of Will] when freed from the mystery in which it has been too generally involved, is found to be nothing more than a desire—a state of mind which can no more arise without a cause, than a sensation or perception ;—and a state of mind, which must infallibly arise, I may add, in the circumstances which are adapted to produce

that holiness and dominion of the spirit his *act* or only his *good fortune*?—After all that others have said on

it, as the feeling of fragrance, when the odoriferous particles of a rose are brought into contact with the organ. * * * *

To exhibit it as a matter of choice with us whether we will submit to the influence of motives, when their moral power is discerned by the mind, is equivalent with stating that the mind chooses whether it will receive sensation in the case referred to—than which few things can be more absurd.” *Payne’s Elements*, p. 371.

Not so the profound Author of the Ecclesiastical Polity : “ Man in the perfection of nature being made according to the likeness of his Maker, resembleth him also in the manner of working ; so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do willingly work and freely : neither are we according to the manner of natural agents any way so tied, but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone. The good which either is gotten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing itself, causeth not action, unless apprehending it as good we so like and desire it. That we do unto any such end, the same we choose and prefer before the leaving of it undone. Choice there is not, unless the thing we take be so in our power, that we might have refused and left it. If fire consumeth the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose, is to will one thing before another ; and to will, is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding, and the light of that eye is Reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, Knowledge and Will ; which Will, in things tending towards any end, is termed choice.” *Hooker*, Bk. I. Tr.

this point, especially after what has been remarked in reference to it by Schelling in his work entitled "PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES RESPECTING THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM,"¹ we presume that nothing more need be added in order to show that freedom, in and of itself, is something else than the dominion of Intelligence; and that evil cannot be made to consist in the mere feebleness of the intelligential principle, much less in the want of freedom.

In one point, however, there is an agreement between that definition of freedom which has already been considered, and that other given by Schelling. The agreement consists in this, that both definitions primarily have respect to the *use* of freedom; the first expresses the manner in which freedom *should* be used, whilst the last named Inquirer had in mind the principal manifestations of empirical freedom, as they stand opposed to each other. But in regard to both of these views it may justly be asked, whether, if freedom were defined according to its exercises only, the Idea itself would not be ravished from our sight, and merely separate empirical phenomena substituted instead of it? No doubt the word freedom in its primary and literal sense expresses a negative conception, namely, the absence of all force or compulsion; and this universal and essential characteristic of freedom must be found connected with all free actions under whatever variety of outward circumstances they may

¹ Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit.

be performed. On the contrary, those empirical phenomena, which in the above named definitions have been adduced as marks of freedom, are not to be met with in every manifestation of free will ; whilst, therefore, they belong to the history of freedom, they are not such essential and immutable criteria as to be of any service in forming a scientific definition of it considered in itself. That only which cannot be absent from any free will, whatever may be its other condition and relations, that alone is really essential to the nature of freedom, and that alone may be used for its definition. As the dominion of the Intelligential over the Animal, freedom is too narrowly defined, because by this definition all the wicked would be excluded from the class of the free. That definition which declares freedom to be an Ability to good or Evil, also appears unsuitable and erroneous ; for this representation leaves it entirely undecided whether the Good and the Evil result from election and self-determination, or whether they are the products of Divine appointment and necessity ;—so that here is missing that very attribute without which freedom cannot at all be conceived of. Besides, the original and archetypal freedom, that is, the freedom of God, lies entirely without the bounds of this definition, since an ability to evil taken in its real and literal sense, cannot at all belong to Him. Even to the higher un-fallen spirits an ability to evil could only be figuratively ascribed, and in a sense very limited. But since the word can by no means be used in its literal sense with respect to God, nor be so taken as when we speak of

an ability to fly or of an ability to think, and understand by the expression a natural power or constitution from which thought and flying proceed according to established laws ; so it is clear that in this sense human freedom is also incorrectly defined to be an Ability to Good and Evil. Such a conception of freedom were rather a kind of fixed tendency to both Good and Evil as already comprehended in it ; but it would effectually exclude all real liberty. Good as well as evil, as such, does not lie in freedom itself ; opposed to each other, both arise as the consequence of a determinate freedom, that is, of the freedom of man. From its false use, (of which hereafter,) springs evil, which, consequently, is not to be sought in the ability itself, much less in the pure Idea. Hence the predicates Good, morally Good, are never applied to the free Will ; they first arise from a determined mode of its use. Freedom must indeed in itself always be regarded as a Good, since it is the necessary condition of man's higher nature, of his spiritual personality. In the higher domain of spiritual being, however, the activity of the Will is by no means restricted to an election between good and evil ; and hence that definition which limits the Will's freedom to this one point does but imperfectly enumerate its modes of action. The power of the will exhibits itself in such original activities of Mind as have no reference whatever to morality or immorality ; nay, which operate for themselves before all moral law, and entirely independent of it. This is the case with the act of pure self-consciousness, and generally with that ten-

dency which the spirit takes in its higher scientific exertions. In this pure Willing, that is, in the original energy of the spirit acting from itself, nothing is contained which in any, even the most remote sense, can as yet be called evil. Were this the case, then indeed evil would be associated in our very conception of freedom ; but this again would immediately destroy the conception itself, and evil would have to be explained as a product of nature, that is, as necessary. If by the term ability be meant a power real and actual, then an ability to good, as such, must be already good, and an ability to evil, as such, must already be evil ; whence it would follow that there is no freedom at all, but the necessity to become not one of the two, good or evil, but *both* at the same time and in the same manner. There is always a certain indeterminateness, or rather an actual double sense in the expression, that freedom is an ability to good and to evil. For if by the phrase nothing more is intended to be affirmed than that by means of freedom man has in his power the possibility not of moral good only but of moral evil also ; this is indeed an incontestible analytic truth, yet is it in no sense a definition of the free will, but only a consequence developed from our conception of freedom. But if by the expression it be understood that an ability, or (according to the examples above used,) a natural constitution and adaptedness to evil as well as to good, constitutes the essential characteristic of freedom ; then indeed evil must spring from freedom itself, not in the way of an accompaniment, (as, under given circum-

stances, sickness from health,) but always and necessarily. Against such a view what has hitherto been said seems valid, and in general it may be urged against it, that this definition of liberty involves not only the impossibility of its derivation from the Will of a personal God, but also the necessity of evil.

Negatively expressed, Freedom is to be regarded as the absence of all force or compulsion ; positively, as Conscious Self-determination, in which there is given a spiritual Personality or Self-subsistence. The Will is a Conscious Energy, the fountain of actions which spring from the union of powers towards objects and designs. It is originally both the mover and the connecting bond of powers, whereby arises a spiritual and personal life ; hence one may correctly characterize the Spirit as ascending Will. Immediately and simultaneously with the I, exists also the will ; and conversely, where there is no Will there is no Personality, because where this is wanting, rude power may operate, passion and instinct may reign, but no conscious energy regulating itself with self-subsistent determination and design. An unconscious will were a contradiction destructive of itself. All that could be intended by it would be to mark a blind appetency, and it might be compared to the force and impulse of the excited elements.

It were strange, and would betray but little knowledge of that self-subsistent power which lies in the spirit, if the state of desiring and the act of willing were confounded with each other, or if both were used as words of synonymous import. Desire is the very op-

posite of the will, inasmuch as the two reciprocally strive to limit each other, yea rather to destroy each other. Appetite, as hunger or thirst, involuntarily springing up from the deep ground of mere feeling and from a sensible need, has its sole attraction towards self, and seeks to satisfy itself, and in its ascendancy indicates an absence or rather a passiveness of the Will and of Intelligence. Hence the *desirous* man (or man in a state of desire,) is not only something very different from the *willing* man, but the direct contrary of him.¹

¹ And yet two writers on the Philosophy of Mind, most popular with us, strenuously maintain the sameness of will and desire. "The determination of the mind never is, and never can be, to do what, in the particular circumstances of the moment, we do not desire to do."—"What is termed *will*, is a *desire* following directly another desire; but it has this circumstance in common with many other desires, which rise one from the other, and are not considered as involving on that account any peculiar quality. The indolent sensualist, for example, who knows the extent of command over the various objects of luxurious accommodation which wealth confers, may have wishes as various as the luxuries of which he thinks; and the desire of any one of these may be *instantly* followed by the desire of that which he knows to be necessary for the gratification of it,—as instantly, as, when the very delicacy which his appetite has sought is placed before him, his will to extend his arm to it seems itself, in its quick subsequence, to be almost a part of the earlier desire of enjoying what is within his reach, so as to require only the rapid intermediate effort." *Brown on Cause and Effect*, p. 38, 39.

Whilst in desire there is necessarily commingled a feeling of dependence, the will is accompanied with the feeling of independence. This last state, however,

“On various accounts certain actions, i. e. certain motions of some of the bodily members, may be regarded in the light of a good, and so become objects of desire. But as the actual motions follow instantly, by Divine appointment, our desires to perform them, these desires perish, of course, in the moment of their birth. It is to desires of this kind that we give the name of Volitions; but they are not specifically different from our permanent desires—all of which, but for the circumstance of their permanence, would be denominated Volitions.” “There is, then, no radical difference between will and desire.” *Payne's Elements*, p. 365, 370. Thus no distinction is here recognized between the Will, volitions and desires. Indeed writers generally, who in their leading characteristics belong to this school of philosophy, do not seem to admit any radical distinction in fact, (although they do in words,) between acts of the will and desires, inasmuch as they represent all appetites, sensations, propensities, desires, hopes, fears, all apprehension of spiritual truth, the loftiest efforts of thought and imagination, Holiness and Free Will, as being but *different STATES of the same indivisible essence, mind*. Without entering into the discussion, we would simply ask, Have brutes a Will? Are they Persons? Can we call them beings, though lower in degree and varying in their specific characters, yet the same *in kind*, with the Divine Being, angels and men? But have they not desires of various kinds? If now these latter differ not essentially from acts of will, how shall we account for it that brutes are without moral character and irresponsible, as all admit that they are? And whence originate *guilt* and *remorse* in man? See Appendix [C.] Tr.

can exist only under the condition of the self-subsistent determination of a spiritual power concentrated, under the condition of a conscious energy and action springing absolutely from itself; consequently the power of the will is more centrifugal than centripetal, yet at the same time that it has a tendency to place itself in opposition to that which is not self, it also evinces a striving to subject this last to self, and thus to manifest itself to the same as an energetic or creative power.

Desires and passions in and of themselves considered, and aside from their possible derangement are, as well as every other power and activity, of inestimable worth in their proper place; but being blind, and consequently always subordinate powers, they have, as is proper, no determining voice in the counsels of the Spirit, and should therefore never be released from the guardianship and guidance of the Understanding and the Will. The derangement of this proper relation (which, from the nature of free man, we shall hereafter endeavour to explain,) is sin; and evil lies not in any one of these individual powers considered in and of itself, but in the perversion of their order, in the false co-operation and interlinking of powers that have departed from and deranged their original relation. For the activity of the Life is not destroyed by means of evil, but the individual Factors only come to bear a different relation to the Centre. Inactivity or the non-use of the will and of reason is, in strictness, never without guilt; and it is this inactivity of the will which marks every degree of evil, from sinful weakness and inefficiency of con-

duct, to the most abandoned wickedness. An entire perversion follows when the will itself and the abused reason, deluded by the desires and passions as by false friends, rise in league with these in rebellion against the law, and with them make now but one hostile host. The will then becomes an energetic will to evil, nay, it becomes wickedness itself. As the triumph, so also the fruitfulness of Evil, shows itself in this, that the powers by which it is actuated were originally the same as those which operate in the Good. Hence the eternal hostility between the two, and the continual longing after derangement and subversion which cleaves to perfected immorality, because that a system of wickedness and lies can only be constructed from the wreck of truth, and reared upon the ruins of virtue. By this means, that is, through the original homogeneousness of these powers, persons of the very greatest wickedness are oftentimes enabled to show forth capabilities (e. g. of courage, of perseverance, of presence of mind,) which in themselves considered are of very high worth, but in their present relations become most pernicious. From the above representation moreover it becomes intelligible how the wicked can make themselves appear externally virtuous, and how the hypocrite by his deceitful arts can assume the specious garb of piety. For, evil also, inasmuch as it is but perverted good, is susceptible of a refined cultivation, and hence it does by no means always appear in the gross outbreakings of desires and lustful passions, (from which, perhaps, some one might wish that he were on the very summit of

human sinfulness,) but rather the will which has become depraved, and the debased reason, in league with white-washed passions, generate that hypocritical prudence, that false, that oftentimes astonishing worldly wisdom, which can only be characterized as deceitful cunning and cool premeditating wickedness. To wish to derive a phenomenon of this kind from the lusts and desires themselves, were unsatisfactory. Desire wills neither the Good nor the Evil, and that, simply, because it *WILLS* not at all. The human will too, as such, is not, *per se*, essentially evil,—it does not originally will what is wrong; and perfected immorality has never yet at once broke forth from any human soul. But in our view, which we shall endeavour to develope more fully in the progress of this essay, evil arises gradually through the seduction of lust, (obedience to which constitutes the first guilt, but yet a guilt which might be altogether avoided); and thus it increases in the course of a continually augmenting and wicked derangement of powers, until it arrives at a certain state of self-subsistence. A case analogous to it is presented to us in the human organization. When the fluids are diverted from their proper channels they give rise to an after-growth, a product hostile to life and yet deriving its sustenance from life. A neglected mind therefore, especially where it has very early been guilty of crime, may proceed to such a high point of evil that sinfulness will acquire the ascendancy, and for a time prove too powerful for every opposing obstacle. In this condition, although the better voice may call aloud from its depth and command to

return, sudden reformation is impossible—impossible, at least, before the self-consuming madness of evil has run through its course ; as is not unfrequently the case with certain diseases, which no human skill can arrest until they have arrived at a certain crisis. Without doubt it is a remarkable peculiarity—a peculiarity frequently observed in Evil,—that notwithstanding the efficiency of the individual powers operative in it, notwithstanding the apparent self-subsistence by means of which this Life that has moved out of its proper orbit seeks to form for itself an independent and secure middle-point, (as a substitute for the true *centrum* which has been lost,) still there always remains an inward contradiction, a contradiction that cannot be removed ; there is still an indestructible feeling of disunion, a continual longing after something not had. And thus it is that such a life betrays itself as somewhat false and unsubstantial ; it can afford nothing which is healthful and permanent, but seems rather to resemble spectral forms and apparitions. This is the reason why that in individuals who have given themselves up to the practice of wickedness there is observed an internal faint-heartedness and insecurity at the very time when one would least expect it ; their condition is like to that of one under whose feet the solid earth begins to tremble and to move. The abused reason can no longer keep in league those powers that have conspired to pursue a life of falsehood ; and the feeling of disseverance from the Ground of all Life ends in corroding remorse, or cowardly irresolution and despair. Were there an original ground of evil as such, in which it

might have its firm root so far as its developement appears, then in its manifestations it would exhibit a natural and healthy growth, a life inwardly true, peaceful and permanent. But if this were the case it would be difficult to explain why all better persons feel such a horror on witnessing the gross outbreakings of evil ; and still more difficult would it be to account for that internal dissension which exists in the breast of every wicked man, for the arts of hypocrisy and self-deception, and for the self-corroding agony of remorse and despair. After all that has been said, it only remains as a further preliminary step to consider evil as a degeneracy, as a monstrous-birth ; and, since, in so far as its essential being is concerned, it has no fixed ground in an original nature, to consider it as something unsubstantial, and to explain its temporal phenomenon from that determination which the free will of a finite being is able to make. As has already been observed, however, this will is not to be regarded as an ability to evil derived from God, nor must it by any means be supposed that the will originally, as such, is evil ; for by making such a supposition we should be driven to the necessity of assuming a primary Ground of evil, and indeed of considering the Great First of all as being himself also evil. Besides, on such a view it were perfectly inconceivable how a Will, in its very essence infected with evil, could ever be transformed into a good Will, without an utter destruction of its essential being. Hence we are unavoidably led to the conclusion that the ultimate ground of evil lies in something different from nature, and which is itself

originally not evil, namely, in the human will,—from which we maintain that it is free.

This assertion is doubtless worthy of particular attention. For although it is daily assumed that the will is free, still on closer examination, and on a comparison of this with other acknowledged truths, it creates abundant difficulty. So that we deem it necessary in the first place to offer a vindication of this assumption which in many respects appears so strange, or at least to point out in what this supposed freedom consists.

If one considers the phenomena¹ of the sensible

¹ As the words essence, nature, phenomena, and phenomenal, are employed in this essay in a manner differing somewhat from their ordinary use, it may not be improper to subjoin an explanation. "Having resolved all external and internal Intuitions into Sensations, we may with equal propriety apply the name of PHENOMENA, or appearances, to them; and say of Nature, or the external world, that it is only a collection of *Phenomena*, or appearances, which strike our senses and exist in the mind alone; hence also the *two general varieties*, TIME and SPACE, can exist no where but in the mind. We must not however suppose that this in any manner leads to *Idealism*; for it is most certain that in all this procedure the mind is PASSIVE, and is acted upon by something different from itself, and which it does not create; namely, that which produces *Sensation*: and, from the happy discovery that *Time* and *Space* really are the two RECEPTIVITIES of the Sensitive Faculty, we are enabled to say that this something is out of *Time* and *Space*, and may be called the NOUMENON, or Cause of the Phenomena, or the thing in itself independent of the mind. Thus, while

world as such, they appear to form one unbroken chain, each of whose individual links constitutes the necessary condition of each succeeding one. It is an immeasurable system of causes and effects strictly connected with each other; a consecutive series which seems to unwind, as it were, in one long line of inseparable dependencies. The Freedom of the Will is: That it is not subjected to this law;—that every moment, by an

the same *causes* produce the same *effects*, Nature will be as permanent and unchanged as it is at present, and the external world completely secured." *Thomas Wirgman, Encyc. Lond. Art. Philosophy*, p. 128.

"The word nature has been used in two senses, viz. actively and passively; energetic (= *forma formans*), and material (= *forma formata*). In the first it signifies the inward principle of whatever is requisite for the reality of a thing, as *existent*: while the *essence* or essential property, signifies the inner principle of all that appertains to the *possibility* of a thing. Hence, in accurate language we say the essence of a mathematical circle or geometrical figure, not the *nature*; because in the conception of forms purely geometrical there is no expression or implication of their real existence. In the second, or material sense of the word Nature, we mean by it the sum total of all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and consequently of possible experience—the aggregate of Phenomena, whether existing for our outer senses, or for our inner sense. The doctrine concerning nature would therefore (the word Physiology being both ambiguous in itself, and already otherwise appropriated) be more properly entitled Phenomenology, distinguished into its two grand divisions, Somatology and Psychology." *Friend*, p. 410. Tr.


inward self-determination, without being conditioned by any thing extraneous or antecedent to itself, it is able to begin a new ideal series of spiritual effects, and can also arbitrarily connect itself as a forming power with the course of things as they take place before us. By these outward events, however, it is in no way determined, but on the contrary this active imprinting of itself is accompanied by corresponding effects upon nature ; or in other words, these things by which the will is not determined, may on the contrary be determined by the Will. ¹ Without doubt in the spirit and

¹ We find, however, that some writers on the Will do not accord with this representation. "Necessity, as applied to the operation of moral causes, appears simply to correspond with the uniformity which we observe in the operation of physical causes. We calculate that a man of a certain character will act in a particular manner in particular circumstances, or that he will be acted upon in a certain manner by particular truths and motives, when they are presented to him,—by a principle of uniformity similar to that with which we expect an *acid to act in a particular manner upon an alkali.*" *Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers*, Pt. III. ch. IV.

"I assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable : but as to all things that *begin to be*, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence WITHOUT THEMSELVES." [Consequently, every act of the Will which *begins to be*, or every Will in whatever condition or relations it may be, must, provided it was not so from eternity, have some cause, OUT OF ITSELF, why it is as it is and not otherwise. Or in other

the heart of man—a tribunal whose decisions we should know and reverence, even long before we approach nature, so foreign to us, to inquire about the significance of her symbolic language and mysterious hieroglyphics—there lies a defence of the bold assumption that the Will is independent of and contradistinguished from nature. In what immediately follows we shall attempt to vindicate, or at least to point out freedom in the soul of man. But to derive a proof of this from the necessary laws of nature, or to set forth a deduction of freedom drawn from natural causes, is neither attempted, nor is it deemed possible; yet by pursuing this course we do by no means exclude the effort to bring human freedom into an accordance with the Idea of God and with nature, but rather retain it as a farther problem to be solved.

words, the Will is not the Originator of its own acts.] *Edwards' Inquiry on the Will*, Pt. II. Sec. III. On this reasoning Dugald Stewart thus remarks: "The foregoing argument goes to prove, that all human actions are as necessarily produced by motives, as the going of a clock is necessarily produced by the weights, and that no human action could have been otherwise than it really was. Nay, it applies also in full force to the Deity, and indeed to all intelligent beings whatever; for it is not founded on any thing peculiar to the human mind, but on the *impossibility of free agency*; and, of consequence, it leads to this general conclusion, that no event in the universe could have happened otherwise than it did." And, if logically carried out, he might have added the words of Spinoza: "*Res nullo alio modo, neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt.*" Tr.



From the consideration of nature merely, and by means of impressions recieved from without, it is impossible that man could ever have been led to a knowledge of the Freedom of the Will. This is no notion which was made, or which originated from abstraction ; because from the so called universal laws of nature, governed by necessity, it would not be possible to derive its very antithesis—a Law of Freedom. Freedom is an Idea, it is original to the human soul, and so inwoven with it, that it is no less impossible for the mind arbitrarily to divest itself of this Idea than it is arbitrarily to create it. In speaking thus, however, we do not pretend to assert that each particular man, though he possesses this Idea existing in the germ, has so developed it as to have made it an object of clear and distinct consciousness. For there are also other Ideas in many individuals, whose souls seldom or rarely hold converse with themselves, which are either perfectly misapprehended, or only float before the mental vision as obscure representations. But no one will therefore entirely deny to human nature the Faculty of Ideas ; for this would be the same as to say that for the spirit there is nothing unconditioned or infinite, and that all the representations possible for the soul of man are comprehended in the conceptions of the understanding and sensible intuitions. After being sufficiently wearied with perceiving, arranging and combining the endless series of outward phenomena, the spirit at last unavoidably meets with such presentations as cannot be reckoned under the same category with

those phenomena, nor ranged in the same series with them. And it is particularly worthy of remark, that this very power of forming representations which lie above the range of experience and the conceptions of understanding is that which, as the most noble and worthy, not only elicits the highest interest, but it is that alone which gives humanity to Man. Still, however much it may be elevated, it is this faculty which does in an especial manner regulate the course of life; for Ideas, as if they were heavenly powers that might be felt though but indistinctly apprehended, oftentimes exercise a more than earthly power and dominion even over those who are but little cultivated. As is the case with so many other ideas, that of God for instance, so is it especially with the idea of freedom, that it causes itself to be felt by that higher obtrusiveness, and pervades the mind with an indestructible though uncomprehended activity. The chief problem of philosophy is to search into these higher movements of life peculiar to the Spirit, and to make ideas objects of distinct consciousness. For such inquiries he is best fitted who has accustomed himself to consider the soul in its immediate relation to itself—a relation by which it is itself distinguished from that which ends in it or passes by it;—to consider it as that which constitutes the abiding principle, the subject, as it were, of all its changes and conditions; that which at the same time contains the primary standard of all phenomena—a standard not given, but existing anterior to every thing that is given. With special reference to the idea of freedom it

could not be correctly said, that it first originates as the result of varied reflections upon the phenomena of the inner and outward world. For although it is certain that continued thought upon the visible world conducts back to a First and Free Original, who belongs not to the class of the Phenomenal ; and although it is farther certain that meditation upon our internal moral nature can ultimately find rest only in the idea of moral freedom ; yet from all this it does not follow that this idea is first simply formed in the progress of those reflections, and that it is therefore to be regarded as but a mere expedient invented to aid us in the better understanding of both worlds. Indeed this idea could scarcely be applied to the purposes named, did it not exist prior to and independent of every purpose ; for even the application of it supposes its pre-existence i. e. presupposes that it is impossible for the human spirit to rest peacefully in an endless regress of blindly operative causes and consequences ; or, which is the same thing, that it is not possible for it to exclude from itself the idea of freedom. In the first original action, in the act of self-consciousness, is this idea already present ; for even here the soul feels itself to be an energy acting from itself, and finds the act of "Willing" to be so essential to its being, that when critically scrutinized no other predicate whatever can be applied to it, and it is impossible for the soul even to think of itself as *not* Willing. The existence of the idea then, already gives assurance for the existence also of a sphere of action lying above the unbroken visible chain of phe-

nomena, whose changes are effected according to necessary laws. Hence the conflict which man must carry on against necessity, and the pain consequent upon its power, are apparent; for both are conceivable only on the supposition that the essence of the soul originally possesses freedom as its own proper endowment. It is very certain that the brute animal does not thus feel the constraint of necessity, to which it nevertheless yields passive obedience; it does not feel the want of freedom for the very reason that by nature it is unfree, just as a person born blind has no conception of darkness because he never lost that of light¹. In order that he might be able to form to himself a represen-

¹ By some, however, liberty is ascribed to brutes. "The liberty of brutes is as perfect *in its sphere*, as that of men or angels. As they roam in forests and mountain wildernesses, or swim in the depths of the ocean, or fly and gaily sing in the radiant fields of the summer's sky, they are free; they rejoice in their freedom; and prize it as one of heaven's best gifts." *Upham's Essay on the Will*, § 148, p. 231. And by others to rivers. Hobbes says, "The water is said to descend *freely*, or to have *liberty* to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way; but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the *liberty* to ascend, but the faculty or *power*, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsic." Hobbes was a celebrated advocate for necessity, or rather for a liberty which was nothing better than necessity. His definition of liberty was: *The absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent.*

tation of the deep night in which he lives, he must previously have enjoyed the intuition of light. He who has never tasted liberty will also feel no desire to exercise it; nor does any pain arise relative to its hindrance or interruption. He only who is originally free can feel

It was in this sense that he spoke of a river as being free; *in its own sphere* it is free. In his Philosophical Writings Schelling says essentially the same thing: "Frei ist, was nur den Gesetzen seines eignen Wesens gemäss handelt." "That is free which only acts conformably to the laws of its own being." In remarking upon this definition Tholuck observes that it is entirely accordant with the one given by Spinoza, and that it expresses the same as what we mean when we speak of any thing's being necessitated or unfree. He goes on to remark of Neeb, whom he highly commends, that the conception of freedom recognized by him, was, in a *higher sense*, not materially different from that of Schelling and Spinoza, since he ascribed to man in his original condition, and to all holy spirits, such a relation to God, as that by their union with Him they could not act otherwise than according to the laws of their being. This relation, he proceeds, we call free, as, when speaking analogically, every developement of nature, the organization of which suffers no interruption from without, is denominated free. Still, however, there is only an external likeness between this definition and that of Spinoza. For we maintain that man stands in this condition of Divine Freedom by a CONTINUOUS ACT OF FREE SELF-DETERMINATION, which cannot be conceded by pantheists, inasmuch as they assert that even in this self-determination the actor is God. See *Lehre von der Sünde*, 4te Aufl. s. 189, 190. TR,

the constraint of necessity ; as original warmth is demanded to the end that the sensation of cold may be felt. The power of the Will is the warm stream of light that flows through opposing nature, and by which the rigidity and fixedness that pervade it are first made known. But should any one say that freedom is still simply an *Idea*, in opposition to that which is living and actual, it would be because he had entirely misapprehended the nature of an idea, which through its Ideality loses nothing of its Reality, but for this very reason, as has already been shewn, manifests itself by exercising an active influence in life. Freedom is not to be considered as a mere creature of thought, nor as a distant good yet to be hoped for, nor as something long since lost, but as an original, present, existing Power. The will acting from itself is so intimately connected with the essence of spiritual being, that the former cannot be taken away without the destruction of the latter. Without the most free act of the spirit, as has already been intimated, man could never have said to himself "I" ; nor would he ever be able to say it. It is only as the soul arbitrarily, (for in the so called course of nature there is no ground for this interruption,) breaks off the series of passing sensations in which it rather loses than finds itself, and by a reflex act turns in upon itself, that it distinguishes itself from things, and from the impressions produced by them or arising inwardly. Thus only is it that the soul finds itself, not by a seeking, but by virtue of its own free act dependent upon no outward anterior condition. Even the very first act of

self-consciousness is a pure self-determination, so that freedom is a matter of fact which stands or falls with the being of I. Every analysis of self-consciousness conducts back to a point where the chain, (represented as endless,) of connexion between blindly operative causes and effects, does by no means reach; and where, in a manner entirely different from the so called laws of nature, a much higher life, even the life of the spirit, re-creates itself endlessly, and in this repetitive act beholds or knows its own self. So little place is here found for that necessary and inseparable consecutive series of phenomena interlinking with each other, that rather in so far only as that series is removed can self-consciousness enter; and conversely, *this* decreases in precisely the same proportion as *that* appears predominant. The fact, moreover, that the soul always remains conscious of its own identity, as the tide of things rolls onward, and amid the ceaseless change of outward phenomena and inward states, can only be explained on the supposition that it finds within itself somewhat which does not belong to these phenomena, somewhat which is not subject to their laws. The characteristic of these laws is a ceaseless progression from the condition to the thing conditioned, whilst yet for the consciousness of identity there is demanded something permanent and enduring—something that can oppose itself to the rapid current instead of floating down passively with the stream, and which, from its lofty height, can securely contemplate the changing scenes beneath. The state, finally, of the philosophizing mind, is possible only on

condition that the soul has power arbitrarily to withdraw from the consequential series of external or internal phenomena comprehended in the law of constant propulsion, and that in the midst of change and fluctuation it can always turn back to the Permanent as the ground of the Phenomenal, and can elevate itself to the One and the Ultimate ; this never occurs, however, in a progressive series, and can be conceived of only by conceding to the soul its own free determination. Otherwise the spirit, by speculation, could never be made participant of a higher knowledge ; but, if subject to the same law of causality with the phenomena of nature, it would always, buried as it were in the dark perception of the apparent, be borne along together with the ceaseless current of other things. For the spirit, then, there would be progression only without beginning ; always time alone without eternity. Once inserted as a link in the iron chain, there could be for it no deliverance. Nothing but the free spirit can deliver itself ; and this alone has power not only to distinguish itself from things, but also, (for the actualizing of which no course of nature is sufficient,) to go back to the laws of its own agency, and to the ultimate grounds of its existence. So the will then is the true redeemer for man ; and it also constitutes the necessary condition of his higher cognitive faculty, since it is utterly inconceivable how truth and science could be accessible to us without the Will. For although there is frequently found an impulsive kind of knowing not directed by the free will, and which, nearly in the manner of brute animals,

as an instinctive curiosity seeks to satisfy itself with, and impress itself upon, numberless individual objects ; yet there is also a higher scientific insight, which apprehends universal laws and takes its direction according to ultimate grounds¹. Still nothing but the deter-

¹ "In consequence of being endowed with Reason, man strives after a systematic completion of his knowledge, and consequently aims to raise himself to a science of the ultimate grounds and laws of Nature and Freedom, as well as of their reciprocal relations to each other. He is at first urged to this by a blind feeling of need, without forming any worthy conceptions of the problem thus proposed by Reason, without knowing in what way, by what means, or to what extent, the end is to be attained. By degrees, as the self-consciousness of reason is gradually developed, his efforts become more determinate in their aim and more reflective in their character. This reflective effort is denominated the act of philosophizing."—"The human spirit proceeds from dark undeveloped consciousness to clear apprehension, from imagination to thought, from belief to knowledge, from the individual to the universal, and thus accompanied by an obscure feeling of truth, of agreement, of harmony and conformity to law, it seeks for the Certain and the Necessary, to which all the convictions that interest it must attach themselves, and by means of which it may give an account of them. It philosophizes, first for itself, and then generally for the thinking reason. In accordance with the natural progress of cultivation the philosophizing act is first occupied with external and gross objects which strongly excite attention, and afterwards proceeds gradually to the more refined, the more concealed, the inward and the simple. We find this progressive course more or less

mining power of an energetic will can cause this direction ; for which reason also there is a much more intimate and essential connexion between spiritlessness and inefficiency of will than is usually supposed. Even in the productions of the Artist and the Poet it is impossible not to perceive that independence which we have hitherto affirmed the spirit to possess over the mechanism of causes and effects necessarily conjoined. For although the faculty of song and the creative power of art are vouchsafed by Divine favour, and are to be regarded as gifts from above—and although the poet and the artist, therefore, in the hour of inspiration, neither can nor will strive against a higher influence,

among all nations and in various modifications. But a marked difference is seen in this, that in but few the thinking subject proceeds to scientific acts of philosophizing. Whence arises this difference? *Tennemann's Grundr.* § 2, p. 2. *Ib.* § 53. p. 35.

“Man doth not seem to rest satisfied, either with fruition of that wherewith his life is preserved, or with performance of such actions as advance him most deservedly in estimation ; but doth further covet, yea, oftentimes manifestly pursue, with great sedulity and earnestness, that which cannot stand him in any stead for vital use ; that which exceedeth the reach of sense, yea somewhat above the capacity of Reason, somewhat Divine and Heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth than conceiveth ; somewhat it seeketh, and what that is directly it knoweth not ; yet very intentive desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire.” *Hooker.* TR.

still the most free accord of the mind with that higher influence is not to be misapprehended. And it is equally certain, also, that without self-independence and freedom of spirit, no true work of art could ever be produced. As the idea of beauty is evidently somewhat of the inward being, so also the creation of a particular work of beauty, or a criticism pronounced upon it, is plainly a determining act proceeding from itself. Here dependence upon the laws of the visible world is so definitely rejected, that an ideal form of phenomena, conditioned by no law of nature, is rather self-actively called forth, and placed in opposition to the ordinary course of things.

Art is so far removed from being a mere representation or lifeless imitation of that which is exhibited in the phenomena of nature, that it rather strives to present those unseen forms of which external nature is but the correlative manifestation—it seeks to body forth the archetypal nature or ideas. Consequently the Poet and the Artist endeavour to represent another nature, the counterpart of that which is visible; and in their productions exhibit themselves as absolutely free, that is, as creative. But independence of the outward nature is also shown in criticisms pronounced upon works of art;—in determining what in them is beautiful, or what is otherwise. The standard of judgment in such cases is not derived from nature, (which contains rather copied representations than the unsketched originals,) but is taken directly from the Idea, which the poet and the artist, empowered by their ideal

nature, self-subsistently apply. Since now, according to what has hitherto been said, the free will constitutes the fundamental condition as well of true Science as of Poetry and Art, so does it hold the same relation also to true moral Action.

True action is without doubt that which is connected with the consciousness of one's own individual agency. It may be asked, How can such a consciousness arise?—Not from the feeling that something nearly concerns us, even though our whole being were seized with it; for then indeed we might speak of a sensation, or of an impression, or of a Divine ordinance, but not of an election, or of a resolve. Neither could this consciousness ever have arisen if any thing were developed from the depth of our appropriate personality according to the dark laws of nature; as is the case, for example, in an inexplicable shuddering, or a magical inclination, or any other involuntary tendency. In every feeling of this kind something has indeed *happened* to us, but nothing has been *done* by us; and all events of this description, as well as those which a destiny independent of our own agency brings upon our outward life, we name *occurrences*, but not *acts*. The consciousness of true action can arise from the Willing Spirit alone; and, indeed, in that case only, when knowing from itself and self-determined, it decides upon the end aimed at. Nothing but the free will can make that which takes place in reference to us our own act; wherefore, also, the true cause lies in ourselves alone—it lies in that which each one calls him-

self. This power in man is that which is self-knowing and self-active. Hence many things may very nearly concern us, but nothing more nearly than our own act ; but with the consciousness of such an act is also connected the consciousness of freedom.

In every individual act, consequently in all true action, the question in regard to its moral worth cannot be avoided. How comes it that man is able to apply, nay is obliged to apply, such a criterion of judgment not derived from the phenomenal world, to all human actions ?

The fact itself is undeniable. It is a necessity deeply impressed upon the human soul to estimate its own, and the acts of others, not merely according to their external appearance, but to examine and decide upon them according to their moral worth.¹ This

¹ Although the conscious feeling which dwells in the breast of every one must lead him to acknowledge the truth of these remarks, yet there have not been wanting those, who, through perverted speculations, have attempted to sweep them all away. Arabia has produced a sect of fanatics who maintain that with every holy being God created its dark counterpart, and with every Divine one a devil, to the end that the latter might be instrumental in developing to the world the former ; so that when Abraham arose, Nimrod appeared with him, at the time of Moses there was a Pharaoh, and during the Saviour's manifestation upon the earth a black Judas was found at his side. The dark moral shade, say they, is no less excellent than the light which it serves to place in more prominent contrast. Nor have such views been confined to the opium-eating East. Some of the cold-

distinction between the action as it appears, and the inward act of the spirit, cannot be regarded as an inven-

er and less refining spirits of Europe have evolved sentiments of a similar kind. We are told by Diderot that all is necessity, that there is no difference between the holy and the profane, that the doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. Bonnet, the celebrated disciple of Leibnitz, says (as translated by Stewart): "The same chain embraces the physical and moral worlds, binds the past to the present, the present to the future, the future to eternity. That wisdom which has ordained the existence of this chain has doubtless willed that of every link of which it is composed. A CALIGULA is one of those links, and this is a link of iron. A MARCUS AURELIUS is another link, and this link is of gold. Both are necessary parts of one whole, which could not but exist. Shall God then be angry at the sight of the iron link? What absurdity! God esteems this link at its proper value: He sees it in its cause, and he approves this cause, for it is good. God beholds moral monsters as he beholds physical monsters. Happy is the link of gold! Still more happy if he know that he is *only fortunate*. *Heureux le chaînon d'or! plus heureux encore, s'il sait qu'il n'est qu'heureux.*" It may not be uninteresting to notice the shew of mathematical demonstration which Thomas Belsham gives to this view. He argues thus: "According to the hypothesis of free will, the essence of virtue and vice consists in liberty; for example, benevolence without liberty is no virtue: malignity without liberty is no vice. Both are equally in a neutral state. Add a portion of liberty to both, benevolence instantly becomes an eminent virtue, and malignity an odious vice. That is, IF TO EQUALS YOU ADD EQUALS, THE WHOLE WILL BE UNEQUAL; than which nothing can be more ab-

tion of certain sages and lawgivers, since it involves a universal moral necessity felt even by the most simple and unsophisticated. This distinction has been recognized too, although in different degrees of perfection and clearness, yet in essence, among nations of ancient and modern times differing most widely in other respects ; and among whom there also reigns the greatest dissimilitude in manners, religion, and laws. That a higher degree of mental cultivation is requisite to make the distinction spoken of become an object of more clear consciousness, is not intended to be denied ; but on the contrary it is altogether appropriate to the nature of the case that it should be so. In every instance the conception of guilt and of innocence, of merit or the desert punishment, is found to attach to the wide spread and indestructible peculiarities of human nature. But this conception is not any inference or conclusion, it is directly in the will that it originates, which will an inward voice bids us ascribe to man ; and only where an election was possible do we speak of merit or ill desert. In addition to this, it is a remarkable fact that consciousness is universally felt to be the necessary condition of the imputation of a moral character ; so that the moral worth or turpitude of an act is not made to depend upon any outward manifestation whatever, but upon the inmost life of the spirit, and is immediately conjoined with the original activity

surd." *Elements of Philos. of Hum. Mind*, p. 258. Such reasoning needs no refutation ; such statements need no comment. TR.

of the I. As true peace and self-regard depend less upon our external relations and outward actings than upon that which we have inwardly willed, so is it always in deciding upon the moral worth of another—the ultimate and highest ground of decision is derived from the will of the man. The accordance of this will with a law, which does indeed command with necessity, but yet without involving a necessity of nature—a law which in itself is of universal, indisputable validity, but which may nevertheless every moment be violated—this accordance is it that gives worthiness to character, and constitutes the very essence of morality. Without placing an inward and intolerable contradiction in the being of man—without giving the lie to conscience, in the certainty of which no one doubts—it cannot be assumed that what we are not only accustomed, but what we are even bound to ascribe to ourselves and others, is not yet in and of itself the ground of imputing moral character; or in other words, unless that be done, the conviction in regard to the Will's freedom cannot be surrendered. To give up this were at once to contradict the holiest feelings, to resolve the noblest ideas, as virtue, morality, and desert, into mere idle conceits. In which case also every condemning sentence either actually pronounced against man, or threatened in future, would, as resting upon a false principle, necessarily of itself fall away. Thus is it at once obvious how important, even on account of its consequences for the dignity and well being of man, it becomes to determine the question in

reference to freedom or non-freedom. Yet it is by no means exclusively on account of the consequences which might result from particular views on these points, that it is improper to pass them by without consideration in a scientific inquiry. Evil consequences could themselves never become universal, because it would be impossible for an unperverted man to act upon the assumptions from which they must necessarily spring. For in this whole domain we meet with an original obligation, antecedent to all calculation of consequences—with a command neither made, nor discovered, but which existed already coeval with consciousness—a command that does not receive its binding force from any foreign conditions, but which imposes its injunctions unconditionally. It is not necessary to appeal to such a command, as the principle of all moral actions, according to the mode of expression used in the system of any one philosopher; independent of every particular system there speaks in all a Law, which if not in form, yet in essence, is One. Every one knows that he should act conformably to the requisitions of his conscience. Every one must not only approve of righteousness and trueness for himself alone, but must also wish that both might be universally regarded. Through this command originally existent, each one possesses, as it were, a delineated archetype, every departure from which manifests itself by a feeling of disquietude, by a voice of reproach which calls him to return. But an obligation which not only does not require a peaceful surrender to the course of out-

ward events, but on the contrary frequently demands the most determined opposition against them—which not only forbids an individual to permit himself to be determined exclusively by the feeling of gratification, or the probability of momentary advantage, but on the other hand demands that each one should bring every thing else as a sacrifice to the Idea, without giving himself the trouble perplexedly to calculate how this idea may possibly exhibit itself in the world of sense—an obligation of this kind is either independent of sense, or it points to a power of the idea, and consequently to an ability or energy of the will to determine itself according to the moral Ideal, however dissimilar the course of outward events may be. To derive the origin of this law itself from experience were contradictory, because experience can make known an existence only, but not an obligation, and because there is at the same time presented in that law a perfect Archetype, to which no given experience corresponds, and to which, therefore, it is obligatory upon man to approximate in endless progression. It is consequently anterior to all experience and independent of it; a principle of activity in the soul itself, a power in the possession of which the soul enacts its own laws, and is therefore free. It will not be objected that there is perhaps still in the spirit, so far forth as it is itself a law, only a concealed mechanism at work, and that the soul in acting gradually develops an inward predetermined series, which in appearance simply are manifestations of will, but which in fact are but the unfolding of a necessity not yet ob-

served—and that accordingly the soul blindly obeys, not indeed an external, but an internal law of causality, similar to a time-piece, which carries within itself the principle of its own motion, and so far is negatively free, but at the ground is still a machine and therefore unfree. Such an assumption and comparison would be in direct contrast to our conception of a moral law, that is, of a command which possesses unconditional validity, yet without involving any compulsive force. In what has heretofore been said, moreover, there are contained decisive grounds against that pretended concealed mechanism of the spirit, as, (to adduce no other points,) that morality and the imputation of guilt could not in any manner consist with such mechanical creatures. And finally, it is an important objection against the comparison used, and one which is readily seen, that it extends only to the most unimportant part. Without appealing to the fact that a machine, in consequence of the external aids which it requires, and on account of the constant possibility of countless interruptions from without, is incorrectly described as a kind of thing possessing autonomy ; yet self-consciousness generally, and moral consciousness in particular, as the direct characteristic of spirit, is entirely overlooked in that comparison. But as self-consciousness cannot in general be called in question, so in like manner that which is the distinguishing fact of self-consciousness cannot by any one be reasonably denied. Now the "I am" is the first and most distinctive fact of consciousness, which evidently could never have origina-

ted without the most free act ; and it has been shown that by means of it a higher world, the world of knowledge and of truth, is opened up before the spirit. So likewise the other distinguishing facts of consciousness as well as the first, though only rendered possible by the first, are these two : “I ought,” and “I am guilty or innocent ;” respecting which it has not less satisfactorily been shown that their origin is only conceivable on the condition of a free Will.

But since a machine never acts from its own design nor for its own ends, but rather, conformably to our very conception of it, presupposes an intelligent cause, a framer, according to whose design and for whose ends it must blindly move ; so, the necessary mechanism of the human spirit being once assumed, just propose the question, What must you think not only of yourselves and your own dignity, but what must you think of the most perfect Spirit of God, the Author of this pretended time-piece ? On such a supposition man were without doubt no longer the image of God, but the direct contrary, a being the most dissimilar to Him ; and the remaining creation, what would it be, if upon its loftiest summit it ended in a machine ? And how much degraded from its greatness and grandeur, nay how insignificant must it appear, if, in its productions, it never rose to a self-subsistent being—a being acting from itself ? Even to the Creator no glory could accrue from such a creation ; it would but detract from his excellency. And could this view be established, what a strange phenomenon were man, who, in consequence

of a deception imposed upon him by his Maker, would suffer remorse through the illusion of conscience, and would vainly dream of freedom !¹ On such a suppo-

¹ In perusing the various metaphysical systems of philosophers, it is curious and instructive to trace the train of logical consequences which often flow from some one false assumption, to contemplate the superstructure of error frequently reared upon some erroneous principle, to examine into the evil that has resulted from the vain attempt to bring down all the higher forms of spiritual truth to a level with our Sensitive Faculty, to observe the effect of Reason, although thrust out of its legitimate sphere by the intrusion of the Understanding, to give oneness and comprehension and consistency to all knowledge, and finally, to watch the conflict between consciousness and conscience on the one hand, and perverted speculation on the other. One of the leading principles of the Leibnitzian Philosophy was the doctrine of Optimism :—That is, out of the infinite number of possible worlds God selected that which his wisdom perceived to be best, a world where the most realities might find existence and harmony. To such a world his power gave actual existence ; such is the present world. Hence, viewed in all its relations and dependencies, every thing that exists is the best that it could be ; nothing could be better, even though it may in itself be imperfect. Consequently, nothing could be otherwise than as it is, and therefore every thing is necessitated to be as it is ; there is no room left for Free Will. All actions and events are pre-conformed to each other ; all things take place agreeably to the Divine determination. The outward world is a physical machine, the mind is a *spiritual machine* ; their movements are both harmonious and reciprocal. God is the efficient agent in each. The same

sition existence itself would become worthless, and the hope of a future life repulsive ; because the only ad-

mode of representation was subsequently adopted by the dogmatic Wollf.

Lord Kames, whilst he firmly believed that we are necessitated in all our actions, yet openly acknowledged that this doctrine is in direct opposition to the universal and natural feelings of mankind ; nay, he even went so far as to admit that the business and intercourse of life could not be transacted unless each one possessed the assurance that he was free. In order to reconcile his speculative views with his empirical convictions, and to solve the riddle of freedom, he had recourse to the strange supposition that our sense of liberty is false and deceitful, yet necessary ; we are so made, that by virtue of our very constitution we are led to imagine ourselves free, whilst yet, when philosophically scrutinized, we are mere machines, and act only in so far as we are acted upon. Dr. Hartley, as well as his successor and admirer Dr. Priestley, admits that it was against the strongest convictions of his own mind that he adopted his views of philosophical necessity, and surrendered his belief in freedom. Other writers, who were, no doubt, not unacquainted with the agony and bitterness of Remorse, concede that a belief in the freedom of the will is the ground-work and necessary condition of this feeling ; but at the same time they declare that the feeling itself is altogether fallacious, that it is superseded by the "glorious doctrine" of necessity, and that it should never be admitted into a system of moral discipline. Others, again, would persuade us that a belief in a fixed necessity is the most soothing and cheering view that can be taken of the world, and particularly of human nature. It fills us with self-satisfaction on contem-

vantage which futurity could at best promise, would be a more clear insight into the machinery of an inexorable necessity no longer to be concealed—and thus we should be brought to witness the destruction of an illusion, which, whilst it remains, is yet consoling. But who does not see that views of this kind, even whilst they are in the process of thought, do, as it were, destroy themselves, and dissolve into nothing? Besides, by the denial of freedom it could not once be proved that moral evil, for the present life at least, does at all cease actually to exist. It would seem, indeed, that with the removal of the free will, evil also would be taken out of the way; but in strictness it would only remove the ground of imputing moral character, or the right of charging the creature with guilt. Existing wickedness and immorality themselves, however, could not, without an entire, nay an impossible confusion and perversion of all conceptions, be accounted as any thing else than real evil, so that that denial would not remove them; and so long as there were yet conceded—One free Will, an Original Will, the ground of all evil would have to be sought in that alone. On the supposition of that spiritual mechanism which He alone could have formed and can regulate, to the Creator would have to be ascribed not only the permission of evil, and a cer-

plating our own characters, and reconciles us entirely to all our fellow beings, however vile and abandoned they may be, because, forsooth, all their actions are performed agreeably to the appointment of God, and to be offended with them therefore would be open rebellion against Him! Tr.

tain mere co-operation with the sinner, in so far as all power is derived from Him ; but He would have to be regarded as the direct and only cause of evil—of that which still always remains evil. But it were superfluous to dwell more circumstantially on this painful view of the subject, or to consider more particularly the contradictoriness of those thoughts to which the denial of freedom necessarily gives rise.

Our only design has thus far been to point out freedom as it exists in the being of man's spirit itself, and to show that it is so intimately interwoven with his internal economy, that there is no possibility of its removal without the destruction of all that is peculiar to spirit and to morality. It were a very different problem:—To derive freedom from its first grounds, and to show how it must necessarily arise according to immutable laws of nature. Many reasons might be adduced to prove that an investigation instituted with *such* a design would necessarily fail of attaining its end ; yet from such investigation no evil could result against freedom itself, for it should at the same time become the aim of the inquirer to show, that neither in the being of God, nor in the laws of nature, is there any thing to be met with that could oblige us to surrender it. To show this is indeed the most difficult, as well as the most attractive part of the investigation, which now leads us naturally to consider the Freedom of the human Will in relation to God and to Nature ; and to establish the actualness of the free will's existence in op-

position to those mighty forces, of which yet all, upon their ultimate height, appear as but One Force only.

The shortest and surest way to do this seems to be to derive, *a priori*, from universal principles, not only the *possibility* of a free, self-operative, particular will, but also from the very same principles to demonstrate that such will is *actually in being*, and to elucidate the manner of its co-existence with an actual world. If by those principles were understood such laws as the mathematics point out in nature, or if that derivation were conceived to be a construction of freedom resting upon those laws, or an exhibition of the mode of its origin according to them; then would freedom be transformed into a product of nature, and the laws of its movements could be as easily demonstrated as are those of the planets, whose most important phenomena necessarily result from the universal laws of gravity and attraction. But since without a violent and abrupt *sal-tus*, (leap, abrupt transition,) nothing could ever originate from such premises except that which was kindred with them—a necessary product of nature—so it were contradictory to apply such a method of derivation, or proof, to that which is *not* necessitated. From laws that involve within themselves the character of physical compulsion, it is not possible to derive such an activity, whose distinguishing trait consists in this very point, *That it is not subject to that compulsion*. To will, is evidently to act; and to derive this acting from yet other grounds lying out of the will, would be to

destroy that of which we speak i. e. the Willing. Freedom, in regard to its fountain and its appropriate sphere of action, lies in an entirely different domain, and without the bounds of a series of things mechanically developed. It must be regarded as springing forth directly from the Supersensuous, as a power shining in upon the Spacious and the Necessary, without yet becoming subject to their laws ; even as light pervades and illuminates space without filling it, or without being comprehended by it. The ultimate and sufficient ground of human freedom can be found in God alone ; and although many questions in respect to the kind and mode of its origination from God, and of its entrance upon a state of actual existence, must ever remain unanswered, yet it does not seem to fall without the limits of human science to point out its fountain even in the Divine Being. The Godhead is by no means so unapproachable by the spirit that the idea of the Most High must be conceived of only as the utmost bound, but not as the object also of speculation. Surely the idea of this Being contains in it something real, essential, and is not throughout of a merely negative nature. The sole ground, rather, of that deep and thrilling interest which every profound inquiry awakens within us, lies in the possibility, always presupposed, that something may be known of the All Perfect. Human nature's highest attribute, or spiritual personality, of itself conducts every reflecting mind to the Most High, to the *Super-human* ; and we cannot imagine how spirit and

freedom could ever have been imparted to man, except through the will of an originally free and most perfect Spirit.¹

From a still deeper depth, and,—in reference to the personality of God—from a still ulterior ground, Schelling attempts to derive the origin of human freedom and the possibility of sin, in his remarkable treatise entitled “*PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES RESPECTING THE NATURE OF HUMAN FREEDOM AND THE OBJECTS INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH IT.*”² It would be inappropriate to censure an undertaking of this kind, both on account of its difficulty, and because it lies without the sphere of ordinary efforts ; on these accounts it should rather excite the attention of all who have at heart the promotion of true science. Strange indeed is the view which in that work is taken of the highest Being ; especially in that respect, where for science even, men have been accustomed to rest satisfied with an empty or undefined conception. The old objection against an impersonal God, in its indefiniteness and universality ever incorrect, can in no case be promotive of true science ; yet from it first originated the idea—an idea highly beneficial to the cause of science—that the all-perfect Being is to be regarded as a unity of living qualities, and not as a pure unity of conception. As the thoughts of God, (an essential

¹ See Appendix [D.]

² Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freyheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände, von F. W. J. Schelling.

part of whose perfection is, that thought originates being, and that an act of will results in the effect willed,) cannot possibly be a play of empty notions through which nothing living is produced, but must rather be regarded as plastic or creative; so the attributes of God are not mere notional conceptions, but living qualities, or real, yea the most real, active powers. Those who have inclosed themselves in the conception of a pure oneness, as in a blank circle, would do well to look around to see what they can find in it, and how they may get out of it again. In this simple One, according to the very conception of it, there can be no distinction; but where there is no possibility of distinction, there neither intelligence, nor will, nor love can be found. For One has in itself nothing which it can will, or towards which it may exercise affection; it becomes necessary, therefore, that this One should, as it were, double itself by the production of a kindred counterpart. This last, however, presupposes an original twoness, a duality of the Knower and the Known, of the Lover and the Loved; and thus only does it become possible that the eternal Seer may behold and become conscious of himself, and that a proper personality of God can arise. On no other supposition, moreover, than as a movement of distinguishable powers is in this way placed in the life of God, is any outward revelation of the Divine Being, or any farther series of possible generations conceivable.

Hence also every more profound philosophy, even from the earliest times, found its only secure resting

place in the very ancient doctrine of Tri-unity ;¹ a doctrine which distinguishes from the eternal Ground the two-fold manifestations of the same, the one an in-

¹ Great evil has undoubtedly been done to the cause of truth by the manner in which its doctrines have sometimes been enforced. Many instructors of philosophy, especially of religious philosophy, (and strictly speaking indeed there is none other,) have attempted to urge upon their pupils or hearers certain doctrines as the mere arbitrary appointments of God, without attempting to give any explanation, or without pretending to account for their views on any rational ground. Thus the requisitions of the Sabbath have often been urged simply on the authority of the Divine command, as if the Divine law were arbitrary, without noticing the grounds of such an appointment which are found in the wants of human nature and of the animal creation in general. (For the Christian it must be admitted that the Bible constitutes the ultimate tribunal of appeal ; but the requisitions of the Bible are grounded in the highest reason, even in the Reason of God.) The doctrine of the atonement is often held forth with no other claims to notice or acceptance. But it is certain that unless the hearer has been brought to feel in the wants of his own being the necessity of an atonement, he will always think that his teacher has misapprehended the instructions of the Divine oracles. In a particular manner the doctrine of the Trinity—the sublimest and most mysterious of all doctrines—is frequently exhibited in such a way as to leave the impression upon the hearer or reader that it is one of outward revelation simply, that there is no ground for it in the essence of the Divine Being, nor any reason for its belief to be found in the wants of humanity ; that it not only far transcends the comprehension of finite minds, but that it

ward, the other an outward manifestation. Yet this doctrine does not imply an actual plurality in the Divine Essence, but rather fixedly retains the idea of Unity undestroyed. But without supposing an original threefold distinction in the One Divine being, even for science this barren oneness becomes inoperative and dead; and we might in vain seek for that which it must forever want, viz.—a first moving principle, a *primum movens*. In a manner somewhat similar, although adopting neither the same words nor the same mode of exhibition, Schelling long since represented a threefold distinction in God; but more particularly in his treatise on human freedom he has made an appropriate scientific application of this idea. According to his view, the eternal One, (the Ground origi-
nant, called also the unoriginated Ground,) divides in two Originals, both equally eternal; or there is in Him a twoness, (duality,) to the end that life and personality might be possible. By means of that twoness eternally proceeding from the unoriginated Ground, arises Love, which conjoins the one of those eternal Originals, the Ideal, (the existent,) with the other, the

is even above the apprehension of reason and directly opposed to it. History teaches that the awakened Inquirer cannot long rest satisfied with such instructions. Reason is ever striving to give harmony and unity to all its knowledge. History teaches too, that this sublime truth does not lie entirely without the sphere of human thought, or of *practical speculation*, if such an expression may be allowed, (spiritual body). See in Appendix [E.] Tr.

Ground of existence. Essentially, the distinction is here made only that both may become One ; the separation, in order that Love may unite those who are separated. Yet this connecting Love, according to the representation of the above named treatise, is rather an originated Becoming than an original Being ;¹ and the free, independent, permanent Ground does not lose its distinctive characteristic by ascending into the purely ideal, not even in the untroubled clearness of a perfected, inwardly formed counterpart. An appropriate or individual life is rather ascribed to this Ground, and also a distinct agency, which, not only to aid our apprehensions nor in the order of thought simply, but in fact and in the order of time, is antecedent to the agency of the Spirit and of the Love. The procession of things from this Ground, which is the nature in God, and the agency of the Ground generally, is the chief object of discourse in that oft-named treatise ; and thus being a philosophy of the Ground, it is characterized as a philosophy of nature.² The sepa-

¹ The idea of a secondary being without beginning, (*anfangslosen Werdens*, an originated Becoming in opposition to an unoriginated Being, [eternal generation]), a derivation in essence but not in the order of time, was somewhat too refined, was somewhat incomprehensible, nay it appeared even contradictory to Arius, who had but little of the speculative or intuitive. We here see how little Origen's subjective form of intuition was adapted to the spirit of Arius. Neand. *Algm. Kircheng.* II. B. II Abt. s. 771. TR.

² Not having the work of Schelling, a short analysis of

rate existence of things, their distinctiveness from God, is explained in this manner, viz., they derive their ori-

which is here given, I fear lest I may have misapprehended some of the author's terms, and I hardly feel warranted to offer any farther explanations, lest I should misrepresent. Guided by Tennemann and Tholuck, however, I will venture to subjoin a few occasional statements which may serve to throw some light on those peculiar points in the philosophy of Schelling which are brought to view in this work.

Fichte attempted to deduce all things from the I in a progressive method. But with him it was altogether an arbitrary assumption that the Subjective produced the Objective, and not the latter the former. This order might be transposed, and we might as well proceed from nature to the I. Especially if we give ourselves up to wild speculation without critical and fixed rules, one method is just as admissible as the other. Schelling therefore differed from Fichte. He supposed there were two sciences which were the representatives or counterparts of each other;—the one he denominated *Transcendental Philosophy*, the other *Natural Philosophy*, or the philosophy of nature. Out of the I springs the former, and from the same it derives the objective, the multiform, the necessary = Nature; the latter derives its origin from Nature, and from it deduces the I, the Free, the Simple. The tendency of these two sciences is to make both the powers of nature and the powers of the soul, considered as identical, reflect mutual light upon each other. The fundamental principle lying at the basis of both is this; that the laws of nature may be immediately apprehended in consciousness as the laws of consciousness also, and conversely, the laws of consciousness may also be pointed out in objective nature as laws of nature. Yet the first in its constructive form can never ex-

gin from a Ground distinguished from God, but which, conformably to what has heretofore been said, and

haust the multitudinous, nor can the last ever attain to the absolutely simple. It is not possible to conceive how multiplicity could spring from unity, and how again from this multiplicity should spring a unity which at the same time involves within itself both multiplicity and unity. Both of these lose themselves in the infinite, which is common to both. There must therefore be a *higher*, a connecting philosophy, from which these two sister sciences spring. Schelling supposed that the essence of Knowing consisted in the *original oneness* of the knowing subject and the object known; the absolute Ideal and the absolute Real. From thence he deduced his system of the *absolute identity* of the subjective and the objective; or the indifference of the differenced, wherein consists the essence of the Absolute = God. He did not rest satisfied with thus representing God as the Absolute, the Centre from which all things radiate and towards which all things converge; but he plunged still deeper into this mysterious depth and attempted to shew how the personality of God arose. He placed in the Divine Being a dark uncreated Ground and also a brightened Form of the same. A third principle or power united these together. The first he named the perverted God, (*umgekehrten Gott*), the *Enemy of every creature*; and as the bright God was developed from the dark original Ground by means of the evolution of the dark God in the world, so God himself derived his existence from Satan. (We must suppose, however, that these statements are not to be taken literally, but that they are mere symbolic representations.) Thus God is not free and independent, He is subjected to the still higher conditions of his own being; his manifestation was *necessary*,

since no absolute dualism can here find a place, still belongs to God, and is designated as that which is *in* God, but is not God himself. Absolutely considered, God is then first realized only as he beholds himself in an image formed through a reflex presentation. But it is easy to perceive that neither this self-knowledge of God, nor the formation of things would be possible, without an Understanding to arrange and classify, through which distinction and form might be effected among the dark agitations of original powers excited and pervaded by obscure appetencies. From these powers thus distinguished and arranged, or thus brought into order, originates body; but the living bond of union between these powers, distinguished indeed but not entirely disparted from each other—that bond which springs from the depth of the Ground—is called soul. Without that living bond the distinction would not be creative; it would rather be a rending in sunder, yea a deadening of these powers. Hence every being in nature is to be regarded as animated by a soul;¹ and the more perfectly so in pro-

and even in the order of time Intelligence sprang from Non-intelligence, from the nature in God, the Chaos. This being the character of the Absolute and of the Ground, both subject to the law of an inexorable necessity, it follows that every thing that springs from them, nature, the will, sin, and every thing else, is involved in the same law, and therefore his philosophy may justly be characterized as the philosophy of nature; all things are the products of necessity. See Appendix, [F.] Tr.

¹ Beseelt, *soulified*, if we may be allowed to coin a word

portion as the powers contained in it are more definitely and clearly distinguished. Every thing is rooted in a double principle ; first in the Ground, by which it is distinguished from God, and secondly, also, in the understanding of God. Upon the first rests the individual will of the creature ; which, however, in a lower degree of formation appears as a blind instinct only. The highest degree is characterized thus ; that in a being even the deepest point of original darkness—the darkness derived from the Ground—is entirely brightened into light, by means of progressive distinguishings and a more perfect transformation of its powers. Of all beings known to us, man alone is elevated to this summit. Through his derivation from the Ground, he possesses, in reference to God, an independent principle in himself ; but it is only with the transformation of that principle into light, which in its connexion with the Ground remains dark, that spirit at the same time springs up in him : so that the soul of man is the living identity of both principles, the dark and the light. Or in other words, when that principle originating from the Ground—the principle of individual being whereby man is distinguished from God—is elevated to an harmonious union with the ideal principle, there is in man—a spirit. Even as in God also there is spirit, when all the depths of the Real lying in the Ground are illumi-

for the exigency. The author does not mean to affirm that every object in nature is endowed with a separate individual soul, but that all creation is pervaded by a living Power, the Law of Life. TR.

See also for X. L. of Laws.

nated by the Ideal in him, from which illumination there arises a resolved harmony of both principles in the most perfect accord—*that identity, namely, which is not to be confounded with absolute sameness, nor yet with entire inseparableness.* That this peaceful union is indissoluble in God—that these principles in perfect harmony, each one in its proper place and manner, characterize the whole Divine Being—and that in the eternity of God there is no strife or dissonance—this belongs to his perfection. Were the case precisely the same in regard to man, that is, were this bond of both principles in him also so inseparable as that the individual will could never aspire upward from its tranquil Ground, but always remained in peaceful accord and subordination to the other principle, the universal will; then there would be no distinction between God and man—God would not be manifested as spirit, man would be as God. The union of these principles must, therefore, be separable in man, and this constitutes—in the words of the work so frequently referred to already—the possibility of good and evil.

It may well somewhat surprise us that the freedom of the human will, sought for and expected, *is not here to be found*, but on the contrary we are presented with the possibility of good and evil; for these two conceptions are by no means of precisely the same import. In reference to good and evil we must rather inquire in the first place whether they are the actual consequence of human freedom of Will, or whether they arose through

Divine appointment and pre-determination, or finally, whether they must be regarded merely as the natural offspring of an involuntary excitation of forces, which took place already in the first creation? The possibility of good and of evil does not at all necessarily involve the possibility of such beings who with conscious self-determination act from themselves, and from whose free election the moral good and the moral evil of human actions must originate, if so be that moral freedom generally belongs to man.—But in fact it is not the double possibility of good and of evil which can be legitimately deduced from the premises assumed in this work, or from the separability of principles ; but rather, all those positions being conceded, there would result from them directly *the possibility of evil only*. For good is already originally there, and its possibility rests, according to the representations made, upon entirely different grounds than upon the possible disseverance of principles ; the essence of good is namely—the uninterrupted harmony of the powers. Not the possibility of good, but the possibility of *evil* only, depends, as we are led to conclude by following consecutively the whole course of reasoning in that work, upon the circumstance that disharmony may enter into man. And this also appears really to be the true sense of Schelling in his treatise, for the nearer and more direct inquiry expressly proposes as the problem to be solved, the possibility of evil only, and seeks to make this intelligible. But the inquiry proceeding in this manner, recedes farther and farther from the original end proposed ; and it is

no longer the freedom of the will, but evil only which is sought after. And, in consequence of a train of thought once entered upon, this evil seems to be represented as some offspring of original nature,—as a natural product. We believe, too, that this character of evil, and the whole view of the subject as exhibited in the speculations of Schelling, must be the necessary result, so soon as such an importance, nay we might say such a preponderating power, is once attributed to the Ground. From the assumption that there is a Ground independent of God, in so far as he is Spirit and conscious Will—and that out of this ground individual being has originated—may be derived the possibility of evil indeed, (and scarcely even this!) but not the possibility of a free will. For, according to this view, individual being, although independent of God in so far as he exists, yet becomes the more dependent upon him so far forth as he is the Ground of existence; it is therefore independent of the Spirit, but dependent upon the Nature. Hence it is not to any individual man, but to the Ground only that a certain independence of God, a relative self subsistence, can be ascribed. The self-subsistence of each individual will, which can hardly with satisfaction be explained as the correlative image of the Divine Conscious will, must, as it would seem on the view just given, be the correspondent of, or become subordinate to the unfree and dark Ground. For this Ground, operating as a blind power, is able to produce nothing but necessary consequences, in all the gradations of its products, however far

removed. If, then, the derivation of man's free will from God, in so far as he is a spirit and exists with consciousness, has its great and undeniable difficulties ; yet the derivation is encumbered with difficulties infinitely greater, when the fountain of freedom is sought for in something ulterior to the consciousness and the personality of God. Yet the most important question—and one which it is our conviction must be decided in the negative—is, whether there can be supposed to exist in God, independent of his spirit and personality, a root of any life, and an actual distinct agency of the Ground? There must indeed without doubt be in him a distinction of qualities, (in order that there may be life and manifestation); but also, (to the end that he may have unity and perfection,) there must be an inseparableness of powers, together with a peaceful co-union and harmonious co-operation of those powers in Eternity which always remain the same—which excludes every succession and variation of time. As in infinite space—that silent shadow of eternity falling in upon creation—there is neither above nor beneath, so also in the eternity of God there is neither before nor after.

Thus also in the Tri-unity perfected in itself, that which we call first is also the last, and conversely, the last is first ; consequently, there is in it no quality that is anterior to others. It is also impossible that there should be in God any thing prior to the Divine will, and independent of it ; and least of all could it be so in the order of time. God is in no sense before or ul-

terior to his will ; and this Schelling has expressed most definitely in the following sentence : " There is in strict accuracy no other Being whatever than the Willing ;—the Willing is the primary Being." Since, now, we here recognize the peculiarity of this philosophy expressed in a noticeable manner ; and inasmuch as we quote below a passage entire, which is very decisive on the question now under consideration, (—viz. whether the Ground can furnish a root independent of the personality of God ?)—" It is no contradiction to assert, that in the circle from which all things are, that by which the One is produced, is itself in turn again produced from it"—we deem it necessary only to add, that in the singular application of these speculative views in the writing now before us, in order to aid us in discovering the desired root of evil, the idea of unity is frequently lost sight of. Hence in this work we find defended the position of a distinct agency of the Ground *for a longer time* ; hence an excitation of evil happening already in the first creation, and evident indications of it in nature antecedent to human freedom ; hence universal evil developed as a principle, which, throughout the universe lying in hostile opposition to the good, broke forth from *the Creation* ; and hence, finally, the necessity of sin.

The cause of this scientific phenomenon seems evidently to lie in the preponderance yielded to nature, in a strong tendency towards the Real, and in the aversion, which in end of itself is proper, that is felt to mere notional conceptions. Hence even in this

As Prof. Edwards, &c.

inquiry into things purely spiritual, a philosophy of nature, favored by prepossession, becomes predominant. With an increasing love for nature, the ideal principle must frequently be driven back into its inward recesses, or become entirely latent. By placing in God the operation of a nature, it results as a necessary consequence that God himself, as it were organically, is developed before our eyes from deep darkness until he attains to the bloom of a personal life; and, if the expression may be tolerated, he almost appears to be the subject of growth. And as the plant, which in its roots is subjected to darkness and constraint, but in its blossoms struggles forth into light and liberty—thus exhibiting a most touching emblem of silent, longing sorrow—so on the supposition of a nature in God, the Divine Being could never perfectly liberate himself from necessity and darkness; nor could he remove from himself a slight, though always vanquished, sensation, (pressure, impression, Andrang,) of melancholy and sadness. With such a fixed destiny pervading all things, the investigation must necessarily end in the assumption of a freedom, which, in opposition to God and nature, cannot be maintained where it is most needed, viz,—in action. So in this work of Schelling, notwithstanding the opposing moral seriousness that reigns throughout the whole, and contrary to the expectation awakened at the commencement, empirical freedom is entirely given up, and all that is left to man is One free act, anterior to all consciousness; and this act, the possibility of which is

not grounded in the first principles, does forever unchangeably determine all his acting. This is a theory of freedom, which, although undesirable, can by no means be said to be unheard of; for, to name no other examples, Leibnitz and Kant, (as theorists,) long since came to much the same result, though in different ways. For although that intelligible act is not found in the system of Leibnitz, yet in his predetermined harmony, (by which, indeed, still less is conceded to liberty than in the theory of Schelling,) there is already involved the determination of all actions by an unavoidable necessity; since by it must be explained the harmonious connexion between soul and body. It is true that in his view the soul does indeed act from itself; but yet it acts only in conformity with those necessary laws which have been implanted in it ever since creation—and this is necessary, to preserve the harmony between the creation and the Creator. Could the will but *once* depart from the path strictly marked out before it, one such departure would immediately destroy the predetermined harmony. It was Leibnitz's views of nature, and the strict subjection to its laws extended by him even over the realm of spirits, which in a manner compelled him to assume that predetermination. To him the creation appeared so impenetrable and so compactly constructed, that it could never afford an entrance to the light of the free spirit; since the course of life for each individual was already determined from eternity, and had been brought into strict and preestablished harmony with the movements of the

whole machine. He believed empirical freedom to be so irreconcilable with the order of nature and the Divine government of the world, that rather than surrender the latter he preferred to bind the former to an unchanging and unchangeable law of predetermination. But, in what is said of monads; viz. that they are not to be regarded as material, but as powers of presentation, there is contained the germ of a more living view of the world, and the prophecy of our future deliverance from a strict adherence to nature.¹

¹ Leibnitz was one of the first philosophers who was led to a more spiritual apprehension of the material world, and of the laws by which it is governed. Preceding writers had been in the habit of regarding the Creator and the creation as totally and diametrically opposed to each other in their characteristic qualities. The latter, or the material of which it was formed, was regarded as hard, rigid, unyielding, filled with evil properties; and by many it was regarded as the source of all evil. Hence Aristotle believed that the world in its present form was eternal, and Plato taught that matter was co-eternal with God. Hence the atomic theory of Epicurus, who in words indeed acknowledged the existence of a God, but his God had so little intercourse or sympathy with this creation, that he rather enclosed himself in the depths of his own Eternity, and left the universe to take care of itself.

Epicurus held that an infinite number of hard atoms floating about in the vast inane, were by their inward motion gradually brought together, and by degrees arranged themselves in their present forms. Hence also the vortices of Descartes, who thought that on the principles and laws of mechanics simply he could account for all the phenomena of

It is acknowledged by those who have been in a condition to observe impartially the phenomena in the do-

creation without having recourse to the hypothesis of a Framer or Creator. Even Sir Isaac Newton, the cotemporary of Leibnitz, believed that all the forms of the bodily world were ultimately constituted of the same specific material, and that the essence of this material consisted in particles infinitely small. He held that these particles were hard, impenetrable, and totally dissimilar to spirit; he was therefore, in all essential respects, an atomist. He seemed inclined to believe that even the Law of gravitation consisted in a countless number of these invisible atoms—or in other words, that a subtile ethereal matter pervaded the universe, by virtue of which the vast spheres that roll through infinity were attracted towards each other. But if his own principle that matter is *infinitely* divisible be correct, must it not ultimately be resolved into something else than atoms?

Leibnitz rejected entirely the atomic theory and introduced his own theory of monads. In the system of Leibnitz these monads are *spiritual* atoms, not the hard, impenetrable, insoluble things of Epicurus and Descartes, (by the Grecian these atoms were so called on account of their supposed impenetrable nature and their indissolubleness, ἄτομοι γλόνται διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερότητα,) but substances all permeable to a higher power, and actually permeated by a higher power. They are simple, uncompounded, without parts, without divisibility, without extension or figure; they constitute the elements of things, and bodies are nothing more than the phenomena or aggregate of these monads. These units are living, animated, spiritual. “Les substances simples, les vies, les âmes, les esprits, sont des unités.” All creation, therefore, is pregnant with life; and, if the word be taken

See Plato's & Aristotle's Laws. and Seneca

main of science, that the writings of Schelling have of late awakened a more comprehensive view of the world, and in particular have spread abroad a more living insight into nature; that through the influence of this philosophy upon the age a new impulse has been excited for the love of nature, and a more spiritual apprehension of its laws, in as much as he strives to catch the Spirit of Life which manifests itself in the visible world, and through which nature becomes to us both human and divine. By saying this however, it is not intended to be asserted that this has already been fully effected, but rather that there is a strong tendency that way, and still more is continually sought.¹ But a scientific the-

with rigorous and philosophic precision, there is no such thing as *death* to be found. Thus Leibnitz removed the essential dualism which had previously been thought to exist between matter and spirit, and he boldly denied that there was any vast chasm between the creation and the Creator. He maintained that there was no cleft or saltus in nature, but that in the physical and moral world, all was one continuous and connected chain of gradation. "Leibnitz admettoit comme un principe fondamental de sa sublime philosophie: qu'il n'y a jamais de sauts dans la nature, et que tout est continu ou nuancé dans le physique et dans le moral." These speculations were the precursor of the Dynamic theory, and this, in its turn, prepared the way for the Magnetism of Germany. TR.

¹ The writings of Schelling produced a deep and extensive effect upon Germany. His followers were exceedingly numerous, and they were made up of Philosophers,

ory which contemplates nature as no machine, and every activity in it as a real life; which, consequently, in the productions of creation recognizes not merely the results of mathematical laws, but an exhibition of soul and mind, so that to it even body appears as soul, and every plant as some intricate feature of spirit; ¹—should not such a theory have determined first of all whether there is in nature a changeless, necessary connexion

Theologians, Philologists, Physicians and Naturalists. They attempted to comprehend all things according to the point of view held forth in the doctrine of Absolute Identity; they sought also to give systematic completion to this system which had been left imperfect. His speculations had a very remarkable influence particularly upon inquiries into nature, upon Mythology, History, the Arts and æsthetic Criticism. TR.

¹ Schelling held that strictly speaking all things are but one and the same original Being. The difference of things with respect to their essence is in *quantity* only, not in *quality*, (quantitativer kein qualitativer Unterschied;) in the preponderance of the objective and the subjective, of the ideal and the real. Every finite thing, as a product of a reflection existing only relatively, has a reality in appearance only. The One absolute Being manifests himself in the eternal generation of things; and these things constitute the Forms of this Being. Consequently every thing is a manifestation of the absolute in a determinate *Form*. Nothing therefore exists which is not participant of the Divine Being. Hence also Nature is not dead but living, and divine also as well as the Ideal. All events in the universe, all history, is but the developement of God gradually unfolding itself. TR.

between cause and effect, or whether will, and Spirit may not be the ruling powers in it? And if the latter, how can an eternal predetermination and necessity of all human actions appear tenable?—That one intelligible act—an act which was never the object of consciousness, and which in the whole subsequent life must be atoned for or its bitter fruits gathered—offers, to say the least, but a poor indemnification for the loss of liberty in this life, which alone for the present is *ours*. The thought that each one has been from eternity what he now is, and that in consequence of that intelligible act he could not possibly have been otherwise, is repulsive, not so much because it is difficult to be comprehended, as because it does not answer the purpose for which it was invented. It does not remove the difficulties in which the question is involved; it not only renders unintelligible the most remarkable facts of our moral nature, but it directly contradicts them. What concerns the first of these points must be treated of subsequently; but some examination in regard to the second may here find its appropriate place.

How that intelligible act could be a free act, and how, in consequence of it, there can justly be any imputation of moral character, is at least not rendered comprehensible. It would seem rather, that inasmuch as that act lies without the province of and anterior to all consciousness—the indispensable condition of moral freedom—it must be unfree, and that consequently there can be no imputation of it. But as the imputation of moral character is unavoidable, so this imputation must be grounded upon acts of an entirely different char-

acter, that is, upon acts absolutely free.—To the remarkable moral phenomena which receives no elucidation from this hypothesis, we reckon, farther, the gradual deterioration of those who attain to a high degree of recklessness. It is undeniable that this does not take place at once, but progressively, and in the course of time. The fact has already been noticed above, that the evil as well as the good in man is susceptible of cultivation, and that it has a growth ; nay, if not early and vigorously opposed, it will ultimately acquire an unconquerable power. On this view the conflict between good and evil, in so far as it concerns the human soul, is confined to a temporal state ; and the life time of each individual is the appropriate period in which the processes of fermentation and clarification must go on between these hostile elements. According to the other view the most perfect immorality,—for which the perfected villain was already destined from eternity—must break forth with the first dawn of consciousness ; but this is evidently not the case, any more than that moral maturity and manly energy in good, are found to be coeval with the first awakening of consciousness.—Besides, the warning conscience, and that inward conflict accompanying an immoral life, receive at least but a very unsatisfying explanation from the theory here brought into view. This internal strife evidently points—not to a determination now fully made, but to a struggling of powers still arrayed in battle. But if the evil man were already evil from eternity, and if it were impossible for him to be otherwise, whence is that better voice in him, and to what end ? The better

voice in him plainly shows that the contest has not yet been determined ; and indicates that the decision cannot be made before the termination of the conflict. On no other supposition than the one here maintained could the warning conscience have any end. Otherwise its resistance to evil were but a sport of nature, and would have to be regarded as the after-pain consequent on sin ; by means of which, after the perfected birth of evil, no regeneration could be effected. Or we should have to look upon it as the last convulsive effort of better powers already destroyed from eternity, even as in many animals when killed we may still observe a lively play of the fibres, as the last vain reaction of departing life. And another objection, though not the only one, yet one of very great weight against this view, is, to use the very expression of the author himself, that it entirely cuts off from man, for the present life at least, and we may add for eternity too, all hope of change from good to evil and from evil to good. A consequence which is not removed by the fact that the author of that oft named treatise, influenced less by the theory presented than by a strong moral feeling, could not forbear attempting to show the purpose of this better voice, which warns the unreformed to repent, and by yielding obedience to which he first obtains inward peace ; and, as though satisfaction had now first been rendered to the original idea, he finds himself in a state of reconciliation with his guardian spirit. But that stern demand which can endure no evasion, and the universal validity of this inward mon-

itor felt by every one without exception, or rather the sacred and at the same time terrifying character of this better voice, proves the presence of something actually better, of *that* freedom namely, in the possession of which it must be possible for every individual, even now in the present life—in this period so full of other and varied transmutations—to effect that conversion of his inward self which conscience demands, and which alone can deliver him from the pangs of remorse; to effect it even by a free return to God, whether this return ultimately rests upon aid human or Divine.

If now one should wish to explain and determine more narrowly in regard to that inward calling, he would have to find its ultimate ground in God alone, and would be obliged to consider it as but the voice of God heard in the heart. Hence that freedom also, to which this Divine voice so definitely appeals, must be conceived of as in the Divine understanding, and as willed by the Divine will; that is, it must *actually be*. He who would deny this, must point out in the very idea of God such traits as could not, in the present life at least, be reconciled with the freedom of the human will. But one who denies the freedom of man ought to be the last, it would seem, to make his appeal to the Will of God generally, or to the Divine Holiness in particular. For, if there be a Will in God, and even pre-eminently an Holy Will, why should he not have willed that, without which it would have been impossible that he could ever have been manifested as a Holy Being;—viz., the Freedom of the

Will? The more the idea of a free and living Personality is retained in reference to God, the more certainly does the consequence follow, that such a Being, (according to the word of Schelling taken by us in its most literal sense,) could never find his pleasure in a machine how perfectly soever it might be constructed. He must rather will the Free and the Personal, and oppose these to himself as his own image reflected; and they alone can correspond to the proper life of the original Author. To none but beings of this kind, in whom God again recognizes his own spirit, could the Creator direct himself as to the proper and worthy objects of that intellectual and Divine love with which he loved the world from eternity; and on the other hand, none but such beings would be able to know or love Him. For none but personal beings are the proper objects of love; and none other than they possess the capability of loving. Now although it was necessary that man should be a personal being in order that God might be manifested, yet he is surely not to be considered as simply a *means* for the attainment of *this* end; for from the fact that he possesses personality, the end of his existence is at the same time placed in himself; that is, by means of a kind of self-withdrawal of God, man is elevated to that degree of spiritual dignity and self-subsistence, upon which he is capable of being somewhat for himself, and by himself: wherefore, also, the attainment of the end of his existence stands in the strictest possible connexion with his own inward energy. True, indeed, man is placed up-

on that elevated position for the very reason that God must manifest himself; but still, he never would have been manifested as a Will of love and of holiness, had not man at the same time been capable of recognizing himself as a personal being, and as having in him a self-end, and were he not able through his own natural power to strive after the most perfect state of being. But this perfectness of being, wherein does it consist, if not in the realization of the original idea in life, when man through his own agency comes to be conformed to the likeness of God? Thus an obligation, [an absolute Ought,] is imposed upon man, and his personal relation with God becomes at the same time a moral one. But certain as it is that God, as a holy Being, wills morality, so certain is it also that he must will the conditions under which alone morality is possible. Now whether morality appears under the strictest form of self-denial yielding obedience to the law, and brings as a sacrifice to right all opposing feelings, or whether it shines out as love; yet always, under both forms, its possibility and its worth are given only through the freedom of the will. For though love follows the Beautiful without artifice or calculation, yet it is love only on condition that every compulsive power is removed from it, and that the devotion to its object is a most free act of the soul. Thus, too, the pious tendency of the mind towards God; on the one side, indeed, it appears simply to be a natural return to the living Central-point which always attracts the wandering spirit; yet on the other hand there is demanded a

most free directing act of the spirit itself, and this return cannot be effected without a struggle, and a conquest over counteracting obstacles. Even self-denial, in its rigid adherence to law and right, from its very name directs to an individuality of effort, a self-energy, which can vanquish as well as be vanquished ; so also law and right, (rules of conduct for such as are not determined by the law of nature,) are conceptions which have significance only for those who are free. But since the validity of these conceptions, especially for the present state of being, cannot for one moment be disputed, and since the demand to lead a moral life is continually repeated and urged upon every one ; so it would seem that no one can be destitute of the only condition under which such a life is possible in the present period of existence—that is, no one can be without empirical freedom. He who has placed man in this period of trial and of conflict, and imposed upon him an obligation to fight the battle of light with darkness, surely could not have willed that this should be a conflict in appearance simply—the decision of which had been long before made—but must have designed that it should be an actual and severe contest, for which also he must have bestowed upon him placed on the battle-field the necessary powers and weapons—the arms of the spirit and of freedom.

To render intelligible the manner in which a power at least relatively independent of God, can, together with the freedom of the will, be imparted to a creature, is, without doubt, a task of very great

difficulty—and this difficulty presses itself in no small degree upon every theory of freedom where real freedom is retained. Be it now that in this relation God is conceived of simply as might and power, or that he is thought of under the form of Will also, still there is always involved a self-subsistence of the Finite in opposition to the Infinite, and the problem is this: To show how other self-subsistent powers may exist at the same time with the absolute and unlimited power of God, or how a particular individual Will can co-exist with a universal Will? That all beings in the world are necessarily dependent upon God, cannot by any one be called in question. The dependence of creatures upon God, is not, as it were, a mere consequence of the Divine Omnipotence, but is the immediate condition of the continued existence of things. Even in wicked persons—to notice here, by way of anticipation, an objection which appears still more difficult—God must still continually co-operate, in order that their existence may be possible, [for if his sustaining agency were withdrawn they would be nothing.] —But certain as it is that the creature is always dependent upon God, yet the freedom of the human will must be maintained to be *as* certain, and this, too, from grounds of the highest importance. There must, therefore, be a state of dependency with which self-subsistence may co-exist, and such a relation of both may be conceived of, (at least in the Divine understanding,) that neither the freedom of the finite being is destroyed by the infinite power of God, nor is His

power infringed by the freedom of the human will. Were God merely a dead conformity to law, or the totality of powers blindly operative, then indeed the relation demanded could not at all exist. From such a nature in God, had it even been possessed of a might twice as great as omnipotence, nothing personal could ever have been developed ; and no self-subsistence could be maintained in opposition to its unconditioned causality. But the case is very different with the much higher idea of a most perfect Being—the Personal God. True, indeed, every life, even the most perfect, is dependent upon Him in a twofold sense : dependent as having derived its existence from Him, and dependent, also, upon his continuous necessary co-operation and sustaining agency, which must extend through the whole as well as to each individual part. This view of dependency, however, does not in any sense involve an actual denial of the freedom of the will. To have come into being through the agency of another is not to be bound to this agent in every movement of life. Even that which may stand in need of another for its continued existence, does not therefore cease to be and to act for itself ; and notwithstanding the continual influences of this other, yet to a being dependent in this manner, inward individuality, and a self-subsistent agency acting from itself, always remain possible.

Visible nature even furnishes us with a proof of this relation. That which is produced is dependent upon that which produces it only in reference to its coming into existence, and not in regard to its after-

life. The plant which originally sprouts from the earth and is rooted in it, is, indeed, dependent upon its mother in a twofold sense. Yet even to this plant, although placed much lower in the scale of life, there belongs a self-subsistence, which, by its specific individuality, and through the particular mode of its formation and growth, it maintains in opposition to the universal mother of all organized forms that belong to the earth. What to creatures placed much lower in the order of being is a *relative* self-subsistence, that, upon the highest point of developement, is the freedom of the human will. The ground of the perfection of the creature must be sought for only in the perfection of God ; the more perfect He is, the more will a perfection similar to his own be exhibited in the most exalted of his creatures. It belongs to the perfection of God alone not to be continually striving and working through endless impulsion as a blind power without rule or aim, but as a will of wisdom and of love to govern creatures bearing a resemblance to himself. And to the end that the Free and the Personal may exist at the same time with him, his power does not operate with violence or unconditionally, but is conditioned—conditioned, namely, by his own will. This may be regarded as an act of Divine self-denial, or, if any one prefers the expression, as an act of self-limitation. Should any one say that according to this mode of representation God himself, in a certain sense, would seem to be subjected to the form of the finite, he would thereby express a true and religious idea, provided

at the same time he did not exclude the consideration, (which in the domain of the eternal is perfectly conceivable,) that God does not therefore cease to be infinite. But if it be asked, how could God impart to man an unconditioned freedom of action, without any disturbance of the most necessary relations in his government? we at once deny that human freedom is unconditioned; it is rather the freedom of a finite being, and is confined within the bounds of a limited circle of action:—it is precisely the freedom of *willing*, not an unconditional power of operating on creation in general. Finally, should any one be displeased that limits are here assigned to God, only relatively however, and by his own most free determination; to such an one we answer that the conception of an entire illimitedness is in itself merely notional; and is erroneously supposed to belong to the highest perfection. If no limits whatever be ascribed to God—not even those which he may have imposed upon himself—then no real predicates should be applied to him; for every predicate involves some limitation, either that which excludes or that which more narrowly defines every other.

But without predicates the idea itself evaporates into dim incomprehensible mist;—into that which is infinite, but indeterminate and without character. Were the Eternal but a continuous streaming forth of infinite power, (somewhat comparable to an infinite straight line, which from its very nature is susceptible of no specific form, or inclination, not even to itself,) it

would be impossible to make him an object of distinct thought—for there would be darkness upon such a depth. But since the Eternal comprehends himself as Spirit in that streaming forth, and recognizes himself as somewhat limited ; and since, as it were, the flow of the eternal tide sets in against the ebb, from the beholding of this opposition there arises a personal life in God—and there is light. Thereby God exists as Spirit, but for himself alone ; like as a vast depth enclosing the light within itself. But with the Spirit, is also connected the Will, which is originally directed to itself alone, and is hence to be regarded as an intellectual love of God towards himself, as a delight which he takes in his own self-contemplation. Whilst yet the active operation of powers in him is not destroyed by that act of Divine self-knowledge, but only determined or directed by it, so the stream of life is not held in check or interrupted, but is brightened into light. And because this life in God is at the same time a will of love, and as all love would make itself known to that which is not self, there is therefore in God also a will for manifestation. This will is the Word through whom all things exist ; the Word by whom the divine thoughts are brought to a manifestation, are made, as it were, to become Man, (or are formed into humanity, *Menschwerdung*.) As in man himself, without that redeeming or creative Word, the whole spiritual life would have lain buried under the darkness of a nature still teeming unintelligently to the birth ; so also, nothing individual or particular could have ever been developed from the

depth of the Divine Being, had it not been for the co-presence and co-agency of that Primal Word. Considered in itself, that power which constantly co-operates with the creature, is indeed infinite, the more especially so as it is exhibited in man ; but nevertheless this power acts in a determinate mode, in that manner, namely, which is conformable to the Will of Love. Now this Will of love does not desire itself only, and hence does not wish that the pure Godhead alone should exist, but it determines also that at the head of all earthly beings the personal and free creature shall stand as the reflected image of the Creator. Hence it is, that between God and man there exists a double bond of union :—the bond of nature or of life, and also the bond of love and of spirit. The first expresses a necessary, the other a free relation. By means of the first, the soul is rooted in a necessary and indissoluble union with God ; and no freedom can be predicated of this relation in which man, as a natural being, stands to his Creator. The other relation, which in its very nature is a moral one, consists in a free surrender of one's self to God through love and humble acknowledgment. Man's obligation to add the moral to the natural bond is enhanced in proportion as the original love has been the more bestowed on him. If this relation be sustained, it is accounted to man as a merit ; if interrupted or destroyed, it is reckoned guilt :—that is, it must be regarded as his own act.

By the representations which have now been made, although the subject is by no means exhausted, yet we

think that it has at least been satisfactorily shown that with the relation of dependency there may yet at the same time exist self-subsistence and freedom; and that even the perfection of the Creator—that is, the moral perfection of God—renders it necessary for us to assume such a relation between himself and man—a relation which does not destroy freedom, and makes morality possible. The highest power only becomes the more perfect from the fact that instead of acting with all-subduing violence, it operates in a determinate mode as a spirit of holiness and of love. On the other hand, this higher power may safely leave man free, for the very reason that it is omnipotent, for it is the character of strength not to fear freedom; and it is precisely because Omnipotence governs the world, that no infringement of universal order is to be apprehended from the personal self-subsistence of finite spirits.


Besides, the difficulty, a solution of which has now been attempted, is not removed by the surrender of empirical freedom merely, if instead of it, One free intelligible act be conceded, but it is only concentrating the difficulty upon a different point—namely, upon that intelligible act itself. For either the absolute dependence of man upon God, without the possibility of freedom, is asserted, or it is not. If not, then empirical freedom is also possible; but if on the contrary it be so asserted, then without controversy that intelligible act was not really a free act, but one unconditionally dependent upon God. All the other objections, too, which are commonly made against freedom, urge themselves

with the same correctness or incorrectness against that one presupposed intelligible act ; nor does this assumption, in fact, remove one of the important difficulties in which the question is involved. For example, to reconcile the permission of One evil act irrevocably determining for the rest of his life the destiny of the individual who commits it—to reconcile this with the holiness of God, is still more difficult than to reconcile with it the permission of such sins, from which conversion to a better state always remains possible, and in which actual regeneration is not excluded.

In reference to the unity and connexion of the universe, however, and in regard to the infringement of the course of nature apprehended from freedom, it is conceded, indeed, that that eternal act, being antecedent to all phenomena, could not effect any interruption in their order. But still, since the acts of each individual first come to be manifested in the progress of natural events, if the difficulty respecting the infringement of universal order have full and perfect validity under other circumstances, why would not the course of nature be destroyed or interrupted by the manifestation of free acts, originating from a freedom that was before all time ? If that intelligible acting was absolutely free, it must without question be assumed that from eternity every phenomenon of freedom was brought into the most strict accordance with the course of nature, and the latter with the former, by means of a predetermined harmony ; so that on such a supposition, the Determiner of events in this government of the world would not

properly have been the will of God, but rather the good or evil acts of men. But according to this representation the Creator would appear to be dependent upon the creature. And it is altogether more conceivable, and probable, that God should govern the world by imposing upon himself that limitation which we have defended, and by giving to beings actually free a circle of action in which they might move without constraint, than to imagine that the only end of creation should have been the manifestation of those intelligible acts which can never more be changed. The objections, finally, which are commonly urged against freedom from the fore-knowledge of God, apply with equal force against that oft named hypothesis. If Divine fore-knowledge be one and the same with pre-determination, and if it be irreconcilable with freedom; then this objection, if it have any force when urged against the freedom of empirical actions, destroys that also of the intelligible acts. For God must always be thought of as the First of all, and consequently we must suppose that he was in reality anterior to that intelligible act of man, and therefore foresaw it. If, however, this act be made co-eternal with God, then indeed he could neither have foreseen nor pre-determined it; but then on such a supposition there would arise a series of other, and much greater difficulties, which do not here seem to demand any particular investigation.

The author of this essay feels unwilling to express any thing determinately upon the question, whether the



co-existence of the Divine fore-knowledge with human freedom, can be made perfectly intelligible to the understanding; but would only say, as at the beginning, that the proposition in general seems to belong to the infinite. Still, however, as no circumscribing limit is placed upon the inquiry by this concession, so also human freedom would not be deprived of its sphere of action, even though it were in a manner conceded that its connexion with any other idea could not be fully comprehended by the understanding. That which from the other grounds is sufficiently certain, does not become impossible, even though on comparison with other individual truths it may appear paradoxical. Even the idea of God is by no means one of ordinary comprehensibility, yet it is always accompanied with the assurance of unquestionable certainty. And generally, it is in the domain of eternal truths, where the most wonderful paradoxes are found as in the proper place; yet those truths do not on account of these paradoxes, lose any thing whatever of their certainty or influence. The acts of Divine cognition and of thought are, without doubt, something very different from what these words express in the ordinary language of men. So also if any one would speak of the knowledge of God acquired by conceptions and logical deductions, the expressions would have to be taken in an entirely figurative sense. For the supreme Reason which lives in the eternal beholding of the universe needs no conceptions; because conceptions are but shadows of their essential equivalents, and necessary only on account of the poverty and

imperfectness of human intuitions. Still less does it stand in need of logical conclusions, which proceed solely from the effort to widen the circumscribed limits of human insight. In the same manner we cannot speak of God as having memory, or a recollection of events that are past, for with him nothing can pass away ; and for a like reason we cannot, in its literal sense, ascribe to him a fore-knowledge of the future, because Eternity has no future. Without attempting to relieve ourselves from embarrassment by asserting that time, viewed from its loftiest stand-point, is nothing, (since we do not utter a proposition without meaning when we say that things are *temporal*,) yet thus much is clear, that with God time cannot be the same as it is in relation to things, and that therefore we must conceive of the Divine fore-knowledge in a manner entirely different from that in which we are accustomed to view the things of time :—provided, however, that nothing inappropriate or contradictory be connected with this form of thought.

The common conception of prescience, as the fore-knowledge of that which is to take place in future time, is merely a human notion, resting upon the ground of the limited and the finite, whose character is succession ; and consequently it can in this manner by no means be predicated of God. As Omnipresence is not material and does not occupy space, so also fore-knowledge must be conceived of as not successive or temporal. God's knowledge of what is in man cannot be a knowledge acquired gradually in the way of learning ; it must be

an intellectual intuition of human life as a whole. We now acquire our knowledge in a fragmentary manner, but we hope that hereafter, face to face, we shall, by immediate intuition, know even as we are known, that is, as we are known to God, in whose understanding our life must be delineated as a whole, not separately in itself alone, but all its relations taken in connexion with the whole universe. All things present themselves as they are in their essential nature to the contemplation of God, and man also every moment stands before Him as that which he really is. Our form of thought being so intimately connected with succession, we seek to render this intelligible by representing it as fore-knowledge ; but in reference to God himself it can neither be designated as fore-seeing nor as predetermining, but as an eternal changeless act of Knowing, as an ever present, clear insight into the life and connexion of all things.

The question, How can it be that this Divine intuition does not determine the life of man in such a manner that predetermination alone remains, but no liberty ?—is essentially one and the same with that which has already been discussed—that of the relation between God and man, which permits personal freedom to co-exist with a state of dependency. For such an individualizing and separating of the act of thinking and the act of willing, of knowing and of being, as human abstraction has derived from experience, cannot for one moment be supposed to exist in the Divine Life, which excludes all parts and fragments. The

eternally Present stood in no need either of fore-knowledge or predetermination in order that the Divine wisdom might not err in regard to man.—Finally ; it appears to us that when the relation of a free spirit to the Divine Spirit is the subject of discourse, conceptions entirely inappropriate to this domain are too frequently employed—such conceptions, namely, as are abstracted from a consideration of the physical world, and the co-operation of material powers. But as spiritual presence, so spiritual agency, is, in its nature, not fitted to jar with or exclude other spirits. True, indeed, two or more *bodies* cannot at the same moment of time fill the same point in space, nor can they move on the same line without striking against each other. But all those laws lose their force when attempted to be transferred to a supersensuous world. Thoughts and sentiments the most diverse, nay even the most contradictory, may exist in reference to one and the same object at one and the same time, without any, even the least infringement resulting thence to the *spiritual* self-subsistence, or uninterrupted freedom of different individuals. Those phenomena of infringement and interruption can occur only under the condition of space, and existence in dimensions, under which circumstances there may, indeed, a multitude of possible bodily collisions result from matter and its impenetrability ; and hence bodies moving in different directions, if they meet in the same point, must necessarily interrupt or destroy each other's motion. Were the relation of the human spirit to God to be judged of according to these

laws, then the conclusion to be deduced from them would be very plain and easily to be formed ; but by so doing the spiritual would be transferred from its own sphere into one to which it does not at all belong, namely, from the domain of the spiritual into that of the physical and mechanical.¹

¹ These remarks deserve to be thoughtfully considered. May not all our contradictions in philosophy spring from the attempt to bring down to the comprehension of the Understanding those truths which appropriately belong to the domain of pure Reason? And are not many led to reject with scorn the mysteries of our Holy Religion, as contradictory and absurd, from the fact that some of its friends have attempted to embody in logical propositions and under the forms of conception, those truths which are appropriate only to intuition and to faith? The difficulties above noticed are not confined to Metaphysics and Theology. They are found equally in Physics and Mathematics. The subjoined extracts, taken from the Philosophical Collection of the learned Dr. Henry More, will serve to illustrate the principle alluded to.

“If the difficulty of framing a conception of a thing must take away the existence of the thing itself, there will be no such thing as *body* left in the world, and then all will be *spirit*, or nothing. For who can frame so safe a notion of a *body*, as to free himself from the entanglements that the *extension* thereof will bring along with it? For this *extended matter* consists of either indivisible points, or of particles divisible *in infinitum*. Take which of these you will, (and you can find no third,) you will be wound into the most notorious absurdities that may be. For if you say it consists of

It were an entirely different question, though nearly allied to the one last under consideration, to ask wheth-

points, from this position I can necessarily demonstrate that every *spear* or *spire-steeple*, or what long body you will, is as thick as it is long; that the tallest *cedar* is not so high as the lowest *mushroom*; and that the *moon* and the *earth* are so near one another that the thickness of your hand will not go betwixt; that *rounds* and *squares* are all one figure; that *even* and *odd* numbers are equal one with another; and that the clearest *day* is as dark as the blackest *night*. And if you make choice of the other member of the disjunction, your fancy will be little better at ease; for nothing can be divisible into parts it has not: therefore if a *body* be divisible into infinite parts, it has infinite extended parts: and if it has an infinite number of extended parts, it cannot be but a hard mystery to the imagination of man, that infinite extended parts should not amount to one whole infinite extension. And thus a *grain of mustard-seed* would be as well infinitely extended as the whole matter of the Universe, and a thousandth part of that grain as well as the grain itself. - Which things are more inconceivable than any thing in the notion of a *spirit*. Therefore we are not scornfully and contemptuously to reject any notion, for seeming at first to be clouded and obscured with some difficulties and intricacies of conception; since that of whose being we seem most assured, is the most entangled and perplexed in the conceiving, of any thing that can be propounded to the apprehension of man." *Antidote to Atheism*, p. 14.

"Reason attending to the nature of an exact *globe* and *plane*, will undoubtedly pronounce that they will touch in a *point*, and that they may be moved one upon another; but our imagination cannot but make this exception, that the

er the freedom of the human will can in general co-exist with the regular order and law-bondage to which nature is subjected?—and whether the former would not constantly be making insufferable interruptions in the latter?—Since the life of man has its root in the Ground of nature and is inwardly conjoined with the same, from the alleged freedom of the human will there follows a view of the world in every respect double, and, as it might seem, contradictory too. For according to this representation we must suppose that within the limits of one and the same universe, there

globe thus drawn upon the plane describes a *line* which must necessarily consist of *points*, point perpetually following point in the whole description. So likewise the *angle of contact* included betwixt the *periphery* and a *perpendicular* falling on the end of the *diameter* of a *circle*, geometricians prove by Reason to be less than any *acute angle* whatsoever, insomuch that a *line* cannot fall betwixt the periphery and the perpendicular: whence the *fancy* cannot but imagine this angle to be indivisible; which is a perfect contradiction, and against the definition of an *angle*, which is not the *coincidence* but the *inclination* of two lines. Besides, a lesser circle inscribed in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common diameter of them both, and then let fall a perpendicular on that end of the diameter where the circles touch; it will be evident that one *angle of contact* is bigger than the other, when yet they are both indivisible as was acknowledged by our imagination before: so that one and the same *angle* will be both divisible and indivisible, which is a plain contradiction.” *Appendix to the same*, p. 151, 152. Tr.

is on the one side the sternest Necessity, in the most strictly interlinked series of causes and effects ; and on the other, a Freedom from the law of this necessary consecutive series. If, now, in this two-fold view of the world there be involved an actual and inexplicable contradiction, or in other words, if we are obliged to concede in conformity with what has hitherto been said, that the freedom of the human will must be supposed to be correspondent to the will of a personal God, and may yet run counter to the course of nature regulated by law—which course of nature, however, is also to be regarded as an expression of the Divine Will—then it would necessarily follow that something—the freedom of the human will—may at the same time be conformed and not conformed to the will of God. Should any one, in order to avoid this startling contradiction, wish to give up either the necessary conformity of nature to law, or the freedom of the human will, then indeed the question would be quickly settled ;—but certainly not to the satisfaction of science, in whose domain those victories most easily achieved are not always the most glorious.

In the higher realm of thought, the immediate and direct problem for speculation is not to reject one of two apparently contradictory truths, but frequently this more difficult problem, viz. without the rejection of one or the other, to change their dissonance into harmony. In the case before us it is impossible not to perceive that such a demand is made directly upon our reason, because that grounds of equal importance determine us to hold fast both : i. e. we must believe in

a fixed order and necessary connexion in nature, since otherwise neither a science of nature, nor the possibility of seeking or finding God in it, would remain to man ; but at the same time also, we must maintain the self-subsistence of the human will, for without this there could be neither true morality, nor veneration for God as a holy Being. But the thought which naturally arises upon close examination—the thought that the same Divine will which is a will to nature, is also a will to the personality and self-subsistence of better creatures,—makes an absolute contradiction between spiritual freedom and the physical arrangement of the world actually inconceivable. If creation be not in general a machine, but an ascending series of powers organically developed, then it is impossible to understand how reciprocal interruption could take place, or how irreconcilable dissension could reign between powers of a lower order and that higher point of developement on which man is placed. That energy which pervades and animates the rest of nature is no foreign power hostile to spirit. If we are correct in calling this creation a creation of God, we indicate by the expression something more than a mere fabric which he has constructed and framed together from one knows not how many different materials,—a machine which he has now left to regulate its own movements ;—we rather mean by it a manifestation and a realizing of the Divine thoughts.¹

¹ Hooker seems to have entertained views not essentially different: "All things which God in their times and seasons hath brought forth, were eternally and before all times in

Yet the Divine thoughts thus realized do not at first indeed, nor at once, as by one bound, exhibit themselves under the highest and most spiritual forms ; but starting from the basis they rise after a fit and regular mode in an ascending order, and in this manner they proceed through every link of the series, not merely according to the notional representations of men, but in a manner actually creative. In this way every step of the ascending system becomes distinguished by some peculiar formation. Hence also every creature, although at first view it appears only as a finite individuality, yet for the thoughtful inquirer carries within it somewhat of the character of infinity. It is not matter, (a word which conveys little or no meaning,) but Will and active Power, which ultimately constitute the true essence of nature also ;

God, as a work unbegun is in the artificer which afterwards bringeth it into effect. [The comparison cannot be carried out to the extreme in all respects ; for in the latter case the artificer has the material provided ready to his hand, but in the former case the *Material*, as well as the *Form*, was absolutely dependent upon God.] Therefore whatsoever we do behold now in this present world, it was enwrapped within the bowels of the Divine Mercy, written in the book of Eternal Wisdom, and held in the hands of Omnipotent Power, the first foundations of the world being as yet unlaid. So that all things which God hath made are in that respect the offspring of God, they are in him as effects in their highest cause ; *he likewise actually is in them, the assistance and influence of his Deity is their life.*” *Eccles. Pol. B. V. TR.*

and the so called bodily or material things are nothing else than a deeply depressed, and thereby concealed and misapprehended spiritual being.

One cannot say that any where in nature life ceases or begins ;¹ there is every where found—as a mark of the spirit's presence—an energy and formative power. These active forces are, however, frequently concealed, and in a state of confinement. Together with many serene and glorious appearances in nature, there are at the same time spread over creation traces of lowliness and pensive sorrow ;—that depression which operates silently in hidden depths, and never becomes visible to man ; and that sadness which, with inward mourning, feels the want of a still higher freedom, and which sometimes, as it were with convulsive throes, dilates its ancient bonds and strives to burst them. Where do we not see betrayed, as if unintentionally, that inward principle of activity which gives the lie to all opinions of a merely outward and

¹ Locke expands the same sentiment in the following language. "It is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end ; and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely, which is the lowest species of living things, and which is the first of those who have no life ? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as the quantity does in a *regular cone*, where, though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance, yet the difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discernible." Tr.

artificial world—a world which is inanimate and has nothing kindred to spirit? You will say that nature is dead;—for you, then, all the mighty piles of mountains are but inert masses. Yet they send up witness of their life in every fountain, and in their wonderful strata of rocks and minerals. Thus in those subterraneous regions the active spirit of the earth pursues its labour with unheard but ceaseless energy, and when man penetrates thither he finds the work already performed. Yet the forming process and the labourer he sees not; no whispering sound of their operation ever reaches his ear.

But notwithstanding this profound repose, we still have evidences of an inward striving; and on the contemplation of these powers strictly bound, there involuntarily arises in the reflecting mind a feeling that this confined life may yet at some future time break through the covering which now envelopes it. This is especially the case when that hardness and rigidity of form, which is frequently deemed the most essential of all things, vanishes as something unreal: and on the contrary the so called inert masses dissolve into bright activity, and an active power not in the least anticipated manifests itself throughout nature as it lies suppressed beneath our feet. In some particular phenomena there is evinced, not only the possibility, but the actualness of such an effort of struggling powers, when the painful continuance of the creature is no longer tolerable, and it attempts a dis severance of the ancient bond; as, for example, in earthquakes and vol-

canoes, the mute power that had for years been held in bondage, begins to roar from its depth and call aloud for freedom. This energetic striving of rigid powers, which, as if tormented by their bondage to the earthly, aspire after perfection, is not the less perceptible upon a higher scale of organic nature's development, and is therefore here presupposed as acknowledged. Even man, pious and enlightened though he may be, is yet, whilst on earth, subject to the destiny of a creature ; and he too, as if interwoven with the life of nature and borne down with frailties, is often inwardly moved with anxious longing after deliverance from this bondage. But man differs from the lower nature in this, that standing between the phenomenal and supersensuous worlds, he is still as a natural being elevated to bright spiritual consciousness, and is even here already made a participant of moral freedom ; so that both the Divine and the earthly are at the same time combined in one person, and he sustains towards God the double relation of a child and of a creature absolutely dependent.

But since things are so, it may be asked, How should hostility and contradiction exist between man and the rest of nature ? It would seem rather that nature aspires upward to the state of man, or longs to be placed in a condition similar to his, whence arises a relation of harmony rather than of discord : so that it is not possible for nature itself to stand in contradiction to freedom, that is, to the highest attribute which can be possessed within the limits of creation.

But nature itself being unfree, it is alleged that it cannot at least afford to the free will any sphere of action within the limits of its domain.—If by the assertion it is only meant that man cannot destroy or interrupt the entire course of nature, nor abrogate those laws under which it was created, but that he himself is rather on his part also bound to the fixed order and connexion of powers interlinked with each other, and that consequently the laws imposed upon creation by a higher tribunal are inviolable: all this must be acknowledged as unquestionably true. But surely by the term Freedom of the Will, no one ever seriously understood an unbounded power of controlling the laws of the world, or maintained that the will possessed an absolute dominion over nature. Such a power would exalt the creature to the place of the Creator, and instead of a careful and rational investigation of nature, those magic arts forbidden to man would be universally introduced.

But if the objection implies that nothing whatever can act in nature except a stern necessity, and that therefore a self-subsistent personal life is not at all admissible without prejudice to her laws, and that every actual manifestation of free will must be an impossibility;—then we deny all this, because that up to the present moment at least not a shadow of proof has ever been adduced to establish the proposition thus defined. He who would maintain such a position must in the first place show—not that things phenomenal, of a lower order in the scale of existence, are unfree,

which no one denies—but that no free being can find place *above* them, and that the moral freedom of a higher class of beings, standing upon the summit of nature, cannot possibly consist with its fixed arrangement. It is not at all contradictory to suppose that upon the highest point of developement there should be found somewhat which could not be manifested upon a lower point; and the less contradictory will this appear in reference to freedom, if, (as is in fact the case,) it must be assumed that spirit and freedom, which are first actualized in man, constitute the essential being of nature also. But notwithstanding that the essence of nature must ultimately be resolved into spirit and freedom, we must still bear in mind that in these lower orders they lie circumscribed and buried, making known their existence and presence only in numberless attempted formations, as in dark strivings and desires; so that they cannot be seen in their absolute form at the base, but are realized at the apex only. On the other hand, it would be very strange, and contradictory to the law of progressive formation, if upon the highest and most perfect point of developement there were found nothing which is not also to be met with at the first step of the same; and if the creation, thus always remaining in an incipient state, although deriving its origin from will and spirit, should yet never in any of its forms attain to spirit and will. These last named powers, spirit and will, do not indeed belong to a series of things sensuously developed, they are rather in their nature above sense, they spring from the Super-

sensuous, but first make their appearance in the circle of phenomenal nature.

No one has yet proved that the agency of supersensuous powers is irreconcilable with the course of sensuous things controlled by natural law. On the contrary it might be satisfactorily shown that it is only through the constant influence of a supersensuous power, through the unceasing influx of a higher life, that the whole phenomenal world has its existence and maintains its continuance in being. Belief in God, in his being the Creator and Governour of the world, implies nothing else than a belief that the phenomenal world is sustained and interpenetrated by a power that is above sense. To say that the influences of spirit and will upon nature would universally produce effects destructive of it, and in opposition to its law of order, is the same as to explain that vital principle which pervades and animates creation, to be this same destroying principle. Evidently that which is here true of the all-powerful Spirit, or the universal Will, (namely, that its agency and influence do not interrupt the course of nature,) must be still more true when applied to the limited action of finite spirits that are free. And it has already been shown that a relation of dependency upon God, and in a certain sense upon nature also, may be consistently reconciled with this attribute of finite freedom.

But it may here be asked in turn, What kind of representation then lies at the foundation of that view of nature and creation, which assumes it as an impossi-

bility that there should be in them any manifestation of free will? None other than that of a lifeless machine, of a compacted structure framed from rigid and inert masses, and dove-tailed together; it has for its basis the conception of some Thing, which, (though it first becomes so indeed, through artificially invented predicates,) is totally and absolutely heterogeneous to spirit. Yet it can scarcely be denied that an entirely different view is far more worthy of acceptance. Notwithstanding all its apparent inflexibleness and impenetrability, nature is still throughout open to higher influences,—even to the influences of spirit. But since God can work in it and control its movements, therefore the less is to be apprehended for the order of the whole from the influence and working of free man; and under these relations the world's laws must ever continue to remain inviolate and inviolable. Besides, we never in reality meet with that chasm, which, (only in consequence of arbitrary conceptions, however,) has frequently been supposed to exist between nature and freedom; and which has been represented as eternally separating, and rendering inaccessible to each other, the world of spirits and the world of material things so called. Even universal experience shows what is to be regarded as true in reference to the pretended rigidity and hardness of natural things. Those things which are most unyielding and rigid, are always at the same time the weakest and most unsubstantial; whilst those which are more refined, and approximate nearer to the spiritual, approve themselves as the most powerful and essential qualities

in nature, and hold dominion over that which is more gross. Hither are to be referred those principles which in physics are figuratively, though not inappositely, called spirits ; and which, notwithstanding that they are so volatile, yet overcome and dissolve such materials as seem most insoluble. To the same class are to be reckoned the so called imponderable materials, which, although to the common observation they seem trifling and unimportant, yet constitute, in fact, the very life and energy of nature. This being the case, we may with correctness say that the *actualized* spirit, the spirit as it exists in man, is in every respect more powerful and more essential than those spirits which are such in name only. That nature, then, which affords a theatre of action to the latter, cannot exclude the former ; and in the system of the Universe, through which the beam of light finds its way, there may also be opened a passage for the free spirit without introducing any confusion or derangement.

It is evident that the phenomenon of light is already to be regarded as the entrance of a higher potency into the corporeal world ; and hence a remarkable analogy—an analogy frequently observed—nay even a certain homogeneous relation between it and the spirit, cannot be denied. As the whole corporeal world is first unfolded to our view through the agency of immaterial light ; so, in a certain sense, it is the supernatural will of the spirit which first renders it possible for us to take a rational view of nature. As the herald of spirit, light entered already into the first

creation, to make nature, yet void and waste, susceptible of higher formations, and to prepare it for the future arrival of the spirit. Throughout the whole phenomenal world, light approves itself as the symbol and forerunner of the Will. For as the former pervades space without filling it, as it oftentimes disports in bright appearances with the hardest and most inflexible bodies, and, almost as though they were not present, swiftly pierces through such substances as yield no entrance to the finest material air; so also many facts have been presented of those higher influences of Will upon the corporeal world, which, although they did not derange the order of nature, are not yet to be referred to the laws of dark and ponderable matter. This inbreaking of light as a higher potency upon the material world is now admitted as a daily phenomenon, and there has long been an agreement upon it in the theory of nature. Only in so far as it was necessary to constitute a science of light, is it subject to the laws which were imposed upon the rest of the material world. But as optics are not to be given up because it is not possible to explain from the ordinary views of matter what transparency is; so also the doctrines and the hopes grounded upon the assumption of freedom are to be held fast, even though many questions should remain unanswered in regard to the possibility of a free will's shining through and illuminating the system of nature.

And what then were moral feeling, virtue, and expected recompense,—what were the most holy faith, and the noblest efforts of humanity,—without that illumination

of the free will in nature, and without that beam of the spirit, oftentimes though broken by an opposing power? A higher life universally pervades the visible creation, and breaks out from it, as it were before our eyes. In every lofty thought, in every virtuous resolve, there takes place in the midst of nature somewhat, which, as it were, enlightens and sanctifies it; and which would be incomprehensible on the supposition of any system of mechanism, even though it were called heavenly. In every word of truth that is uttered the supersensuous enters into the world; and the whole language of man, by which the spirit is continually re-created in nature,¹ is a very ancient and holy testimonial of its better descent—a testimonial hereditarily transmitted from the first creation.

Those varied modes of the spirit's manifestation upon the earth, and especially the interpenetration of freedom in the midst of necessity, might, perhaps, be denominated miraculous in so far as the laws of an earthly nature are of themselves alone not sufficient to afford an explanation. Yet because these physical laws are not sufficient to afford a solution of such manifestations, we are not thence obliged to deduce the impossibility of a spiritual freedom elevated *above* this series of phenomena, nor is it necessary to infer that there are therefore no higher grounds of explanation. This holds true also in reference to an actual miracle, lite-

¹ Speech is the very image whereby the mind and soul of the speaker conveyeth itself into the bosom of him which heareth.

rally so called. Human freedom is not a miracle in the ultimate strict sense of the word, because in the present ordinary course of events it effects no changes which are difficult of explanation ; and because no one wonders at the cases of its daily occurrence which are so frequently observed. The capability of the will's action might be called miraculous in the strictest sense, if, by its own immediate influence it were able so to modify the course of nature, that by its own direct energy phenomena would be effected in it contrary to the ordinary current of events as known to us from long continued experience. To affirm that such a power of the spirit over the sensible world is in itself impossible, would only betray an ignorance or misapprehension of both.

From the position that nature is ultimately animated by spiritual and moral powers, as well as from the idea of the pure will, it spontaneously follows that in the will there dwells an energy of acting upon nature which cannot be estimated—a power of acting upon nature, not as striving against, but as comprehended in, and hence correspondent to the will. It is not the visible creation directly which first closes itself against the spirit ; but the energy of the will becomes paralyzed, the vision of the spirit is darkened, and thus true living cognition becomes as it were dissipated. After all that has been said in favour of the position we cannot be brought to persuade ourselves of the deep depravity and ruin of Creation ; and least of all can we believe that nature as it now is—according to the

representations of some—is almost more the work of the Devil than of God. Without wishing to deny that in many particular instances there is found much that is disagreeable and repulsive, we are still of the opinion that the chief ground of the unyielding resistance by which the sick man is so frequently pressed down, lies less in nature than in the man himself—in his despondency of heart, in the fluctuating insight of the spirit, and in the powerlessness of a will not free from guilt.

That which is determined with an energetic will in the spirit of truth and purity, is determined by the Spirit of God; and it is but a postulate of reason to assume that nature cannot strive against such a will. It was on this account that Christ was a worker of miracles, and the time of his sojourn upon the earth was a time of signs and wonders. From many intimations one might be led to suppose that the momentary interpretation of the idea, and the dominion of the spirit, were a derangement not to be tolerated, nay, as though it would be a great evil;—but such is not the fact, for on the contrary nature, instead of suffering violence or injury from it, manifests her dignity in a miracle. The miracle consists in this, that the highest energy of the power of the will is at the same time an act of reconciliation between the Spirit and Nature; it is both the triumph of freedom and the deliverance of the powers of nature held in bondage!¹ The more

¹ It would seem that the performing of miracles was the natural mode of the Redeemer's agency; for inasmuch as

intimately both conceptions are conjoined,—that of freedom and that of miracles—and the more powerfully both energize in nature, the less is it possible to think anything satisfactory of the first without being borne onward to the second, and the more certain does it become that a place is due to both in the philosophy of nature.

Divine powers resided in him, they necessarily gave rise to supernatural phenomena. Hence it is that we cannot adopt as our view of miracles that conception which represents them as suspensions of the laws of nature. If we receive the biblical representation of the immanence of God in the world, we cannot regard the laws of nature as mere arbitrary and mechanical arrangements, the operation of which cannot be interrupted except by some invasion from without; but on the contrary we must consider them all as ultimately resting upon the being of God. Consequently, those phenomena which cannot be explained either from known or unknown laws as developed in the earthly life, must not therefore be regarded as opposed to law, or as suspensions of the laws of nature. These are themselves rather comprehended in a higher whole conformed to law; for even the Heavenly and the Divine constitute the essence of Law. That, therefore, which is contrary to nature is opposed to God, and the true miracle is only a higher form of the Natural coming from the world of untroubled harmony and shining in upon this unharmonious world. Where this view of the world is retained the attempt to explain miracles from natural causes must be rejected as evil; for according to it the Miraculous, (taken in a higher sense,) is also the Natural, and the Natural, (commonly so called,) is the Miraculous. Olshausen's *Biblis. Com.* B. I. s. 242, 243. Views corresponding with these may be seen in Heinroth's *Psychologie.* s. 632, Tr,

But notwithstanding that these things are so, yet the performance of a miracle, or even the will to perform one, cannot be the determination of man, nor is that the immediate end of moral freedom. By means of this freedom a *moral* relation between God and man is rendered possible, and it is imposed upon every one as his first and prime duty to realize this relation in life; wherefore there is but One miracle which all should endeavour to perform, that, namely, of effecting their own holiness by a free consecration of themselves to God. As men now are, the more frequent bestowal of the gift of miracles would only be misused to disturb the order and harmony of things; and the world too, in and over which the Creator reigns, but rarely stands in need of such a gift. Hence it has appeared seldom, like comets, only at great intervals of the world's history; whilst moral freedom, as indispensable for every truly human being, like the all-pervading light of the sun, illumines every day of our earthly existence. Besides, man does not primarily stand in need of any other freedom than that of being able to act upon himself and to determine himself. He first of all demands from nature, that as his outward existence is under her control, she must not domineer over his will; but that she permit him, unfettered by her iron chain, with his inmost self to look down from a secure elevation upon the impulses of unconscious powers, and to aspire upward, after a mark placed much higher—a goal which is either not at all attainable, or can be reached only in the way of inward free election and self-determination. The

proportion in which the transient phenomena of the visible world may or may not correspond to his will, can determine nothing for his moral worth or ill desert; yet this he knows, that the will is in its essence the mightiest energy, that it is originally the creative power of motion, (volition,) and that therefore it is God-like.

Regarding himself as an individual and responsible agent in distinction from the Creator, he feels that he is neither bound by an inexorable fate, nor yet absolutely independent. It is but a happy necessity that man cannot *act in DIRECT OPPOSITION to the Creator*; yet he can *will* contrary to Him, and he must have this power in order that his accordance with God may be a harmony of love, and not a worthless and blind servitude—the obedience of a machine. The freedom of each individual always reaches as far as the order of the whole will permit; and this whole is to be considered as a great Divine state, the regulation of which corresponds to the sense of a Divine government in this, that a personal life is developed and freely acts in it. It is not accident which rules in this state. Those events only can be denominated accidental which cannot be explained from any natural cause, or which were not designed by some act of will. The supposition that all things which take place either happen necessarily or accidentally, pre-excludes a possible third, the action of freedom, before any proof is given. Besides, that antithetic proposition is in itself mere nothingness, because even accident is but an obscure necessity—a necessity not seen into nor traced from its premises;

consequently it is a mere negative notion, the whole sum of which resolves itself into a confession of ignorance of the efficient cause.

If under the name *Nature* were comprehended things of the lower orders only, and if it were considered as something existent for itself, then in reference to *this* nature, indeed, free action might be denominated accidental, because in such nature no true ground of explanation could be found. It is to be taken into consideration, however, that the above is a mere notion arbitrarily formed, and that in reality there is no nature found which constitutes in itself a strictly finished whole with the exclusion of the Rational and the Free. We know of but one nature only, of that namely, which, as in a mirror, reflects itself in the cognitions of free rational beings. A nature not contemplated by mind, a world of pure objects, were an entirely vain and empty notion. We do not deny the actualness of nature, but we do deny that a series of unconscious phenomena constitute its essential being, and that these of themselves make up the whole sum of nature; for to living nature in its proper sense spirit and will are communicated, and they are something of a much more *essential* character than motion and gravitation. Still less has it been our design, by what has been said, to deny the so-called mathematical laws of the world. It may, however, be safely asserted, that these laws explain but *one* side of nature only, and not the whole of it; and that in general they afford but a subordinate, and, (as soon as they are taken for the only and highest truth,) but a partial knowledge of nature.

Calculus and mensuration are always immediately at an end wherever life properly begins. That which is *living* must be apprehended with a Living Sense, the Spiritual must be Spiritually judged of; and if any where, it is in the domain of freedom that this requisition possesses validity. The rich multiformity of nature abounding in life and activity, and the mental character of most of her productions, would be entirely inexplicable from a mathematical necessity; much less would such necessity suffice to explain the thousand varied phenomena of the spiritual and moral world. In the domain of Thought and Will there exists in love and hate,—in hope and fear,—in the investigation and apprehension of truth,—in the strife to overcome self,—in the effort to become devotional and heavenly minded,—in this sphere there is found a realm of invisible life, which, in comparison with the impulses of material things, can only be denominated *super-terrestrial*. Even perverseness indicates a self-subsistence; and error can be explained only on the supposition that the spirit which is susceptible of it, is not bound by an eternal unerring necessity. If, as the only self-subsistent Being, the One and first Good were alone capable of acting freely with all-subduing efficiency, then we should universally find a similar conformity to law without any transgression; and sin—the bitter fruit of finite freedom—would be entirely inconceivable.

And here we come upon a point, the consideration of which was, perhaps, earlier expected.—**EVIL** is the

stone of stumbling, especially for those with whom a uniform agreement with law passes for a mark of goodness and perfection. But nevertheless this evil, however difficult it may appear to incorporate it with a system of the world and of science, must still, as something spiritual and as something undeniably existent, have a place conceded to it in the last, as it has long been received into the first.

And although a discord for the mind and a vexation for the understanding, still its existence merits the highest attention, because that man alone upon the earth is capable of committing it, and because that we are thence led to infer a certain superiour excellence of the powers operative in him. It is also worthy of attention as developing itself under a varied diversity of forms, from that state, where with inward wickedness there is connected a cheerful and amiable deportment, which almost challenges our esteem and affection—or where evil is associated with wit and levity, so that it becomes a derision of life and a parody upon all seriousness and virtue—unto that condition where a faithless fury, apostate from truth, betrays its desperation of all good by a wild recklessness, or, more revolting still, by cool premeditated crime. Always, as it would seem, evil is to be considered as a degradation of powers, as a perversion of the original life; and in this state of perverseness, it now manifests itself monkey-like exciting laughter,—at another time it appears as a monstrous birth, creating loathsomeness and disgust,—and again it is seen as an object of horror, awakening terror and alarm.

However difficult now, it may appear, to find an appropriate place for evil in a scientific system proceeding from Unity, and certain as it is that sin has ever been the thorn that has destroyed the peace and quietude of life, or the discordant tone which has ever with jarring dissonance disturbed the harmony of the universe; yet these difficulties do not immediately press themselves upon him, who, only in a scientific manner maintains the freedom of the human will, undisturbed about the consequences or the possible abuse of the doctrine. On the contrary, not only the possibility but the undeniable actualness of sin, as has already been shown, is indeed a melancholy, but at the same time a most convincing proof in favour of the alleged self-subsistence of the human will. It is impossible to derive sin *immediately* from God, the highest Good. Were He the *only* free Will, then it would follow that every thing else must flow from him in a peaceful conformity to law; throughout the universe there would be nothing but compulsion, and compulsion too, effected by a most perfect Central and Universal Will. Or in other words, every efficiency would only be some form of God's agency, and consequently, since it is impossible for God to act in opposition to himself, it would follow that every where there would be nothing but harmony, and that in reference to God every thing that exists would be good. We say explicitly in respect to God. Because considered in and by itself the creature could be neither good nor bad; for both, (that is, moral good and moral evil,) can only originate from an

individual's own will. But instead of that peaceful concentration in One central Will,—instead of that harmony of all the powers and their conformity to law—we find the fact to be directly the contrary. Sin, as a self-active striving against God, compels us therefore to adopt the position that the pure Godhead is not the only efficient agent in the creature, but that it also at the same time possesses an independence of God, (an independence bestowed upon the creature for the behoof of personality ;) and that this self-subsistence granted to man is moral freedom, the fountain of his moral good and moral evil. Should any one wish to seek the fountain of moral evil in any other place, it would only remain for him either to place in God something which is not himself, which is not actually good, (on which point we have already expressed our opinion, and from which evil could not still proceed ;) or else he must assume the existence of another uncreated being co-eternal with God ;—a form of dualism which is scarcely adapted even to a wild and heated imagination, in as much as it is repulsive to the human mind and cannot be confirmed to any scientific proof.¹

¹ “ The Origin of Evil, meanwhile, is a question interesting only to the Metaphysician, and in a *system* of moral and religious Philosophy. The man of sober mind, who seeks for truths that possess a moral and practical interest, is content to be *certain*, first, that Evil must have had a beginning, since otherwise it must either be God, or a co-eternal and co-equal Rival of God ; both impious notions, and the latter foolish to boot. Secondly, That it could not originate in God ; for if

If now, as we have endeavoured to show, the root of evil is not to be sought for in God, but in freedom alone; yet freedom itself, as such, is not to be considered as something already actually evil. For were this the case, God would again be made the Author of evil; since, in conformity with all that has been said, it is plain that freedom can be derived from Him alone. Considered in itself, then, this freedom is to be regarded as nothing else than the highest good of man. Yet it is not at all contradictory that evil should spring from this good. The abuse of the highest good can only be productive of the highest evil,—Sin.—It may, however, be asked how such an abuse, which is itself already sin, can be possible?—It is sufficiently evident that every aberration from the line of rectitude, such as has above been spoken of, is entirely inconceivable when applied to the absolute Divine Freedom, which is identical

so, it would be at once Evil and not Evil, or God would be at once God, (that is, infinite Goodness,) and not God—both alike impossible positions.”—“A moral Evil is an Evil that has its origin in a Will. An Evil common to all must have a ground common to all. But the actual existence of moral evil we are bound in conscience to admit; and that there is an evil common to all is a Fact; and this evil must therefore have a common ground. Now this evil ground cannot originate in the Divine Will: it must therefore be referred to the Will of man.” *Aids to Reflection*, p. 158, 174. See the same philosophic view expanded, and rhetorically delineated by Professor Tholuck in his *Lehre v. d. Sünde* s. 14—26. TR.

with holiness—the higher necessity of the good. In God there is infinite perfection ; but the perfection of man is finite ;—although a similarity there is yet a distinction. Human freedom, moreover, is not absolute, and consequently involves in it no holy necessity of good.

Bestow upon a finite being, in every respect imperfect, freedom of will ; or impart to it, (whilst at the same time you exempt it from an infallible but necessitating guidance,) the power of self-determination, and you at once create in it the possibility of erring and of abusing its powers,—that is, the possibility of sin. It is plain that the only way of excluding this possibility would be either to take away freedom itself, or else to elevate man to the condition of God. It is not here our purpose to explain how sin can be permitted by God, or, according to the much used phrase, to justify him in reference to the existence of evil in the world ; the proposition was, and still continues to be only this ; To explain the possibility of sin from the spiritual personality of an imperfect creature, whom the Creator has left free to engage in the hazardous enterprise of life.

Were freedom a *thing*, somewhat *material*, like the floating atoms, then, indeed, we would be led to seek the cause of its departure from a straight line or from the path of rectitude, in something lying out of itself ; and the ground of this cause would again have to be sought in something still farther back, and so on in infinitum, and at the end we should still find our-

selves linked to a chain of endless regression. But all this results from an entire confusion of conceptions, for nothing whatever can be conceived of freedom upon the stand-point of the purely Corporeal, and where impulsion and repulsion are literally spoken of. If an erroneous point of view be once chosen, and a first false position be assumed, a whole series of conclusions will follow, which although entirely consequent, will yet lead only to a compulsion and a mechanism of nature ; and from such materials there will spring up spontaneously a whole superstructure of error. The same is the case in the moral life, when once the first false step has been taken, when the understanding and the conscience have yielded to the first lie, (the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*,) it is but too easy for a chain of error to follow, nay for a whole structure of sin to be reared upon it. But the Idea of the Will is that it is no *thing*, and least of all a *bodily* thing, subject to physical laws ; but that it is a Productive Energy, a Life that re-creates itself and acts from itself. Nevertheless it may be said in a certain sense, only somewhat more circumscribed, that freedom is determined by something else, by something which lies out of it ; or rather, (in which that more limited sense is contained,) that it can permit itself to be determined, [or, that it can take occasion to determine itself in view of some outward object or some end proposed. The difference between the Will's *being determined* by objective motives, and *determining itself* in view of these objects as occasions, is broad and radical, and should ever be kept in mind.] For, according to our

very conception of an action there precede it a multitude of contradictory and opposite possibilities, which operate upon the acting subject by more than one solicitation. But which solicitation the agent will permit to gain the preponderance, the ground of that lies in his will alone; and to seek for another ground different from it, and lying without it, would be the same as to maintain that the will never can be a ground, that is, that there is no such thing as Will.

It cannot be said that according to this view man acts without a reason, simply *in order* to will. The will is itself a ground as well as the solicitation through which a person determines himself; he must will, and must decide in view of the continuous inflowing of various excitations, because neither the inward nor the outward life can remain stationary. The act of willing is therefore necessary to his continued spiritual existence; but what direction he will take, or what act he will choose to make his own—these are matters of his free election. That the election of a finite and imperfect being, left to act upon his own peril, is not always righteous, but frequently false and incorrect, is less a matter of astonishment than if the case were otherwise. For a peaceful course of human life, and one always conformed to the Divine law, would be in the highest degree wonderful, and would be no unimportant objection against the actualness of freedom. It is from freedom alone, moreover, that the manifold anomalies and irregularities of character found among men can be explained.

It may be objected, indeed, that the aberration, or

act of erring, which is capable of being explained from the freedom of an imperfect being, cannot still be one and the same with actual crime, and with the evil doing of an intelligent and consistent wickedness ; and it must be conceded that the high point of evil spoken of does not result immediately from the conception of *one* act of departure from the line of right : still, however, it may be explained by the intermediate conception of a gradual deterioration. This deterioration, as the continuance of a life given up to derangement, becomes more and more perverted, and gives birth to products increasingly loathsome in their character ; and it is, also, quite as intelligible as moral growth in virtue, which is nothing else than a progressive cultivation of powers conformably to the original law. These same powers, however, in a perverted state or falsely directed, do indeed in their progressive operation and growth, always still continue to manifest the character of a Life ; but on account of that derangement their forming principle, their PROTOPLAST¹, exhibits itself in mis-formations, that is, in such products as are opposed to a sound and healthy life. The more perfect the Original of a Life, the greater the multitude of possible aberrations ; and the more excellent are the active powers of a being, the

¹ So our medical writers commonly translate Professor Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb*, the vis plastica, or vis vitæ formatrix of the eldest physiologist, and the life or living principle of JOHN HUNTER, the profoundest, we had almost said the only, physiological philosopher of the latter half of the preceding century. *Friend*, p. 433. TR.

more energetic and destructive is their agency in a perverted state.

Hence man's departure from the moral Ideal is to be lamented as a deeper fall ; and among all the monstrous forms of life, moral deformity is the most loathsome, and excites the greatest horror. It would be very remarkable if sin alone, when it is not immediately and firmly withstood, were incapable of increase and progressive growth, inasmuch as it belongs to the peculiar character of man that neither his inward nor his outward life, as has already been observed, can ever endure an absolute cessation. No where, where life exists, is there found a fixed and motionless state of Being ; on the contrary, we universally meet with progression, a ceaseless Becoming. Even in sickness and decay there is only exhibited the operation of a continuous activity ; and the death of organized things is but a transition from one state of existence to another, is only another form of Becoming. The moral life, also, exhibits similar phenomena in good and evil ; and it has already been shown in the preliminary part of this essay, how that evil, in the progress of a continually augmenting and guilty derangement of the moral powers, may attain to a certain state of self-subsistence. This perverted condition of the moral man may be illustrated by an analogy drawn from those who are diseased in body—an analogy which others have frequently observed—that is, from the so called after-organizations.

From all that has now been said it seems to us that we can be at no loss for an explanation of the phe-

nomenon, that the freedom of the will is not altogether annihilated by a series of continued acts of sinfulness, but that it nevertheless becomes so strongly fettered ; and that evil may be raised to such a degree of strength, that return to a better state is rendered exceedingly difficult, nay, under certain circumstances, almost impossible. Besides, we can now be at no loss to discover the reason why a constantly progressive course in good or evil, persevered in for a long time, lessens the probability of an entire change in either case ; yet this fact does not render such a change absolutely impossible, nor does it destroy freedom, but only proves that it is a human freedom, that is, such a freedom, in the possession of which man does not cease to be a natural being and to develop his character in conformity with the laws of nature.

To explain the *Universality* of sin upon the earth, is more difficult and perplexing ; and we may well be at a loss to show how it is, that every human being as soon as it attains to a state of consciousness, at the same time finds within itself a consciousness of evil. Not that we would be understood to affirm that the whole human race is involved in one and the same state of wickedness, equal in degree ; but as men now are no one feels that freedom from guilt which conscience demands, and all moral excellence here below must be attained through the travails of a new birth. And whenever man wishes to possess any thing actually good, and to have it grow and become a living principle in him, he must first root out and deaden the

weeds of evil which stand in the way. The entire race of man, as it presents itself to the eye of daily observation and experience, at the same time that it is endowed with invaluable powers and talents, is yet infected with hankering desires after that which is forbidden ; and whosoever has remaining a sufficiency of moral energy impartially to contemplate his inmost self, will there find not indeed a necessity of sin, but yet somewhat already existent without his agency or concurrence—somewhat which his better voice cannot approve but commands him firmly to resist. And no matter how soon the contest may have been seriously commenced, still even the most excellent man will always find something evil to have been anterior to all his efforts ; a something which in a thousand cases cannot indeed be denominated as actual guilt or wickedness, but must still be considered as transgression. The same is the case also with one who has already commenced the work of reformation ; he will not pursue the straight path of life, nor attain the goal placed before him, without similar aberrations.

In what way soever we may otherwise judge of this depraved state of human nature, we must yet always attribute to the individual himself every act of erring or departure from right which has been really perfected. Even the *best* among men, (as it is not necessary here to speak of the most criminal and abandoned,) do not find their whole life to be free from guilt ; whilst yet every moral error can only arise on the condition that the will consents to the transgression of an

always existent and always known law. This universality of guilt points to some great, deep-laid cause; to the universal prevalence of a depraved disposition. To place this evil disposition directly in the very essence of freedom, were contradictory; because, by so doing, freedom itself, that is, the freedom of election, and with it the imputation of moral character which must always be maintained, would all be swept away. To make the will a Principle of Evil would be to make every true moral action entirely incomprehensible. Nor could that disposition have been imparted by the Creator. For the Great First of all, God, is the Good; and our better nature imposes upon us an obligation to withstand the impulses of that depraved disposition, which would be utterly inexplicable were God originally the Author of that evil state. It can therefore only have arisen through guilt.

But here it may be asked, How could a universal and permanent evil disposition spring from any single act of transgression? And how could that which is already born with us have come into existence through guilt? To say that every individual in his Maxims commits, through the elections of his will, occasional transgressions of the law, explains nothing. The universality of sin, which, so far as history extends, is without exception, cannot be accounted for on the supposition that innumerable individuals differing so widely from each other, all possess a free self-determination. And besides, this supposition would not explain the circumstance that that evil disposition is born

with us, for that a Maxim should be connatural is in opposition to the very conception of a maxim. It is by no means to be assumed that such a universal accordance of all free persons in a perverted maxim can have its ground in freedom alone; and the less so, since, independent of its universality, the particular fact that it is born with us points to an entirely different domain than that of arbitrary election. It refers us rather—(we speak it at the hazard of being misunderstood,)—to a dark law of nature.

But it is likewise undeniable, and, as it might seem, contradictory to what has just been said, that moral good and moral evil can only originate from some exercise of freedom, so that the inborn imperfect condition must still have its sole ground in the will as the moral ability, and must adhere to the same. This contradiction can only be explained on the supposition that the ground of the universal state of sinfulness lies in something which is both free and necessitated; that is, in an original act of the free will, the consequences of which develop themselves according to the laws of nature. For the solution of the problem it is expressed more definitely by saying that an original act of guilt must be presupposed, through which there is implanted in human nature a preponderating inclination to yield to sensuous impulses, and by means of it obedience to the law is rendered not indeed impossible for the will but exceedingly difficult, so that from this cause transgressions are to be met with in the course of every man's life.

In the examination of this assumption the point must not be lost sight of that we here simply inquire into the *Universality* of sin, and consider more particularly that inborn, and consequently involuntary disposition to it. To place this involuntariness immediately and primarily in the will itself were,—contradictory. The feeling of guilt arises when the will, not originally determined to evil, but finding itself called upon to obey the injunctions of the better voice, does nevertheless bring no determined opposition against those powerful impulses which exist in the man without his agency or concurrence. If you placed in man a predetermination of the will as the source of evil—a predetermination derived either immediately from the Creator, or resulting from one intelligible act,—then neither could the reaction against evil be explained, nor would it ever be possible for the energy of a good will to achieve a victory over sin. Both, however, become intelligible if the occasioning cause of a *Universal evil disposition* be sought for in something out of the will, namely, in an excited and strengthened sensuousness, in a preponderance of the irrational principle, which, (in its present state,) is interwoven into the very being of human nature. Through this preponderating influence of the Sensuous, the will is stunned and can be easily seduced to sin; this consequence, however, is not rendered absolutely necessary, as in very many individuals, it does by no means always continue to follow. Since, now, according to what has been said, the cause of so strong a solicitation cannot

lie in the will of each individual, nor yet in the original creation, so it only remains to assume a catastrophe subsequently brought in—a catastrophe which could not have originated from natural laws, (for if so, the Creator would have been its direct cause,) but which afterwards operated according to the laws of nature, (because on any other supposition the involuntary universality of the solicitation could have no ground.) This catastrophe may here be more strictly defined as an original free act, antierior to all history ; to this act, however, the present human race stands related in the necessary connexion of nature.

Is not this now the proper place, where *a priori* grounds reach no farther, to present the testimony in favour of this view derived from other sources? For there is a tradition among the nations, which has existed from time immemorial and is still current, that goes far to establish the theory derived from the occurrence just presupposed.

History itself indeed, taken in the strict sense of the word, does not extend back to the time of the fact after which we are inquiring ; but this fact is rather already presupposed in all history, and sinfulness has been recognized as universally prevalent through all past centuries. For our present purpose it is not necessary to appeal to the more flagrant crimes, many of which history records ; according to her testimony, even among the Noble and Virtuous of all times, the *very best* were those who were not entirely without failings, but those who were charge-

able with the fewest faults. And that man has always been accounted virtuous, not he who was entirely free from sin, (only One such, as a Miracle, shines through the world's history,) but he who strove most constantly and victoriously against that evil which he could not yet perfectly eradicate.

So in the progress of history, the stream of life is never more found to flow perfectly pure, but its waters have always been troubled and obscured with commingled evil. From the very earliest antiquity, however, this evil was lamented, not as something originally created by God, but as something subsequently introduced; and it was the common belief that by its violent entrance into the world, and through its impurity, the pristine immaculate life was polluted. According to all the traditions of the earliest times which have come down to us, the human race did not commence in a state of depravity, but in a state of virtue; and they all agree that a time of happiness and innocence preceded the centuries of sin and guilt. Paradise, the Golden Age of peace and innocence, is so indelibly impressed upon the recollection of all nations, and its loss has been, (the higher up the more definitely,) so deeply felt and so universally deplored, that it requires no small degree of arrogance to give the lie directly and without farther examination, to the unanimous testimony of the oldest generations who were placed nearer to this age of original happiness. It is most difficult for men to forget that which is irrecoverably lost; and hence with the knowledge of that

state of original happiness was, fixedly connected the knowledge of its loss. Consequently the fact by which that earliest purity was first and forever polluted, has been transmitted in a more or less intelligible form through all subsequent traditions.¹ In the oldest say-

¹ The tradition of a Golden Age is found in the earliest records of history, and in all parts of the world ; it must, therefore, have been antecedent to all history. Some have supposed that far back in the depths of antiquity, long before the Augustan days of Rome, or before civilization and science had dawned upon Greece, there existed an age of refinement and learning, no traces of which have been handed down to us, unless, perhaps, the Orphic Fragments may be referred to that period. Those most conversant with the early history of the world, say that the farther history is traced back the more definitely is seen the influence which religion exerted upon politics. It is also known that the Indians, the Chinese, the Chaldeans and Egyptians were early acquainted with Astronomy, Geometry, Natural Philosophy and Architecture. Hence, in conformity with the statements of the oldest classic writers, and contrary to those who would make the first Parents of the human race to have been semi-brutes, many of the best German Historians and Philosophers, such as Johannes von Müller, Heeren, Herder, Schlegel and Tholuck assume that man was originally placed by God in a high state of cultivation, and was endowed with distinct apprehensions of religious truth and duty. So also the celebrated Antiquary Oüverof: *L'état naturel de l'homme n'est ni l'état sauvage, ni l'état de corruption, c'est un état simple, meilleur, plus rapproché de la divinité ; l'homme sauvage et l'homme corrompu en sont également*

ings of the nations this fact was designated as **THE FALL**, or the **ACT OF GUILT**, in essentially the same manner as is done at the present day. Of this act of transgression the original parents of the human family, how many or how few soever they may have been, were all equally guilty.

It has already been shown that a departure from, or transgression of the law, may be understood from the existence of human freedom considered in itself, and that it is not necessary to assume any other disposition in order to account for it. But according to tradition this transgression of the first parents produced a natural disharmony extending to all their posterity ;— and from this is explained the universality of sin.

It is plain that some wonderful change must have been connected with the *first* step to evil ; it was a transition from a state of happy innocence to one of guilt and discord ; it was a perversion of original relations, pregnant with evil consequences, and taking deep hold upon the essential character of human na-

eloigné. "The natural condition of man is neither the savage condition, nor the state of corruption, but it is a simple and better state, approaching nearer to the divinity ; the savage man and the corrupt man are both equally removed from it." It is not necessary to mention how well these statements accord with the Biblical representations. For further information on this interesting topic, the reader is referred to NEANDER's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, B. I. s. 15, 211—216 and the authorities there quoted, or to PROF. ROBINSON's *Bibl. Repository* Vol. II. p. 119—123. Tr.

ture. The thorn of a new incitement, never before experienced, must have goaded on the hitherto peaceful life to a sickly and inefficient activity. As a strange violence for the first time came like a shock—as the host of desires and lustful passions which had before reposed in their dark depth were suddenly awakened from their light slumbers—as the animal nature which had previously remained in peaceful subjection was excited and broke forth in hostility from its silent ground—then indeed the whole internal and external organization must have been brought into wild confusion by the sudden interruption of the previous harmony, and there must have been experienced an alteration difficult to be described.

Human life is a life only on condition that in it should be found not pure freedom alone, but necessity also; upon which necessity it rests as upon a dark ground of nature. But this dark ground once displaced from its benevolent relation operates rudely and destructively, as does every blind power no longer held by the bond of harmony; and to allay the driving storm, to banish back the subterranean spirits once brought up, requires an energy of will entirely different from that which first called them forth from their places of repose. Yet this conflict between the spirit and blind impulse, arising from the double nature of man, is not fully decided: and we still always see how that which was intended as the support of life, when brought into confusion, becomes its destroyer.

Even in the peculiar relations of the human body we already see distinctly shadowed forth that co-existence of necessity and freedom, which is in itself indispensable, and in the highest degree salutary. In the royal seat of the head the free spirit manifests itself, since it is from the brain as the support and instrument of the will, that voluntary motion proceeds; but in the lower parts of the body a nature withdrawn from consciousness and not under the control of will, performs its mysterious operations in a manner not less wonderful. This arrangement is made in order that the silent functions of life, undisturbed by changeful caprice, may proceed without interruption. And to the end that the spirit also may not be troubled with the continual supervision of the operations of the earthly life, immediate insight into that depressed depth is withheld from a healthy consciousness by means of the salutary limits, (the ganglia,) imposed upon it. Disorder and disease are connected with the overstepping of the limits here prescribed; and however remarkable and instructive the phenomenon may appear, it is still true, that light cannot fall in upon this region originally consigned to peaceful darkness, without a great and hostile derangement to the functions of life. For which reason also a clear magnetic insight, whilst on the one hand it affords the most important solutions in regard to the essential character of life, and leads to the most noble views respecting it, yet on the other hand cannot but prove humiliating to the free spirit.

We need not here be required to furnish any circumstantial analysis, in order to prove what is sufficiently evident from the foregoing remarks, that that part of the human being which is withdrawn from consciousness and not subject to the determinations of will, yet contains within itself a realm of great and wonderful active powers. Thus the free and conscious man stands over the waves and agitations of his own life, as over a concealed and slumbering volcano, which whosoever presumptuously dares to lay open or kindle up, it burns like a consuming fire. Easily excited, these concealed powers rend the thin veil which covers them; and those otherwise benevolent qualities, when brought into disorder, turn to bitter rage and demoniacal fury. The state of one who has permitted his sensuousness to gain the predominance over him—a condition which may daily be observed—is in like manner only to be considered as a perversion of relations, as a hostile out-breaking of that which properly belongs to the depth, and which in its subordinate sphere was designed to promote the operations of life.

It must without controversy be assumed that the first rupture caused by excited impulse was to the power of human nature, yet fresh and undepraved, like a mighty electrical discharge, and took place with extraordinary violence; and that this rupture was accompanied with particular consequences in the highest degree remarkable in their kind. The young life, still immediately warmed with the spirit of the first creation, in respect to good and evil must have been capa-

ble of an energy now no longer felt ; and hence also in the first fall a greatness of excited passions may have been experienced which it were impossible for the sluggishness of a later race to comprehend. It is therefore not for one moment to be doubted but that such a catastrophe had a most powerful influence upon the entire being of the first Parents, and that it left behind deep traces upon their organization.

Human nature after the fall became something very different from that first and original nature ; not differing indeed in essence and substance, but in regard to the reciprocal relation of its powers. This modification could not possibly have entered into the first parents of the human family without leaving a physical influence upon their posterity ; and hence we have—not an hereditary sin, (for the conception of such sin is in itself contradictory, and the Will is the One thing which cannot be transmitted as an inheritance,)—but a predominance of the irrational principle propagated by generation,—a continual solicitation from the natural side of our being, which is always striving to raise itself from the depth to which it belongs, and to gain over man that dominion which it was never designed to exercise. Since, now, this side of our being, as that which stands deepest, is always in the order of time antecedent to the intelligent principle, and hence from youth up the Reason being as yet unadmonished and the Will not proportionally strengthened, they do not withstand it sufficiently early ; so in the progress of life this dark power by its bewitching arts introduces at

least inefficiency and headlong precipitance, of which even the best have found cause to accuse themselves.

We hope that the objection of arbitrariness will not be urged against this attempt to explain the universality of sin. Unless we are totally deceived, throughout the whole representation none but compulsory grounds have been taken—not seldom, we are free to confess, with the struggling feelings and inward aversion of the author. Not to mention the painfulness excited by the supposition of an hereditary sin, nor to notice the contradiction involved in the assertion itself,—a contradiction with which the author feels conscious that the present essay is not chargeable,—yet even the assumption of an inherited wicked disposition contains in it something unkind and forbidding.—That theory which places the occasioning cause of universal sinfulness, not immediately in a disposition of the Will, but in that excitation of the irrational principle which took place already in the first Parents, is unquestionably more tolerable and in every respect more conceivable ; a theory which on the one side is conformable to experience, and on the other still leaves open the hope of victory over evil and always guarantees to man the freedom of election. Both these, as it seems, must fall away, if a principle of wickedness be placed originally in the human will itself, and if it be maintained that we are therefore incapable of any good, but are rather wicked by nature and born sinners. No one can hesitate to consider this theory, invented for the pretended honour of religion, as a calumny upon human nature—a calumny which can be justified on no ground

whatever. Besides, whosoever from a religious zeal would defend the above figment also renders himself obnoxious to the charge of slander against the love of God towards man, which must likewise be maintained. For even a fallen spirit—in reference to evil constantly striving against it, although not always victorious yet not absolutely wicked—may be an object of love and complacency to a holy Being. That an inter-communion of love and of faith should exist between beings diametrically opposed to each other in their characters, is not possible ; but can this relation between God and man be misapprehended ? Is it not plain in language and in word, in tradition, in revelation and religion, through all ages of the world down to the present time ?

Correspondent to that attractiveness which goes forth from the eternal Central Point, and which, notwithstanding that sin has entered into the soul, still draws it with the living bond of Divine love, there is found in all religion a reflex effort of the spirit to return to God ; and connected with it there is universally found an amiableness and benevolence more or less pure. This movement of the soul tending towards and seeking the One and the Eternal as the Centre, must first be annihilated before it can be said that the fall of man was an entire and total apostasy ;—an irreconcilable disseverance between himself and his God. Nay it is even by sin, or the feeling of error and of guilt, through which an entirely peculiar inwardness is imparted to religion ; and from this cause it is that

in christianity there is found to exist that deep seriousness, that consciousness of the need of salvation, and that lively, spirited commingling of sadness and of joy.

To derive the origin of religion and of revelation from sin itself were unsatisfactory, and would give rise to unworthy views. Religion is natural to every better unfallen spirit; and an inter-communion between God and man is appropriate to the nature of both. Yet through the introduction of sin among men there has arisen a new and peculiar need of religion. On sin too is grounded not only the necessity of a higher Divine guidance, but also the indispensableness of a scheme of atonement resting upon a particular revelation. As every particular individual of the present race of men becomes human only through instruction and superintending care, and as he stands in need of education to aid his better being, and to develope and sustain his spiritual part in opposition to the irrational nature; so also (fallen) humanity in the aggregate, (in order that human education may thereby have a ground and continuance,) cannot surely dispense with superhuman guidance and education. As in organic life where a strongly excited activity calls forth its antagonist principle, and leads to opposition, so also by the appearance of evil it was demanded that good should come forth as an *antithesis* to this phenomenon; or it became necessary that good should manifest itself. This special revelation can never cease from men until sin has not only as it were interrupted, but absolutely destroyed the reciprocal relation between God and us; so that by this

destruction there would be effected an entire cessation of communion with God, an absolute irreconcilable dis-severance. In this case, however, a perfect separation would be necessary, and with the withdrawal of God from the fallen creature, the necessary result would be for the latter a state of entire rejection, or rather a proper non-entity.

The religious doctrines of the oldest nations accord with the view now presented, for among them human nature was indeed universally considered as fallen, but it was never regarded as having irrecoverably apostatized. Hence we find that the hope of re-union and reconciliation, (more or less distinct and perfect,) was universal; but no where do we find any people despairing of a possible return. And this distrust was the less, since among the most remarkable people of antiquity, (as the Indians and Egyptians,) there was spread abroad the belief in a means of deliverance effected by Divine power, and a new relationship of man with God. They believed God himself to be manifested in a finite form of being.¹ It is very instructive and affecting to see in the mysterious doctrines of antiquity how the consolation of redemption always goes side by side with

¹ Tholuck has shown that the hope and expectation of a Divine Restorer, of a coming age of virtue, was not confined to the Indians and Egyptians, but was also prevalent among the Persians, the Chinese, the Greeks and the Romans, in short, that it was universal. *Leh. v. d. Sün. vierte Beilage.* s. 229—237. TR.

evil, and how, although guilt and death have come into the world, yet no religion has ever recognized their power as forever binding; but rather from this wreck of the first there arises another creation, and through continual reformation and renewal, light springs from the bosom of night, and out of the midst of death life is born.

Such a view is necessary for him who feels that his earthly life, notwithstanding sin, is still interpenetrated by that which is above earth; and who feels that man, with all his deficiencies, is yet in no way thrown without the circle of the Divine life and influence. For man generally this conviction is the first and most indispensable condition of reform and salvation; and in it science finds the resolvent word which unriddles the difficulty presented by the existence of evil in the world.

It is only from a religious stand-point, as it would seem, that we are able to gain a view with regard to the relation of sin to the holiness and wisdom of God, which, although it may not embrace all the bearings and connexions of the subject, may yet prove satisfactory, and may serve to obviate the chief difficulties raised against freedom on account of its abuse. From the preceding investigation, indeed, it appears that the existence of sin does not render doubtful the actual and present existence of the free will, but rather confirms it. It is true, however, that doubts with respect to the derivation of freedom from God may be raised from the fact that sin is the offspring of the misuse of freedom—a freedom not always infallible. All will readily con-

cede that if there had been no freedom, sin or moral evil, never could have had any existence. Hence the question particularly urges itself upon our consideration ; How could the Divine Will, which is and only can be a Will of Good, have willed such a freedom with which is evidently connected at least the *possibility* of evil ?

In the course of the preceding essay it has been shown from ultimate grounds that such a freedom of will as is possessed by finite creatures must not only have had the concurrence of the Divine Will permitting its existence, but that it must have been expressly willed by God, nay, that it must be regarded as the very key stone of that creation known to us. At the same time, however, we trust it has been satisfactorily shown, that although no immorality were possible without moral freedom, that yet freedom itself in its essential being is to be considered as a good, even as the highest good of human nature ; and consequently, is in no sense to be regarded as something actually evil. But it is the characteristic peculiarity of this good bestowed upon humanity, that the possibility of its abuse cannot be excluded without at the same time removing with it the good itself. He who willed that man should exist, must also have willed his freedom ; but he who willed human freedom, evidently could not exclude from it the possibility of false election. The Will were falsely called a self-subsistent Power if it could determine in regard to one course of conduct only, but in reference to the other was determined by a superiour destiny. Besides, we should have to call the

election of good, in case the contrary were an impossibility, unfree and worthless ; or rather there would be no election at all, but absolute pre-determination. To say that in leaving man free, God did by that act decree the existence of evil, would be a groundless assumption resting upon an ignorance of the character of freedom, and upon entirely false representations of God and his Will. Even Omnipotence, for the very reason that it is Divine omnipotence, stands subject to the laws of universal and eternal truths ; and whatsoever involves in itself a contradiction, as being absolutely impossible, that is also impossible for the Divine Will.

To will the dignity of spiritual personality and of morality, and yet not at the same time to will freedom, were contradictory, and hence not possible even for the Creator. To will the freedom of a human, that is, of an imperfect being, and yet by any kind of constraint to exclude from that freedom the possibility of evil, would also be contradictory in itself, and therefore in no way possible for the Divine Will. It is only from the fact that God willed the actual existence of the Good, because he willed that the morality of a personal being should rest upon free unbiassed election, that he made the free creature the reflected image of himself ; between them, however, there is this difference, that with the former co-exists the possibility of evil, which can never be an object of the Divine Will. But the Divine understanding saw that the possibility of evil was something inseparably connected with finite freedom, and that therefore it

was the necessary condition of true, that is, of free morality. After all this it may correctly be said that whosoever claims for man the impossibility of sin, at the same time removes from him the possibility of moral good, and thereby adjudges to evil a rank and importance which by no means belong to it.

The evil actually occasioned by sin is not of itself so great, that in order to prevent it, the highest good, spiritual personality and self-determination, should have been denied to man; for in that case in order to obviate the possibility of a *relative* evil, it would have been necessary to impose upon him something *absolutely* evil, viz. a mechanism incapable of morality. The highest end after which creation strives is the self-subsistent developing of moral natures. Evil should not be rendered impossible in it, but should be vanquished in manly conflict. Constrained uniformity and limitation of powers cannot in the least be reconciled with the highest view of a Divine Governor; and in the circumstance that God imparts to the creature a freedom which can manifest itself in opposition to Him, as well as in harmony and love, seems to lie the evidence not only of the highest power, but also of the Divine love and self-denial. Yet the influence and importance which belong to the evil actually springing from this striving against God, are both finite and circumscribed. Good only, as participant of the Divine nature, is indestructible and eternal. But evil arising as a kind of accompaniment in the formation and developement of finite powers

endowed with self-subsistence, is on this very account, so far as its actualness is concerned, merely a temporal phenomenon. But with its first appearance in a finite state commenced also a Divine method of salvation, which throughout all periods of the world has been gradually developing itself. By means of this redemptive plan the character of a Divine scheme remains perfectly vindicated for nature and for history ; and in a manner, too, which reconciles all apparent contradictions, in that it is conformable to the holiness and the goodness of the Creator, as well as to the freedom of the finite though not guiltless creature.

It is true in a very limited sense only that God permits sin or evil, or that he ever did permit it. In the whole circle of physical powers—the appropriate domain of might and natural energy—no one is able to point out any thing actually evil. Considered absolutely and in itself as an effect upon nature, an act could be regarded as evil, not simply when committed by an evil will striving against God, but when sufficiently powerful to operate destructively upon the system of the universe, to suspend the operation of the divine laws imposed upon it, and thus to counteract the efficient determinations of God himself. But no one has yet adduced any proof too show that an evil act has this power ; nor has the position been controverted that the world is upon the whole governed by good and not by evil powers. Yet the Good exercises one dominion in the circle of the physical, and another in that of the spiritual and moral powers. In

the latter there never does exist, and, according to our very conception of it, never did exist on the part of God, any physical constraint, and consequently no compulsory prevention of moral evil. But moral means of deliverance—by revelation, religion and efficient grace—as the only conceivable principles which could be brought to bear in this domain, are opposed to moral evil. God has not destroyed the essential character of the creature; and the latter abusing that freedom which was bestowed upon it no longer chooses the right alone, but is in a continual conflict between good and evil. But inasmuch as each individual's sphere of action is very much circumscribed, so also the evil which he may effect must be very limited; whilst on the other hand good, as participant of the Divine nature, on that account carries within itself the guarantee of final victory. On account of this peculiarity of good, Divine revelations, as illuminating phenomena, shine through the most ancient history—as phenomena, in which, together with the pervasion of supersensuous powers, the might and energy of good exhibited themselves as victorious. And from this very circumstance it is plain that with God there is no unconditional toleration of evil. Consequently with the outbreking of sin the infant race of man was by no means annihilated in its birth, but on the contrary sin itself was made the occasion of establishing a mode of regeneration which no one will find to be inappropriate, who thinks that the existence and continuance of humanity is at least sufferable, and who thinks the

redemption of the world more desirable than would have been its destruction.

Presumptuous as it may appear to wish to penetrate into the secrets of the Divine counsels ; and certain as it is that at this precise point there is opened up before the spirit a depth, into which it may look indeed, (though not without shuddering and terrour,) without yet being able to fathom it ; still with *him* who acknowledges God there can be no real doubts in reference to the final end of this history, for he feels assured that the powers that enter upon a finite state of being do all, though it may be in general, tend to one grand result. Every individual or particular being has actual existence conferred upon it because God must manifest himself. And from the fountain of eternal birth once opened up there burst forth every varied form ; and in the progressive formation and distinction of powers, upon the highest point of creation, where spiritual personality is developed and free powers operate, there also evil makes its appearance as an accompaniment arising from that formative process. Considered as evil, it is not that which the active powers of the world seek to attain as their end, but must rather be considered as that which is to be entirely separated through various clarifying processes,—as the dross which is to be more and more separated from the pure metal. Once separated, no longer in conflict or commixture with the good, evil ceases to be evil ; as after

a thorough separation the heterogeneous masses that remain no longer stand in a disturbing relation with the gold that has been obtained pure.

Every power strives after an end ; every course seeks to return into its beginning. The creature also seeks its beginning again ; yet without being at the end of its seeking merely the same that it was at the beginning. The conscious and personal being is only as it were raised to the state of individuality, in order that at the end he may, by the free self-subsistent direction of his own spirit, bring himself so to harmonize with the whole, as before creation in the peaceful depth of eternity, All Powers were as but One Power. Then will God be All and in All, when every creature without ceasing to have an individual existence shall yet find itself in willing accord and harmonious union with Him.

That now which here appears to be the end of the world's history, is at the same time the problem to be solved by every individual human life, in whom the laws of the Universal are Spiritually repeated. Correspondent to the voice of the indwelling conscience and of each one's reason are the particular Divine revelations made to man ; and these revelations are but so many evidences of a continual inter-communion between God and us, and are at the same time so many means of imparting light, and the power of a higher world, to those engaged in a free conflict with darkness. As the summit of all Divine revelation, but also as the Archetype of man and the Image of God, Christ stands forth in the midst

of the World's History. In him we recognize the sound and living germ around which a new spiritual creation is gradually formed, and from which also light and energy are continually streaming forth through all the arteries and veins of this new world, and whence they will forever continue to stream. This temporal state is not one rejected of God, but was rather chosen by Him as one in which moral natures might form themselves into harmony with the whole.

For dark matter also there is in reserve a higher transmutation and clarification, even a concord with the life of Spirits.

On the great circle which creation describes, this re-union of things marks the point where the end rests again upon the beginning ; and here God becomes All and in All. Yet even here things cease not to have their own separate existence ; but the Original Idea rather shines with unsullied lustre in Each Individual One.

But here we meet with objects of consideration, which, although not foreign to the present inquiry, yet seem worthy of a particular and not merely an incidental examination. Hence the author of the present treatise has long had the wish, and has formed the determination, if his situation should permit, to bestow upon them a more circumstantial examination at another time.¹

¹ The Author did not live to accomplish his purpose. TR.

APPENDIX.

A.

As the word Idea is of such constant use in Philosophy, the critical reader cannot but be pleased with the following extract. It is taken from an article of profound thought and learned research on Brown's Theory of Perception, and may be found in the Edinburgh Review for 1830. We could not conveniently embody it in the work, and have therefore thrown it into the appendix. The writer is commenting upon this passage in Brown's lectures on the Philosophy of Mind: "In the Philosophy of the Peripatetics, and in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of that system, *ideas* were truly considered as little images derived from objects without; and, as the word *idea* still continued to be used after this original meaning had been abandoned, (as it continues still, in all the works that treat of perception,) it is wonderful that many of the accustomed forms of expression, which were retained together with it should have been of a kind that, in their strict etymological meaning, might have seemed to harmonize more with the theory of ideas as images, which prevailed when these particular forms of expression originally became habitual, than with that of *ideas* as mere *states of the mind itself*;

since this is only what has happened with respect to innumerable other words, in the transmutations of meaning which they have received during the long progress of scientific inquiry. The idea, in the old philosophy, had been that, of which the presence immediately preceded the mental perception,—the direct external cause of perception ; and accordingly, it may well be supposed, that when the direct cause of perception was believed to be, not a foreign phantasm, but a peculiar affection of the sensorial organ, that word, which had formerly been applied to the supposed object, would still imply some reference to the organic state, which was believed to supply the place of the shadowy film, or phantasm, in being, what it had been supposed to be, the immediate antecedent of perception.” Lect. XXVI.

“ It is always unlucky to stumble on the threshold. The paragraph [quoted above] in which Dr. Brown opens his attack on Reid, contains more mistakes than sentences ; and the etymological discussion it involves, supposes as true, what is not simply false, but diametrically opposite to the truth, Among *other* errors—in the *first* place, the term ‘ *idea* ’ was never employed in any system, previous to the age of Descartes, to denote ‘ little images derived from objects without.’ In the *second*, it was never used in any philosophy, prior to the same period, to signify the immediate object of perception. In the *third*, it was not applied by the ‘ Peripatetics or Schoolmen,’ to express an object of human thought at all. In the *fourth*, ideas

(taking this term for *species*) were not 'in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of Aristotle,' regarded as '*little images derived from without*;' for a numerous party of the most illustrious schoolmen rejected *species*, not only in the *intellect*, but in the *sense*. In the *fifth* 'phantasm,' in 'the old philosophy,' was not the '*external cause of perception*' but the *internal object of imagination*. In the *sixth*, the term '*shadowy film*' which here and elsewhere he constantly uses, shows that Dr. Brown confounds the matterless species of the Peripatetics with the substantial effluxions of Democritus and Epicurus

Quæ, quasi *membranæ*, summo de cortice rerum
Dereptæ, volitant ultro citroque per auras.

Dr. Brown in short only fails, in illustrating against Reid the various meanings in which 'the old writers' employed the term *idea*, by the little fact, that the old writers never employed the term *idea* at all.

The history of the word *idea* seems completely unknown. Previous to the age of Descartes, as a philosophical term, it was employed exclusively by the Platonists,—at least exclusively in a Platonic meaning; and this meaning was *precisely the reverse* of that attributed to the word by Dr. Brown;—the *idea was not an object of perception*—the *idea was not derived from without*.—In the schools, so far from being a current *psychological* expression, as he imagines, it had no other application than a *theological*. Neither, after the revival of letters, was the term extended by the Aristotelians even to the objects of *intellect*. Melanc-

then indeed (who was a kind of semi-Platonist) uses it on *one* occasion as a synonyme for notion, or intelligible species (*De Anima*, p. 187, ed. 1555;) but it was even to this solitary instance, we presume, that Julius Scaliger alludes (*De Subtilitate*, VI, 4,) when he castigates such an application of the word as neoteric and abusive. ('Melanch.' is on the margin.)—We should have distinctly said that previous to its employment by *Descartes himself*, the expression had never been used as a comprehensive term for the immediate objects of thought, had we not in remembrance the *Historia Animæ Humanæ* of our countryman David Buchanan. This work, originally written in French, had for some years been privately circulated previous to its publication at Paris in 1636. Here we find the word *idea* familiarly employed, to express the objects, not only of intellect proper, but of memory, imagination, sense; and this is the earliest example of such an employment. For the *Discourse on Method* in which this term is used by Descartes in an equal latitude, was at least a year later in its publication—viz., in June 1637. Adopted soon after also by Gassendi, the word under such imposing patronage gradually won its way into general use. In England, however, Locke may be said to have been the first who naturalized the term in its Cartesian Universality. Hobbes employs it, and that historically, only once or twice; Henry More and Cudworth are very chary of it, even when treating of the Cartesian philosophy; [relatively to More this assertion is broadly incorrect.

His philosophic pages which he occupies with the higher forms of metaphysical discussion are literally *sprinkled* with the word *idea*.] Willis rarely uses it ; while Lord Herbert, Reynolds, and the English philosophers in general, between Descartes and Locke, do not apply it psychologically at all. When in common language employed by Milton and Dryden, *after* Descartes, as *before* him, by Sidney, Spenser, Shakespeare, Hooker, &c., the meaning is Platonic. Our Lexicographers are ignorant of the difference.

The fortune of this word is curious. Employed by Plato to express the real forms of the intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of the sensible ; it was lowered only when Descartes extended it to the objects of our consciousness in general. When, after Gassendi, the school of Condillac had analyzed our highest faculties into our lowest, the *idea* was still farther degraded from its high original. Like a fallen angel, it was relegated from the sphere of Divine intelligence, to the atmosphere of human sense ; till at last by a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, IDEOLOGIE (for IDEALOGIE,) a word which could only *properly* suggest an *a priori* scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from sensation.—Word and thing, *idea*, has been the *crux philosophorum*, since Aristotle cursed it to the present day ;—τὰς δὲ ἰδέας χαίρετω· περιττώματα γὰρ εἰσὶ.” Vol. LII. p. 181–3.

B.

The remarks in the text to which this note refers are evidently levelled against the theory of Kant, who, it is well known, maintained the doctrine of two reasons, or Reason under the twofold form of the Speculative and the Practical. *Speculative* reason strives to give unity and comprehension to all knowledge by classifying our ideas, and ranging them under particular heads, such as absolute substance, absolute cause, and the like. *Practical* reason aims to give unity and consistency to all our desires and the objects to which they are directed, by holding forth to our view ideas and principles which it generates; or it is the province of practical reason to subordinate our desires and conform them to the moral law. Reason, therefore, in so far as it has power to regulate our desiring faculty, is practical, because it does by that means determine our practice. That faculty which is susceptible of being directed to action through the determining power of reason is the Will. Practical Reason is therefore the same with Will.

Kant held that the pure reason is in possession of sciences, *a priori*, as mathematics and philosophy, which are grounded in the unconditioned, the absolute and the eternal. That these forms of cognition may from sense through the understanding be traced up to their fountain analytically, or may be evolved synthetically. He believed in the actualness of an outer

world, but declared that we can know nothing of it *in itself*; and of matter considered in itself he would not ever predicate *existence* in time and space. He asserted that all we can know of it are the phenomena of which we are conscious; these phenomena are in the mind, we cannot tell any thing about their essential character, and they succeed each other according to fixed laws of necessity. So in action, all that we know of freedom is our consciousness of it; we can tell nothing about it considered in and of itself. Freedom, in his system, is the only one among all the ideas of the speculative reason, which, without yet having an insight into it, we are able to know *a priori*, because it is the condition of the moral law with which we are acquainted. (In another place, however, we are told that the moral law is the only condition under which we can first *become conscious* of freedom. In order to reconcile this seeming contradiction we must bear in mind that with him Freedom is, indeed, the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, but that the moral law itself is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. For if the moral law were not distinctly developed in our reason and apprehended by it, we should never be justified in assuming the existence of freedom. And conversely, were there no freedom, we should never meet within us any such thing as the moral law.) The ideas of God and immortality are not conditions of the moral law, but they are only the conditions of a will determined by this law, that is, conditions merely of the practical employment of our pure reason. It is, therefore not only im-

possible for us to have any apprehension or insight into the actualness of these ideas, but we cannot even know any thing of their possibility. Still, however, their real existence must be ASSUMED for the behoof of moral action ; and it is sufficient for all practical purposes that they involve no impossibility nor inward contradiction. He therefore assumes freedom as a postulate of the practical reason, without clearly showing whether, in a higher and transcendental sense, it may not be under the law of a rigorous and unchanging necessity. It would seem, then, that all which Kant concedes to us physiologically and psychologically, is a series of conscious phenomena ; in the wide universe of being he has left nothing but a number of unknown quantities—of things in themselves nothing can be predicated, they are without form, and lie far beyond the circumference of human vision.

Tennemann in noticing Kant's Practical Reason speaks thus : Reason, however, is not merely theoretic, but is also *practical in the determination of the will*, by the ideas of duty and right. An examination of the conception of duty, and a good will in which even common reason places the highest worth of humanity, leads to a recognition of practical knowledge *a priori*, in which we find delineated or determined not *that which is*, but *that which should be*. The practical reason is autonomic [self-law-giving, *αὐτὸς νόμος*,] it determines only the form of the will, and pre-supposes freedom as a necessary condition. The moral law, in opposition to an empirically determined act of choice, exhibits itself un-



der the character of a *categorical imperative*, (an absolute Ought [unconditional duty]), and places itself at the very summit of the practical philosophy. As the universal rule of every rational will, this Imperative with stern necessity prescribes a *universal conformity to the law* [of duty]; and by that means it establishes the highest absolute end and motive of acting, which should not be a pathological feeling [mechanical or blind instinct,] but a reverence for the law, as *virtue* is the moral strength of a man's will in the pursuance of his duty, (that is, of moral compulsion by his law-giving reason,) or in the subordinating of his propensities and inclinations to reason. The ideas of God, of immortality and of freedom, obtain through the moral law reality and certainty. Yet this conviction of their certainty is no theoretic knowledge, but simply a *practical belief of reason*, (Moraltheologie). *Grundriss* § 383. p. 469, 470.

In order that Kant might be permitted to speak for himself on this point we have ventured to undertake the translation of a passage from his own writings.

Of the Idea of a Critic of the practical Reason.

The *theoretic* employment of reason busies itself merely with objects of the cognitive faculty, and a Critic of Reason, when considered in reference to this employment, properly treats, only of the *pure* faculty of cognition, because this at once awakens the suspicion, which is also subsequently confirmed, that it may easi-

ly lose itself in striving after objects unattainable and beyond its own boundaries, or amid conceptions altogether conditionous of each other. The case, however, is entirely otherwise in respect of the *practical* use of reason. In this latter employment the reason is occupied with the grounds of determining the Will, which is a faculty that in outward acts is able to embody objects corresponding to subjective representations, or at least it has power to determine itself towards the actualizing of these representations, (whether the physical ability may be sufficient for the accomplishment or not,) that is, it can establish its own causality. For the reason can at least attain to the Will's determination, and only in so far as it is concerned with the act of willing does it possess objective reality. Here then rises the first question: Is the pure reason of itself alone sufficient for the determination of the will, [does it determine the will], or is it a ground of determination only as an empirically conditioned reason?

But here now there enters into the account a conception of causality justified by a Critic of the pure Reason, but susceptible of no empirical delineation, namely, the conception of *Freedom*; and could we here discover reasons to prove that this attribute does in fact belong to the human will, (and therefore also to the will of every rational being,) it would thereby be shown not only that the pure reason *may* be practical, but that it alone, and not the empirically circumscribed reason, *is* practical in an unconditional manner. Con-

sequently we would have no occasion to elaborate a Critic of the *pure* practical Reason, but simply of the *practical* Reason in general. For pure Reason, when it is in the first place proved that there is such, stands in no need of a Critic. It is that which contains within itself the standard, (measuring-line, Richtschnur,) of a Critic in respect to all its different employments. It therefore becomes obligatory upon a Critic of the practical reason generally, to keep back the empirically conditioned reason from arrogating to itself the claim that it alone in an exclusive way is to furnish the ground of the will's determination. The use of the pure reason, if it is once made out that there is such, is simply immanent; but the empirically conditioned employment, which arrogates to itself the sole executive dominion, is on the contrary transcendent, and manifests itself in requisitions and commands which ascend up above its sphere. This relation is directly the opposite of that which can be predicated of the pure reason in its speculative employment.

Meanwhile, since it is still always pure reason, the cognition of which here lies as the basis of the practical use, so, in its general features, the division or distribution of a Critic of the practical reason must be graduated conformably to that of the speculative. We must, therefore, have in it a *Doctrine of Elements* and a *Doctrine of Method*, as in that of the speculative Reason. In the first part is required an Analytic, as a rule of truth, and a Dialectic as an exhibition and a solution of the phenomena exhibited in judgments of the

practical reason. But in the subdivisions of the Analytic the order must be the reverse of that which it is in the Critic of the pure Speculative Reason. In the present case, (practical reason,) beginning with fundamental principles we proceed first to conceptions, and then where it is possible, to the senses ; but in the speculative reason, on the contrary, we must commence with the senses, and end with fundamental principles. The ground of this again lies herein : that at present we have to do with a will, and have to consider the reason not in relation to objects, but in relation to this will and its causality ; since the fundamental principles of the empirically unconditioned causality necessarily constitute the beginning, after which the attempt can first be made to fix firmly our conceptions of the determining ground of such a will in its application to objective ends, and finally in its application to the subject, and the subject's sensitive faculty. The law of causality proceeding from freedom, that is, from some pure practical fundamental principle, here inevitably constitutes the beginning, and establishes the objective ends to which alone it can be directed. *Critik der pract. Vernunft. Einleit.*

C.

Concerning knowledge ; *Behold*, saith Moses, *I have set before you this day good and evil, life and death.* Concerning Will, he addeth immediately, *Choose life* ; that is to say, the things that tend unto life, them choose. But of one thing we must have

special care, as being a matter of no small moment, and that is, how the Will, properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred unto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferior natural desire which we call Appetite. The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, and such like, being as it were the sundry forms and fashions of Appetite, can neither arise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no. Whereas actions which issue from a disposition of the Will, are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will's Solicitor, and the Will is Appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject. Neither is any other desire termed properly Will, but that where Reason and Understanding, or the shew of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired. It may be therefore a question whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible provoketh Appetite, and Appetite causeth action, Reason being never called to counsel; as when we eat or drink, and betake ourselves unto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men, having attained to the use of Reason, are voluntary: for as the authority of higher powers hath force even in those

things which are done without their privity, and are of so mean reckoning, that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not: in like sort, voluntarily we are said to do that also, which the Will, if it listed, might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressly use our Reason or Understanding, and so immediately apply our Wills thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the Will doth yield her assent, as it were, with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparent as in express mandates or prohibition, especially upon advice and consultation going before. Where Understanding therefore needeth, in those things Reason is the director of Man's Will, by discovering in action what is good. For Laws of well-doing are the dictates of right Reason. *Hooker Eccles. Pol. B. I.*

D.

As the Ideas of the Deity, and of the Perfect, constitute the first and the last truths of Philosophy as well as of Religion, and as the views advanced by our author are oftentimes controverted, it will be interesting to hear what two of England's greatest scholars and thinkers have said on the point.

"It is true, indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fullness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency of its brightness;

but for the very same reason it may be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet it is notwithstanding far more visible also than any of the *nebulosæ stellæ*, the small misty stars. Where there is more of light there is more of visibility ; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is more of conceptibility and cognoscibility ; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility ; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity ; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain, on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe ; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look through and through, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them ; then could there be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For

though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been taken by Aristotle *γαῖα μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν* &c. that by earth we see earth, by water, water, and by fire, fire ; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves : yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophic poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection of our narrow understandings must make them asymetral, or incommensurate, to that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect." *Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. of the Universe.* Lond. 1820 Vol. III. p. 221-3.

" 1. Those who deny Infinity in God, must necessarily attribute it to something else, as to infinite Space, infinity of succession of ages and persons, if the world were eternal ; and therefore it is most unreasonable to reject any notion for that which it is impossible, but if I deny that, I must attribute it to something else, to whose Idea it is far less proper than it is to God's. 2. Lest I should rather seek to avoid the argument than to satisfy it, I say, that though infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet may we clearly and distinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature that no limits can be assigned to it, as to its Power or Presence ; which is as much as to understand it to be infinite. The *ratio formalis* of Infinity may not be understood clearly and distinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity itself cannot be on

this account, because however positive we apprehend it, yet we always apprehend it in a negative way, because we conceive it by denying all limitations and bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a Positive Manner, although not adequately, because we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and distinctly see the sea, though we cannot discover the bounds of it; so may we clearly and distinctly apprehend some Perfections of God when we fix our minds on them, although we are not able to grasp them altogether in our narrow and confined intellects, because they are infinite. Thus we see that God's Infinity doth not at all abate the clearness and distinctness of the notion which we have of God; so that though the perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnance at all to men's natural faculties, to have a settled Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect in their minds.

It seems highly probable and far more consonant to Reason than the contrary, that this Idea of God upon the mind of man, is no merely fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whose Idea it is, and therefore doth suppose a reality in the thing correspondent to that objective reality which is in the understanding. For although I am not so well satisfied that the mere objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly considered in itself, because of the unlimited power of the understanding in conception: yet I say considering that Idea in all the circumstances of it,

it seems highly probable that it is no mere *ens rationis*, or figment of the understanding : and that will appear on these considerations : 1. This Idea is of such a nature as could not be framed from the understanding's consideration of any corporeal phantasms. Because whatever hath any thing of matter in it, involves of necessity many imperfections along with it ; for every part of matter is divisible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to natural light that it is a greater perfection not to be divisible than to be so. Besides, corporeal phantasms are so far from helping us in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a distinct conception of it, while we attend to them ; because these bear no proportion at all to such a Being. So that this Idea however must be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore supposing there were no other Faculty in man but imagination, it would bear the greatest repugnancy to our conceptions, and it would be according to the principles of Epicurus and some modern philosophers, a thing wholly impossible to form an Idea of God, unless with Epicurus we imagine him to be corporeal, which is to say he is no God. Which was the reason that Tully said Epicurus did only, *nomine ponere, re tollere deos*, because such a notion of God is repugnant to natural light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abstract from corporeal phantasms, it thereby appears that there is a higher Faculty in man's soul than mere imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends to an infinite object should come, but from an Infinite

Being: especially if we consider; Secondly, That the understanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by distinct acts first collect one perfection, and then another, and at last unite these together, but the simplicity and unity of all these perfections is as necessarily conceived as any of them. Granting then that the understanding by the observing of several perfections in the world, might be able to abstract these severally from each being wherein they were, yet whence should the Idea of the Unity and the Inseparability of all these Perfections come? The mind may, it is true, knit some things together in fictitious ideas, but then those are so far from unity with each other, that in themselves they speak mutual repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper *entia rationis*, but these several perfections are so far from speaking repugnancy to each other that the Unity and Inseparability of them is as necessary to the forming of this Idea, as any other perfection whatsoever. So that hence it appears that the consideration of the perfections which are in the creatures, is only an occasion given to the mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea itself depends upon those perfections as the causes of it: as in the clearest *mathematical* truths the manner of demonstration may be necessary to help the understanding to its clear assent, though the things in themselves be undoubtedly true. 3. It appears that this is no merely fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all persons who have freed themselves from the entanglements of corporeal phantasms. Those we call *entia rationis*, we find by

experience in our minds that they are formed *ad placitum*, we may imagine them as many ways as we please ; but we see it is quite otherwise in this Idea of God ; for in those attributes or perfections which by the light of nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform consent in all those who have divested their minds of corporeal phantasms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a Being absolutely Perfect, there hath been no dissent in the perfections which have been attributed to it ; none have questioned but that infinite Wisdom, Goodness and Power, joined with necessity of existence, have been all implied in this idea. It is hardly conceivable there should be so universal a consent of minds in this Idea, were it not a natural result from the free use of our Reason and Faculties." *Bishop Stillingfleet's Origines Sacræ*, B.III. ch. I. V. VI. p. 234—6.

E.

Even now there are not a few, on whose convictions it will not be unfluencive to know, that the power by which men are led to the truth of things, instead of the appearances, was deemed and entitled the living and substantial Word of God by the soundest of the Hebrew Doctors ; that the eldest and most profound of the Greek philosophers demanded assent to their doctrine, mainly as *θρησκεία παραδότου*, i. e. a traditionary wisdom that had its origin in inspiration :

that those men referred the same power to the *πῦρ λειζων ὑπὸ διοικοῦντος ΛΟΓΟΥ*; and that they were scarcely less express than their scholar Philo Judæus, in their affirmations of the Logos, as no mere attribute or quality, no mode of abstraction, no personification, but literally and mysteriously Deus alter et idem.

The very same truth [that the Life is the Light of men] is found in a fragment of the Ephesian Heraclitus, preserved by Stobæus, and in somewhat different words by Diogenes Laertius. *Ξὺν νόῳ λεγόντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ἕκυνῳ πάντων· τρεφόνται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπινοι νόοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ (Λογοῦ) κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει, καὶ ἐξαρχεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.* TRANSLATION :—To discourse rationally (=if we would render the discursive understanding "*discourse of Reason*") it behoves us to derive strength from that which is common to all men : (=the light that lighteth every man.) For all human understandings are nourished by the one Divine Word, whose power is commensurate with his will, and is sufficient for all and overfloweth (=shineth in darkness, and is not contained therein, or comprehended by darkness.) *Aids to Reflection*, p. 387, 8.

The learned Cudworth in the preface to his great work speaks thus : "Moreover we have in the fourth chapter, largely insisted also upon the Trinity. The reason whereof was, because it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pagan theology, it being certain that the Platonics and Pythagoreans, at least, if

not other Pagans also, had their Trinity as well as Christians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of these two together : upon which occasion we take notice of a double Platonic Trinity ; the one spurious and adulterated of some later Platonists : the other true and genuine, of Plato himself, Parmenides, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be opposed by us to the Christian Trinity and confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that, do we find a wonderful correspondence : which is largely pursued in the Platonic Christian apology. Wherein, notwithstanding, nothing must be looked upon as dogmatically asserted by us, but only offered and submitted to the judgment of the learned in these matters ; we confining ourselves in this mysterious point of the Holy Trinity, within the compass of these its three essentials declared :—First, that it is not a trinity of mere names or words, or of logical notions only ; but of persons or hypostases.—Secondly, that none of those persons or hypostases are creatures, but all uncreated.—And, lastly, that they are all three, truly and really One God. Nevertheless we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiously insist upon this argument, because of our then designed defence of Christianity ; we conceiving that this parallelism, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonic and the Christian Trinity, might be of some use to satisfy those amongst us, who boggle so much at the trinity, and look upon it as the choke-pear of Christianity ; when they shall find that the freest wits amongst the Pagans, and the best philosophers, who

had nothing of superstition to determine them that way, were so far from being shy of such an hypothesis, as that they were even fond thereof.—* * * True, indeed, our belief of the Holy Trinity is founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation ; it being that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and revealed religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or *mormo* in it, which even Pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncaptivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.” Vol. I, p. 60–2.

It should perhaps be mentioned here, that some recent German writers have endeavoured to show that the Idea of a Trinity is not to be found in the writings of Plato. Yet even if this were true it would not disprove the principle involved in the preceding remarks. For in addition to the traces of a trinity in a Divine Being current among the Jews of Alexandria and the Platonists, there are many other indications of the same in all the East, particularly among the Indians and Egyptians ; which is proof sufficient that this doctrine, whencesoever it may have been first derived, whether from outward or inward revelation, or from tradition, is not so repugnant to the principles and the belief of the human mind. Indeed

Neander says that “The Idea of a God *not wrapt up in himself*, but *manifesting himself*—without which there could be found no perfect revelation of God,—nay, of a God *imparting even his own essence*, is the fundamental Idea of Christianity, and also the BASIS OF ALL LIVING THEISM.” Alg. Kircheng. B. II. abt. II. p. 789.

If, as some maintain, the Idea of the Trinity so far transcends the apprehension of all finite faculties, and if yet this doctrine be found in the Bible, we might ask whether the Prophets and Apostles who were the instruments of communicating this revelation had any distinct apprehension of it? And if so, were they still *men*? If it be necessary that a super-human agency be brought to bear upon the mind in order to enable it to apprehend the doctrine of the Trinity, do all enjoy that Divine aid, or do they not? If not, is that doctrine a truth for them? Or, if the mind in itself or in conjunction with those supernatural influences vouchsafed to all, had not a capacity or adaptedness to the apprehension of the highest spiritual truths, could those truths be communicated to it by writing or verbal address? Can an ape be brought to apprehend the principles of mathematics? And why?

Plotinus, as quoted by Coleridge, says: “To those to whose imagination it has never been presented, how beautiful is the countenance of justice and wisdom; and that neither the morning nor the evening star is so fair. For, in order to direct the view aright, it behoves that the beholder should have made himself congenerous and simi-

lar to the object beheld. Never could the eye have beheld the sun, had not its own essence been soliform," (*that is, pre-configured to light by a similarity of essence with that of light,*) "neither can a soul not beautiful attain to an intuition of beauty." Nor, we may add, can a mind in its nature not adapted to form an Idea of the Trinity, ever attain to an apprehension of the Trinity. On the use of Reason in Religion Quenstedt aptly remarks: "Sine usu rationis nemo in theologia versari potest; neque enim brutis aut animalibus, rationis expertibus, proponenda est theologia. Uti itaque homo sine oculis non potest videre, sine auribus non potest audire, ita sine ratione, sine qua ne quidem homo est, non potest percipere, quæ fides complectitur. With Saurin, Bayle believed that the christian doctrines accord with reason, but that human reason cannot perceive this accordance. He did not doubt but that the mysteries of christianity were conformable to the high absolute reason of God, but he believed that the small imperfect part of reason communicated to man is not sufficient to afford him an insight into that agreement. Leibnitz held that the mysteries of the christian faith are not *opposed* to reason but *above* it. He made two classes of truths, the one eternal and necessary, the opposite of which would be a contradiction; and the other positive truths, or those laws which God, according to his own wisdom and goodness, imposed upon creation. Nothing can contradict the former, and therefore nothing can be absolutely *opposed* to reason; the latter may be subordinated to higher

grounds, and consequently some things may be *above* our reason. He thought also that much confusion arose from confounding the words to *comprehend* and to *explain*. Les mystères surpassent notre raison, car ils contiennent des vérités qui ne sont comprises dans cet enchainement ; mais ils ne sont point contraires à notre raison, et ne contredisent à aucune des vérités où cet enchainement nous peut mener.

Il y a souvent un peu de confusion dans les expressions de ceux qui commettent ensemble la philosophie et la theologie, ou la foi et la raison ; ils confondent *expliquer, comprendre, prouver, soutenir*. Les mystères se peuvent *expliquer*, autant qu'il faut pour les croire ; mais on ne les sauroit *comprendre*, ni faire entendre *comment* ils arrivent. On this subject generally, many remarks rich in thought and profound may be seen in Twisten's *Dogmatik*, B. I. ss. 463-496. Without an outward revelation correspondent to the law written upon the heart, in order that the former might serve to elicit the latter and awaken it to life, and without supernatural or Divine influences to enable him to rise above himself and to withstand the promptings of an inward depravity as well as to attain to clear intuitions of objects spiritual and unseen, forlorn indeed were man. And although, compared with the full-orbed day of Christianity, Paganism was but the dark night of religion, still on examination we shall find that night to have been studded with twinkling and heavenly stars,

F.

The prominence which our author concedes to Schelling, and the little that is known of him in this country, will be a sufficient justification for our dwelling with the more particularity upon him. He is universally allowed to have been a thinker of great depth and originality. But at the same time that this acknowledgement is made, and whilst some of the most judicious writers in Germany admit their indebtedness to him, they yet charge his philosophy with being essentially pantheistic, and accuse him of radical error in many of his fundamental principles. The annexed description of himself and his system by one of his own countrymen, although partaking somewhat of the character of the humorous, will be read with interest. After speaking of Fichte and various others of Schelling's predecessors, the writer proceeds :

Now came Schelling. He sought not so much to balance accurately the opposition between the Subjective and the Objective, as to deduce from their original union, (identity,) the Philosophy of Identity, of which the two poles are the philosophy of Being, (philosophy of nature,) and the philosophy of Knowing, (transcendental Idealism.) He was a bright phenomenon, perhaps the most distinguished that has ever appeared in the domain of philosophy. Who has not at least a general knowledge of the views of Schelling? In the mean time, however, it must not be con-

cealed, that in antiquity as well as in the middle ages, kindred spirits announced kindred theories, yet not with the same fulness or systematic completion as has been done by him. Even in the antiquity of Greece we find already the doctrine of One in All, (or all in one,) and the same doctrine existed still earlier in the East. Then in the middle ages, what a kindredness of views do we find to have been held by Scotus Erigena, by Gerson, by Giordano Bruno, whom Schelling himself has recently called forth from his darkness, and finally, by that mystic of all mystics, Jacob Boehman! And besides, without Fichte, or even without Kant, what would Schelling have been? Still, however, although outward stimuli were brought to bear upon him, and his growing mind was nourished by nutrition received from others, yet he possessed an individual and inward power, a living activity; he was endowed with an energy and a union of intuitive thought or thinking intuition, (*eine Verbindung des schauenden Denkens, oder denkenden Schauens,*) in a manner and to a degree that was imparted to no other thinker of that period so rich in men of thought. Nevertheless, has this man of Genius conducted any farther than to pantheism? It would be difficult to show that he has, and therefore he has only reached that goal which in the East is the starting-point of philosophical speculations. Now these oriental speculations in destroying the conception of a creation, annihilate also the conception of a holy Creator and Lord of the world; or in other words, if the Divine revelation contained in the sacred

history be true, they put falsehood in the place of truth. But this Oriental pantheism being once received, how does the pantheism of Schelling differ from it? And wherein consists the distinction between the former, and the doctrine of All in One, or the doctrine of Identity? But grant that they are true, and what advantage accrues to our knowledge from the genial speculations of Schelling, or what farther insight do we receive from the no less genial speculations of the old East? They teach us to know neither the All nor the One, but we must rest satisfied with empty postulates and hollow formulas, of which the highest and the ultimate is that $A=A$. [Absolute Identity alone *is*, and besides it there is in fact nothing else; consequently also there is nothing which is *in itself* really finite. All things that *are*, are but the Absolute Identity and its developed being; for the opposites, as the *Impression*, the *Sides*, the *Poles* of the Absolute, do yet derive their existence from it, and are only distinguished now by the preponderance of the Ideal and now of the Real, (duplicity, polarity,) and these again become unified, (indifferenced,) through *Totality*. Identity in Triplicity is the law of developement. This derivation of existence, or these developed forms of being, is at one time called a *Dualizing*, (a distinguishing, a differencing,) of the Absolute, and again it is called *Self-revelation*. Through this self-revelation absolute cognition is also rendered possible; and Reason itself, in so far as it is *absolute*, constitutes the identity of the ideal and the real. The Form of the

essence of the Absolute, is the absolute act of knowing, in which identity, unity, passes over into duplicity, $A=A.$]

Notwithstanding all the intellectual intuition [The absolute identity of the Subjective and the Objective constitutes the essence of the Absolute=God. Through an *absolute* act of cognition, in which the subjective and the objective become identical, is the Absolute known. This cognitive act is termed intellectual intuition, *intellectuelle Anschauung.*] of Schelling, from the Starry Heavens on high down to the small blade of grass upon the earth, the energy and Creative power of the All-Seeing One is entirely concealed from our view. And the All-Seeing himself, does he exhibit his countenance in this Philosophy of Identity? He before whom hosts of angels—if revelation does not deceive us—continually cry aloud, Holy, Holy, Holy, does He obey the magic call of the Philosopher and stand before us in his grandeur and in his glory, and at the same time in his mercy and compassion towards the weak race of man? The Philosopher does not think on poverty of spirit, nor on the feebleness of man; but as a young Lion rather he bounds forward exulting in his might. And well might he do so, since a God and a Universe simultaneously, or rather a God and a Universe one and the same, One in Two, spring forth from the thinker's head;—an act which may be compared with that of Jupiter's in giving birth to the Goddess of Wisdom, when Minerva leapt forth from his head armed and mailed against every opposing foe.

It is well known how warmly the Philosophy of the Absolute went forth armed with Sword and Lance to withstand its opposers to the face.

We may calmly acknowledge, however, that no one of these opposers ever attained to the height of Schelling ; for it is much easier to find fault with that which has been created than to call it into being. Does not the nasal-twanged Jurist whom Goethe mentions in his biography, say " I have detected imperfections even in God himself ? " Why then should Schelling have remained unattacked ? Who is not open to attack in some part ? [Even Achilles, though plunged into the Styx by the Goddess Thetis, was still not invulnerable in the heel.] But notwithstanding the opposition which Schelling had to encounter, on the other hand he found more disciples, followers and imitators, than any of his cotemporaries or predecessors in the New Philosophy ; and those who with views either apparently or actually of a contrary tenour opposed themselves to him, even they, as if involuntarily, did still imbibe his spirit. HEINROTH'S *Pisteodicee*, s. 312-314.

ERRATA.

Page 16	line 14	from	top	for	"principle"	read	<i>principal.</i>
" 21	" 8	"	"	"	in being	"	<i>inbeing.</i>
" 46	" 5	"	"	insert	<i>the</i> before	"	<i>understanding."</i>
" 65	" 11	"	"	for	"effect"	read	<i>effort.</i>
" 83	" 13	"	bottom	"	"remain"	"	<i>remains.</i>
" 84	" 2	"	"	"	"end"	"	<i>and.</i>
" 88	" 10	"	"	"	" <i>ηλονται</i> "	"	<i>καλοῦνται.</i>
" 92	" 2	"	top	"	receives	"	<i>receive.</i>
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